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Abstract

Three Essays on Crime
by
Hernán Botero Degiovanni
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
West Virginia University
Stratford Douglas, Ph.D., Chair
In this dissertation, I use the tools of economics to analyze two forms of crime –
property and violent crime–in order to investigate three specific incentives that induce them. First, I develop a property crime model with secondary markets for stolen
durable goods where agents can be thieves who steal durable goods to consume or
exchange them for a profit, and non-thieves who can also demand stolen durable
goods in the secondary market. The results indicate that the government must focus
their resources to capture thieves on the streets in order to minimize their number
in the economy. They also indicate that when the government focuses its efforts to
control stolen property traders, the price of a stolen durable good increases, which
in turn increases the number of thieves who want to consume the good. Second,
I study the relationship between property crime and minimum drug consumption
requirements. I use a crime model with an exogenous income distribution to determine the government’s optimal drug supply control in the presence of drug addicts
who might be induced to commit property crime to satisfy their minimum requirement of drug consumption. If the government does not have a budget constraint and
aims to reduce the percentage of thieves in the economy, the minimum percentage
of thieves is reached when the government spends on capturing thieves and not on
seizing narcotics. If the government has a budget constraint and intends to minimize
its expenditure on enforcement, minimum expenditure requirements make the government spend on both capturing thieves and seizing narcotics. This occurs when
the government’s budget is not enough to control the optimal percentage of thieves.
Once the government has enough revenue to attain that optimal number, it subsidizes
drug consumption. Finally, using the altitude of each municipality and distance from
capital cities as sources of exogenous variation, I estimate the effect of drug enforcement on violence in Colombia. To test the latter hypothesis, I use drug and violence
information on Colombian municipalities during the period 1999 − 2010. The results
seem to indicate that both the Colombian government’s enforcement activities and
the war among drug dealers are important sources of violence in the country.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Crime is a very complex phenomenon that can be manifested in different forms
and incentivized in a variety of ways. In this dissertation, I use the tools of economics
to analyze two forms of crime – property1 and violent crime– to investigate three
specific incentives that induce them. With regard to property crime, in chapter 2, I
develop a model of property crime with secondary markets for stolen durable goods
where agents face various decisions at different stages. First, they decide whether to
become a criminal or not. Next, criminals decide whether to consume or sell the stolen
durable goods in a secondary market, and non-criminals decide whether to buy legal
or stolen durable goods. In this scenario, the government can target law enforcement
activities to capture criminals in flagranti or monitor the illegal transactions that take
place in the secondary market. The chapter studies the different types of equilibria
that would arise from different combinations of law enforcement activities. Here,
property crime arises from intertemporal incentives to consume stolen property.
In chapter 3, I study the relationship between property crime and minimum drug
consumption requirements. A crime model with an exogenous income distribution
is used to determine the government’s optimal drug supply control in the presence
1

Property crime can also be a violent crime. I am abstracting from this feature of property
crime to focus attention on the economic incentives behind this type of crime without explicitly
modeling the victims’ costs associated to violence. In spite of the fact that these costs might be
very important from a victim’s perspective, they depend on the victim’s valuation of being subject
to criminal activities, which might be uncorrelated with the economic incentives behind property
crime. As a result, I abstract from these costs to avoid considering these subjective valuations in
this initial analysis. The introduction of these costs will be left for future research.
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of drug addicts who, in equilibrium, might be induced to commit property crime to
satisfy their minimum requirement of drug consumption. This model enables us to
interpret a positive percentage of drug control as a tax and a negative percentage
as a subsidy. If the government does not have a budget constraint and aims to reduce the percentage of thieves in the economy, the minimum equilibrium percentage
of thieves is reached when the government spends on capturing thieves and not on
seizing narcotics. If the government has a budget constraint and intends to minimize
its expenditure on enforcement, minimum expenditure requirements make the government spend on both capturing thieves and seizing narcotics. This occurs when
the government’s budget is not enough to control the optimal percentage of thieves.
Once the government has enough revenue to attain that optimal number of thieves,
it subsidizes drug consumption.
In the case of violent crime, in chapter 4, the strategy of Mejia and Restrepo, 2011
is used to disentangle the causal relationship between drug enforcement and violence.
To test this relationship, I use information on Colombian municipalities during the
period 1999 − 2010. Due to technological reasons related to the quality of terrain,
climate, and locational characteristics of the Colombian territory, cocaine production
is more productive at low altitudes. Using the altitude of each municipality and
distance from capital cities as sources of exogenous variation, I estimate the effect
of drug enforcement on violence in Colombia. The results seem to indicate that the
Colombian government’s enforcement activities generate violence and displacements.
Yet, the war that take place among drug dealers is also an important source of violence
in the country.
This dissertation contributes to the economic literature in at least three aspects.
First, it formally determines the conditions under which a durable good is stolen
when the economy is inhabited by risk-neutral individuals who can target the good
either to consume or sell. This analysis allows us to ascertain which factors affect
individuals’ decisions to engage in property crime of a durable good and for what
purpose. Second, it shows that when the economy is inhabited by individuals with
lexicographic preferences with respect to the single composite drug commodity in the
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economy, drug control policies operate in an environment of risk-lover individuals
who can be induced to crime by their addiction. In this environment, if drug control
policies do not generate a sufficiently large equilibrium drug price, it might induce
addicts to crime. Finally, it introduces a set of valid exogenous sources of variation to
test whether drug enforcement increases violence or not. This analysis also allows us
to test whether a policy targeted to reduce an externality might create another one.

4

Chapter 2
Property Crime and Secondary
Markets
2.1

Introduction

The application of choice theory under uncertainty to the analysis of crime has
gained wide attention in economics since the seminal paper of Becker, 1968. Traditional models on crime, however, do not consider explicitly the nature of the goods
being targeted by criminals nor the existence of secondary markets for stolen goods
on individual criminal behavior.
Traditional models of crime assume that individuals make criminal decisions based
on three factors: payoff of the activity 1 , risk of the activity

2

and the individuals’

risk aversion and preference structure, summarized in each individual’s utility function. These models are based on three further technical assumptions: first, criminals
and non-criminals are matched randomly. Second, payoffs from illegal activities are
assumed to be a lump-sum transfer of wealth from non-criminals to criminals.
1

Traditionally, models on this literature assume that any non-monetary payoff has an equivalent,
convertible monetary payoff from an individual perspective. These payoffs are net of the monetary
costs incurred if a criminal is captured and the dis-utility of imprisonment and/or fine.
2
Which is understood as the probability of capture posed by the government on criminals. It is a
probability that depends generally on the amount of resources spent by the government on on-street
police and prosecution, and the number of thieves. Several functions have been proposed in the
literature to capture this functional relationship, but there is not a consensus on which is the best
specification(e.g., see the survey by Pyle, 1983 on the discussion around the empirical specification
of this technology).
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Third, the government maximizes a social welfare function, composed of both
criminal and non-criminal individual utilities, subject to the costs of police on the
streets, prosecutors, court personnel, plus the harm that criminals cause when they
commit a crime, if any. The control variables for the government are a combination
of the sanctioning rule (strict or fault-based), form of sanction (monetary vs nonmonetary), and magnitude of the sanction with the probability of capture.3
These technical assumptions have been considered in the literature as not representing real life appropriately, so contributions have been focused on improving
them.4 An assumption that has generally left untouched is monetary illegal payoffs.
Despite of the fact that criminals ultimately might desire an amount of money to
satisfy their specific preferences, criminals do not always target cash. At least, that
is what the definitions of burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft indicate and what
the international statistical information on these crimes strikingly show.5
3

For references on applications of the model of Becker, 1968 to a diversity of issues around the combination of sanctioning rules, forms of sanction and its magnitudes,
see Allingham and Sandmo, 1972, Ehrlich, 1973, Heineke, 1978, Heineke and Darrough, 1978,
Heineke, 1988, Polinsky and Shavell, 1979, Polinsky and Shavell, 1984, Shavell, 987a, Shavell, 987b,
Polinsky and Shavell, 1991, Kaplow, 1990, Kaplow and Shavell, 1994, Wilde, 1992, among others.
For a thorough summary of the deterrence hypothesis and its main results, see Eide, 1994,
Garoupa, 2007, Shavell, 2004 and Polinsky and Shavell, 2007
4
See Fender, 1999 and Garoupa, 2001 on endogenous probability of capture,
Hung and Marceau, 1993, Hui-Wen and Png, 1994 and Helsley and Strange, 2005 on private
security provision, Lochner, 2004 on human capital and crime, Imrohoroglu et al., 2000 and
Merlo, 2003 on the political economics of income distribution and crime, Goff and Tollison, 1993
on control policies that induce crime, Deutsch et al., 1987, Chiu and Madden, 1998,
Dixit, 2003, Burnham et al., 2004 and Rattner and Portnov, 2007 on criminals choosing spatially their victims, Marceu, 1997 on local government competition and crime deterrence,
Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2004 on social networks and crime, Burdett et al., 2004 on unemployment and crime, and finally, Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1997 on organized crime.
5
For a thorough statistical report on criminal activities on the world from UNODC, see: International Statistics on Crime and Justice at UNITED NATIONS, 2012. The definition used for United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for burglary: it “means gaining un-authorized access
to a part of a building/dwelling or other premises; including by use of force; with the intent to steal
goods (breaking and entering)”. UNODC do not present a separate definition and measurement of
a variable larceny due to the fact that there are countries such as Norway that provides information
on burglary including some cases that could be defined as larceny in some other legislations, and
on which there is separate statistical information, such as in U.S.. In this last case, for the Bureau
of Justice Statistics larceny means: “the unlawful taking of property other than a motor vehicle
from the possession of another, by stealth, without force or deceit. This includes pocketpicking,
nonforcible purse snatching, shoplifting, and thefts from motor vehicle”. In turn, for UNODC Motor Vehicle Theft:“ means the removal of a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner of the
vehicle. ‘Motor Vehicles’ includes all land vehicles with an engine that run on the road, including
cars, motorcycles, buses, lorries, construction and agricultural vehicles.(UN-CTS M4.4)”
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Several questions arise from the facts presented in the report on crime and justice
elaborated by UNODC: Why do criminals steal goods? Which good do they target?
Why do they target those goods and not others? Several criminology studies on UK
and USA have tried to give an empirical answer to what makes a good attractive
to thieves (Cohen and Felson, 1979, Clarke, 1999 and Sutton et al., 2008). This literature has even crafted the acronym CRAVED to refer to six elements that make
a product attractive or “hot” to thieves: concealable, removable, available, valuable,
enjoyable and disposable.
Enjoyable and disposable refer to the preference structure of both criminals and
non-criminals for a specific good, and the potential existence of a secondary market
for its illegal trade. Available and concealable pertain to a technical feature of a “hot”
good: it must endure on time in order to be able to be stored and then, consumed at
a later period. Removable refers to the technology that the security agencies have at
hand to combat property crime: if a good can be stolen and re-sold easily, without
the security agencies being perfectly effective in controlling these transactions, that
good might become a “hot” good. Finally, valuable is related to how costly a new or
legal good is relative to its stolen counterpart: if a new good is too expensive relative
to the stolen one, that good might also potentially become a “hot” product.
In other words, according to this literature, criminals target highly demanded (by
both criminals and non-criminals) and expensive durable goods for which the enforceability of its property rights by the government is imperfect. Despite its insightful
conclusions, the authors of these studies recognize that there is not a sound theoretical
background on which we can determine the extent to which each of the aforementioned factors influence the likelihood of a good of becoming a “hot” product.
In this paper, I introduce an illegal secondary market for durable goods in a model
of property crime. A durable good is a good that does not rapidly depreciate, or
equivalently, a good that gives utility to consumer(s) over time. For example, jewelery
could be considered a perfectly durable good because it should theoretically never
wears out; other goods such as refrigerators, cars, or mobile phones usually continue
to be useful for a limited period of time of use. The analysis of durable goods is a
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well established topic in industrial organization theory.6 A common theme in this
literature is that new durable goods always compete with used ones of older vintages
of the same kind. This occurs because individuals have economic incentives to demand
and supply used durable goods in a secondary market.7
In the model constructed in this paper, the secondary market is formed by individuals who rationally decide to become criminals, steal durable goods, and supply them
in the market, and by non-criminals that demand stolen goods. By construction, all
these decisions are endogenous and take place sequentially. Three aspects are worth
noticing of our setup. First, criminal activities take place because individuals target
durable goods either for re-selling or for consumption. Second, criminals activities
take place because there is a potential demand for stolen property. This demand
is composed of individuals buying stolen property willingly. Finally, as part of our
contribution to the literature on crime, the government performs two crime control
activities: street control and control on illegal transactions taking place in secondary
markets8 .
None of these factors have been incorporated in a formal model of crime nor have
criminal effects been considered in the literature of durable goods. Based on a simplified assumption of preferences (risk neutrality), I show that, (1) under certain
conditions individuals with a low preference for the durable good steal and sell the
goods; (2) the preference for the durable good also determines whether consumers will
become criminals or not: individuals with a “low-middle” preference for the durable
6

See Coase, 1972, Swan, 1970, Aghion and Tirole, 1994b and Esteban and Shum, 2007 on durability, secondary markets and optimal monopoly response, Akerlof, 1970, Aghion and Tirole, 1994a
and Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999 for adverse selection, durable goods and secondary markets and
Pelletiere and Reinart, 2002, Clerides, 2008 and Clerides and Hadjiyiannis, 2008 on international
trade and political economy of entry barrier on durable goods, to cite some insightful examples.
7
See especially Porter and Sattler, 1999 on an analysis on the patterns of demand and supply of
used durable goods.
8
In the real world, there are prosecuting agencies who perform several activities to control crime
on durable goods. One such activity is the investigation performed by prosecutors to apprehend and
indict criminals. As in this model the government directly performs prosecuting activities without
relying on a bureaucracy to do it, the control of illegal transactions incorporate the activities of these
agencies. In other words, in order to stop the functioning of illegal markets for stolen property, the
government is assumed to perform all kind of activities to accomplish this task. In this sense, I am
not formally modelling the activities of the prosecuting bureaucracies to impede criminal activities.
This analysis is left for future research.
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good will always steal the durable good regardless of what the government does when
street control is less than “perfect”; and (3) some non-criminals that are subject
to crime and lose their property may have incentives to replace the stolen good by
purchasing it in the secondary illegal market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section (2.2) introduces the model and section
(2.3) characterizes the equilibrium. Section (2.4) examines different possible scenarios
under which the government might operate for different combinations of law enforcement activities and proposes a few policy recommendations. Finally, section (2.5)
concludes.

2.2

The Model

The economy is populated by a large number of heterogenous individuals who
live one single period. Each individual i is characterized by two parameters [αi , wi ]:
wi determines the productivity of individual i, and will be equal to the individual’s
equilibrium wage when employed; αi measures the preference for quality of a durable
good. A higher value of αi represents a preference for better quality of the good.
αi is assumed to have a uniform probability density function defined on the interval
[0, 1]. Consequently, αi also determines the percentage of population with a preference
parameter of αi or less.
There are potentially three goods supplied: a numeraire good, a new durable good,
and a stolen durable good. The first two goods are always available, at prices 1 and pq ,
respectively, because they are produced legally. The supply of the stolen good in turn
depends on the availability of the durable good and on the number of stolen durable
goods that are brought successfully to the secondary market. This good, if supplied,
will be offered at a price pq0 . Normalizing prices in terms of the numeraire, I say that p
and p0 are the prices of the new and stolen durable goods, respectively, relative to the
price of the numeraire. I also assume that a new durable good is infinitely-elastically
supplied at the price p, where p is taken as an exogenous parameter of the model.
Despite the fact that a new and a stolen durable good are in essence the same
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good, they have two different qualities which make them different in the consumers’
eyes. Let q and q 0 represent the quality supply by a new and a stolen durable good
respectively. I assume that a stolen good is seen by any consumer as being of a lower
quality than a new one. I assume that there is an objective reduction in quality of
the stolen durable good that is common knowledge to all individuals in the society,
both criminals and non-criminals together, and that all agree on the “real” quality
of a stolen durable good. Let q 0 = γq, where γ [0, 1] captures the loss in quality of a
new durable good when it is supplied stolen.
Government expenditures on law enforcement determine two types of probabilities:
the probability of capturing criminals in flagranti, i.e., while committing the crime,
π1 , and the probability of capturing criminals that operate in the illegal market, π2 .
When a criminal is caught in flagranti, she is subject to a monetary penalty denoted
f1 , and when the seller of a stolen property is caught, she is subject to a monetary
penalty denoted f2 .

2.2.1

Timing of Events

The timing of the game is as follows9 :
1. Government expenditures on law enforcement determine π1 and π2 .
2. Each individual decides whether to become a criminal or a non-criminal.
3. Non-criminals decide whether to buy a new durable good or not. If a noncriminal decides to buy a new durable good, it will be subject to robbery with
a probability λrnc . Since the government captures criminal on the street with
a probability π1 , the new durable good is effectively stolen on the street with
probability λrnc (1 − π1 ), and not stolen with probability (1 − λrnc ) + λrnc π1 . Those
who become criminals are randomly matched with a non-criminal with probability λrc . A criminal is captured on the street with a probability π1 . As a result,
9

This game is based on the extensive form representation presented in figure (A.1)
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a criminal will effectively rob a durable good with a probability λrc (1 − π1 ), and
will not with a probability (1 − λrc ) + λrc π1 .
4. Non-criminals who did not get their property stolen or got their property recovered on site enjoy the good, and will make no further decisions. Those who
got their property stolen can still consume a durable good. They decide to buy
a new durable good, a stolen good, or abstain from consuming the good. When
making this decision, they also perfectly know the legal status of the stolen
goods.10 If they buy a new durable good again, they will enjoy it for the rest of
the good’s lifetime without further risks. However, they can potentially enjoy
two durable goods at the same time: if the government returns stolen property
to those who already bought a second new durable good, they will enjoy two
durable goods instead of one for the remaining of their lifetimes. In turn, if they
abstain from buying stolen property, they still can enjoy their property when
the government intervenes to recover stolen property in the illegal market. If
they do not abstain, individuals can get their property seized by the government. For simplicity, I assume that a non-criminal might both recover her stolen
property and get seized her bought stolen property by the government with a
probability π2 . If a non-criminal does not get her bought stolen property seized,
she will enjoy its consumption without facing further risks. Criminals who were
captured stealing on the street will have to pay a monetary fine f1 , and will not
make further decisions. In contrast, criminals who successfully stole a durable
good will further decide whether to sell it or keep it. Those who sell it will further face a probability π2 of being captured.11 If these criminals are captured,
they will have to pay a fine of f2 ≥ f1 for selling stolen property1213 If they are
10

There is not asymmetric information.
For simplicity, I assume that criminals sell their own property. The economics of organized
crime for this type of crime go beyond the scope of the presence study.
12
f2 ≥ f1 makes sense as a restriction if we think that stealing and selling property are two
compounded activities punishable hasher than performing one of these activities in isolation. As
the timing of the game generates that criminals selling stolen property have already committed two
felonies, instead of one, it is natural to assume this restriction is true.
13
I also assume that criminals are captured after they have sold their property to non-criminals. I
do not explicitly study what is called in the literature as “sting” operations, in which police officers
11
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not captured, they will make a profit of p0 per durable good sold. Any of these
individuals make further decisions. Finally, those who keep it will not face any
further risks or decisions

2.2.2

14

Additional Assumptions

A few additional technical assumptions are necessary. First, non-criminals are interested in buying a single unit of the durable good, whether new or stolen. Also,
thieves can only steal and supply one unit of the durable good. This assumption is
rather common in the industrial organization literature and implies that the distribution of αi determines the aggregate supply and demand of stolen durable goods and
the demand of new ones, as I will explain below.
Second, individuals are all risk neutral and have the following utility function
U (.) = ci + Iic Iik αi qi0


0
0
+(1 − Iic )αi Iiq (Iiq,1 qi + Iiq ,1 qi0 ) + (1 − Iiq )(Iiq,2 qi + Iiq ,2 qi0 )

(2.1)

where ci is the amount of numeraire good consumed by individual i, αi is the preference parameter for quality, qi is the demand for high quality (new good) of individual
i, and qi0 is the demand for low quality (stolen good) of individual i. Iic = 1 if an individual i becomes a criminal, Iiq = 1 if a non-criminal i consumes a new durable good
in the first round of decisions, Iiq,1 = 1 if a non-criminal i consumes a new durable
good in the second round of decisions when she also has bought a new durable good
in the first round of decisions, and Iiq,2 = 1 if a non-criminal i consumes a new durable
good in the second round of decisions when she did not buy a new durable good in
0

the first round of decisions, Iiq ,1 = 1 if a non-criminal i consumes a stolen durable
act as buyers of stolen property to capture thieves. This idea is left for further research.
14
There could be a probability of capture for “consuming” stolen property. However, this probability makes sense for some durable goods, such as cars, than for others, such as tv’s or parts of
a car. In the case of a car, it is easier for a police officer to ascertain ownership, after it has been
either stolen and used by its own thieve or bought and used by a non-thieve. But, for a part of a car
or a tv, it is way more difficult. For these later goods, the police would have to dismantle every car
on the street or knock on everybody’s door to ascertain legal ownership of them; a rather expensive
and ineffective control activity. Consequently, in the present paper I abstract from it. To analyze
the case of the whole car, this model has to be adjusted on this regard. This avenue will be pursued
in the future.

Hernán Botero Degiovanni

Property Crime and Secondary Markets

12

good in the second round of decisions when she has bought a new durable good in
0

the first round of decisions, Iiq ,2 = 1 if a non-criminal i consumes a stolen durable
good in the second round of decisions when she did not buy a new durable good in
the first round of decisions, and 0 otherwise, Iik = 1 if a criminal i decides to keep the
stolen property for their consumption. Note that I assume that only non-criminals
can make decisions on whether to buy a durable good or not, whereas criminals can
consume a durable good only if they steal it and decide to keep it.
Our third assumption refers to the durability of the good. I assume that a durable
good, irrespective of its quality, lasts one period as opposed to the numeraire which
is consumed at the beginning of the period completely.15 Let βi ∈ [0, 1] capture
the portion of the durable good enjoyed by a non-criminal i who buys it at the
beginning of the period. Consequently, at time βi the non-criminal derives a level
of satisfaction βi q. If a non-criminal i gets her new property stolen at time βit0 ,
she consumes qi = βit0 q of her new property. If later on this individual decides
to consume a durable good, she can either buy a new durable good instantly, and
enjoys qi = βit0 q + (1 − βit0 )q = q, or wait until period βit1 , moment at which the
secondary illegal market opens for her and purchase a stolen good at a risk. If the
stolen good purchased in the secondary market is not seized, she obtains the utility
qi + qi0 = βit0 q + (1 − βit1 )q 0 . If her property is returned once the illegal market opens,
she will consume qi = βit0 q + (1 − βit1 )q = q + (βit0 − βit1 )q.
To avoid keeping track of individual βs for criminals and non-criminals, our final
assumption is that both criminals activities and the operation of the illegal market
happen at the same inframarginal moment β. Consequently, βi = β for all noncriminals i. Additionally, all criminals will steal and supply their stolen merchandize
at the same inframarginal moment β. The choice of this inframarginal moment is
exogenous to both criminals and non-criminals, and it is assumed to be one of the
parameters of the model.
15

In this sense, a non-criminal who buys a new durable good at the beginning of her life, and does
not get her property stolen effectively, enjoys her durable good until it naturally scrapes itself at the
end of period. At this moment, both the owner and the good “die”.
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With all these assumptions in place, an individual i’s maximization problem is:
0
0


max
ci + Iic Iik αi qi0 + (1 − Iic )αi Iiq (Iiq,1 qi + Iiq ,1 qi0 ) + (1 − Iiq )(Iiq,2 qi + Iiq ,2 qi0 )
{Xi }

s.t.
If Iic = 1; ∀Iik = 0, 1.
ci = wi − f1 ; qi = 0; qi0 = 0 with prob. λrc π1
ci = w i ;

qi = 0; qi0 = 0 with prob. (1 − λrc )

If Iic = 1; Iik = 1.
ci = wi ; qi = 0; qi0 = (1 − β)q 0 with prob. λrc (1 − π1 )

(2.2)

If Iic = 1; Iik = 0.
ci = wi − f2 ; qi = 0; qi0 = 0 with prob. λrc (1 − π1 )π2
ci = w i + p 0 ;

qi = 0; qi0 = 0 with prob. λrc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 )
0

If Iic = 0; Iiq = 1; ∀ Iiq,1 = 0, 1; Iiq ,1 = 0, 1
ci = wi − p; qi = q; qi0 = 0 with prob. λrnc π1 + (1 − λrnc )
0

If Iic = 0; Iiq = 1; Iiq,1 = 1; Iiq ,1 = 0
ci = wi − 2p; qi = (2 − β)q; qi0 = 0 with prob. λrnc (1 − π1 )π2
ci = wi − p;

qi0 = 0 with prob. λrnc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 )

qi = q;

0

If Iic = 0; Iiq = 1; Iiq,1 = 0; Iiq ,1 = 1
ci = wi − p − p0 ; qi = q;

qi0 = 0

with prob. λrnc (1 − π1 )π2

ci = wi − p − p0 ; qi = βq; qi0 = (1 − β)q 0 with prob. λrnc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 )
0

If Iic = 0; Iiq = 1; Iiq,1 = 0; Iiq ,1 = 0
ci = wi − p; qi = q;

qi0 = 0 with prob. λrnc (1 − π1 )π2

ci = wi − p; qi = βq; qi0 = 0 with prob. λrnc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 )
0

If Iic = 0; Iiq = 0; Iiq,2 = 1; Iiq ,2 = 0
ci = wi − p; qi = (1 − β)q; qi0 = 0 with prob. 1
0

If Iic = 0; Iiq = 0; Iiq,2 = 0; Iiq ,2 = 1
ci = wi − p0 ; qi = 0; qi0 = 0

with prob. π2

ci = wi − p0 ; qi = 0; qi0 = (1 − β)q 0 with prob. (1 − π2 )
0

If Iic = 0; Iiq = 0; Iiq,2 = 0; Iiq ,2 = 0
ci = wi ; qi = 0; qi0 = 0 with prob. 1
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0

where Xi = {ci , Iic , Iik , Iiq , Iiq,1 , Iiq,2 , Iiq ,1 , Iiq ,2 }. As can be seen in the previous problem,
this model is a sequential game in which each individual i has five information sets
in three rounds of decisions for an individual who becomes a non-criminal or two
rounds of decisions for an individual who becomes a criminal. In the first round, each
individual i has an occupational choice. In the second, non-criminals make a decision
on whether to buy a new durable good or not and criminals are faced by a random
match probability that determines whether they rob or not. And in the last round,
some non-criminals will make a further decisions whether to buy a durable good, new
or stolen, or not, whereas criminals decide whether to keep the stolen property or
not. In the next section, I introduce the solution concept I use to solve the problem
laid out in equation (2.2).

2.3

Characterization of the Equilibrium

In this section, I derive the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibria of this game. I first
determine the optimal response of each non-criminal and criminal in each of their
information sets at the last stage. Sequentially, I move one step backwards to obtain
the optimal response of each non-criminal at their second round of decisions, and
finally, I find who becomes a criminal and who does not. All these decisions will
depend on the variables under the government’s control.

2.3.1

Last Round of Decisions

At this stage, each individual i has perfect knowledge of her types (i.e., each i
knows the values of αi and wi ), as well as whether they have become a criminal or
not. Additionally, each criminal i who makes a decision on this stage has stolen a
durable good successfully, and is making a decision whether to sell it or not. Using
problem (2.2), each criminal i’s preference relation can be expressed in the following
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way:
sells  keeps if αi <
sells ∼ keeps if αi =
sells ≺ keeps if αi >

(1−π2 )p0 −π2 f2
(1−β)q 0
(1−π2 )p0 −π2 f2
(1−β)q 0
(1−π2 )p0 −π2 f2
(1−β)q 0

(2.3)

From a criminal’s perspective at this stage, the values of p0 and π2 are taken as given,
and q 0 is an exogenous parameter of the model. Consequently, the cutoff of the righthand side of equation (2.3) is exogenous from her perspective. This implies that a
criminal i’s supply of a stolen durable good is given

sells

= 1, σikeeps = 0)

 1(sells)(σi
0
qi s =
1(sells) σisells + 0(sells) σikeeps


 0(keeps)(σ sells = 0, σ keeps = 1)
i

i

by:
if αi <
if αi =
if αi >

(1−π2 )p0 −π2 f2
(1−β)q 0
(1−π2 )p0 −π2 f2
(1−β)q 0
(1−π2 )p0 −π2 f2
(1−β)q 0

where σisells and σikeeps are the mixed strategy probabilities for criminal i of selling
and keeping her stolen property respectively. Disregarding the mixed strategy probabilities, and assuming that when αi is equal to the cutoff on the right-hand side of
equation (2.3) the good is sold, the supply of a stolen durable good is:16

 1(sells)(σ sells = 1, σ keeps = 0) if α ≤ (1−π2 )p0 −π2 f2
0s
i
i
i
(1−β)q 0
qi =
0
(1−π
keeps
2 )p −π2 f2
 0(keeps)(σ sells = 0, σ
= 1) if αi >
0
i

i

(2.4)

(1−β)q

In turn, each non-criminal i who makes a decision at this stage is in any of the
following two situations: either she bought a new durable good in the second round
of decisions and her property was stolen by criminals; or she did not buy a durable
good in the second round of decisions. In any of these cases, a non-criminal i has to
make a decision whether to buy again a new durable good, a stolen durable good or
not buy a durable good at all. The following proposition provides a useful result:
Proposition 1 Risk-neutral non-criminals, with a utility function as in equation
(2.1), will have the following preference relation with respect to buying a new durable
good (q), a stolen durable good (q 0 ), and not buying a good at all (0), at the last round
of decisions, regardless of whether they have bought a new durable good or not in their
16

From now on, I will disregard mixed strategies.
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second round:
q  q0

if αi >

q ∼ q0

if αi =

q≺q

0

if αi <

p−p0
(1−β)[q−(1−π2 )q 0 ]
p−p0
(1−β)[q−(1−π2 )q 0 ]
p−p0
(1−β)[q−(1−π2 )q 0 ]

q0

if αi >

q∼0

if αi =

q≺0

if αi <

p
(1−β)q
p
(1−β)q
p
(1−β)q

q0  0

if αi >

q0 ∼ 0

if αi =

0

q ≺0

if αi <

p0
(1−β)(1−π2 )q 0
p0
(1−β)(1−π2 )q 0
p0
(1−β)(1−π2 )q 0

The threshold values in equation (2.5) help determine whether a non-criminal, with
an αi , buys a durable good again or not; and when she buys it, these threshold values
also help determine the legal status of the bought good. Again, from a non-criminal’s
perspective, the values of p, p0 and π2 are taken as given, and q, q 0 and β are all
exogenous parameters of the model. As a result, all three cutoffs of equation (2.5) are
exogenous from the non-criminals’ perspective. We can rank all these three cutoffs
depending on the values of (p/p0 ). Using this ranking, the following proposition is
obtained.
Proposition 2 A non-criminal i’s optimal demand schedule at the last round of
decisions, regardless of whether she bought a durable good or not in the second round
of decisions, is:

p
p0

p
p0

≥

<

q
(1−π2 )q 0

q
(1−π2 )q 0

=

1
(1−π2 )γ

⇒ qid2

⇒ qid2



0


=
q0



q

 0
=
 q

if αi <
if αi ∈
if αi ≥
if αi <
if αi ≥

p0
0
(1−β)(1−π
2 )q
h

p0
p−p0
,
(1−β)(1−π2 )q 0 (1−β)[q−(1−π2 )q 0 ]
p−p0
(1−β)[q−(1−π2 )q 0 ]

(2.6)

p
(1−β)q
p
(1−β)q

This last proposition indicates that when the relative price of a new durable good
with respect to a stolen durable good is “too” large, there are dynamic incentives for
non-criminals to buy a stolen durable good when the illegal market opens, regardless
of whether they have bought a new durable good in the second round of decisions
and is stolen or have bought none. This proposition also says who has this dynamic
incentive: if we interpret αi as the marginal rate of substitution between quality of
the durable good and the numeraire, non-criminals who buy a stolen durable good
are those with an intermediate marginal rate of substitution.
Equations (2.4) and (2.6) determine which individuals supply and demand the
stolen durable good in the secondary market. However, I cannot determine yet neither

(2.5)

Hernán Botero Degiovanni

Property Crime and Secondary Markets

17

the aggregate supply nor the aggregate demand of the good because both depend on
the number of individuals who decide to become criminals or non-criminals and on
the number of non-criminals who decide to buy a new durable good in their first
round. As the occupational choice precedes what a non-criminal decides to do in her
first round of decisions as a non-criminal, I study in the next section the optimal
decision of a non-criminal, and in section (2.3.3) I will consider the occupational
choice decision.

2.3.2

Third Round of Decisions

As explained earlier, only non-criminals make decisions at this round. They must
choose whether to buy a new durable good or not. They know that if they buy a
new durable good they might get their property stolen in the street, whereas if they
buy merchandize after criminal activities have taken place they would avoid such a
situation and be able to acquire a cheaper durable good. This decision comes at a
utility cost: a non-criminal who awaits until criminal activities have taken place has
not enjoyed αi βq units of quality, expressed in levels of utility, β part of her life.
At this stage, a non-criminal i with αi decides whether to buy a new durable good
(qi = q) and not buy at all (qi = 0) as follows:
h
 i
q  0 if αi > h

1−(1−β)λrnc (1−π1 )(1−π2 )−(1−β) 1−λrnc (1−π1 )σ q

h
1−

q ∼ 0 if αi = h

1−

i

 i

1−λrnc (1−π1 )

0

1−(1−β)λrnc (1−π1 )(1−π2 )−(1−β)



i

 i

1−λrnc (1−π1 )



q−(1−β)(1−π2 ) 1−λrnc (1−π1 ) σ q0 q 0
0

σ q p− 1−λrnc (1−π1 ) σ q p0

1−(1−β)λrnc (1−π1 )(1−π2 )−(1−β) 1−λrnc (1−π1 )σ q

h
q ≺ 0 if αi < h



1− 1−λrnc (1−π1 ) σ q p− 1−λrnc (1−π1 ) σ q p0



q−(1−β)(1−π2 ) 1−λrnc (1−π1 ) σ q0 q 0



0

σ q p− 1−λrnc (1−π1 ) σ q p0

1−λrnc (1−π1 )σ q

i



q−(1−β)(1−π2 ) 1−λrnc (1−π1 ) σ q0 q 0

0

where σ q and σ q are the behaviorally mixed strategy probability that a non-criminal
i assigns to her decisions on her last round of decisions. In our case, these probabilities will only take the values of 1 and 0 because I am disregarding those mixed
strategy probabilities that lie within the interval (0, 1) to focus on pure strategy decisions. Hence, in equation (2.7) all the values that conform the cutoff which determine

(2.7)
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optimal behavior are exogenous from a non-criminal i’s perspective except for these
mixed strategy probabilities.
Combining conditions (2.6) and (2.7), we can determine the following individual
demand of a new durable good by a non-criminal i with an αi at this third round of
decisions given λrnc and p0 :
If λrnc <

β
,
(1−β)(1−π1 )(1−π2 )

then:

(1 − β)(1 − π2 )γp
⇒
1 − (1 − β)λrnc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 )


p− 1−λrnc (1−π1 ) p0



 0 if αi <
1−(1−β)(1−π2 )γ−(1−β)(1−γ)λrnc (1−π1 )(1−π2 ) q

=
p− 1−λrnc (1−π1 ) p0



 q if αi ≥
r

p0 <

qid1

(2.8)

1−(1−β)(1−π2 )γ−(1−β)(1−γ)λnc (1−π1 )(1−π2 ) q

(1 − β)(1 − π2 )γp
⇒
1 − (1 − β)λrnc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 )

p


 0 if αi <
1−(1−β)λrnc (1−π1 )(1−π2 ) q
=
p


 q if αi ≥
r

p0 ≥

qid1

(2.9)

1−(1−β)λnc (1−π1 )(1−π2 ) q

If λrnc ≥

β
,
(1−β)(1−π1 )(1−π2 )

then:


β − (1 − β)(1 − γ)λrnc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 ) p
p <
⇒
β + (1 − β)π2 λrnc (1 − π1 )


p− 1−λrnc (1−π1 ) p0



 0 if αi <
1−(1−β)(1−π2 )γ−(1−β)(1−γ)λrnc (1−π1 )(1−π2 ) q
d1

qi =
p− 1−λrnc (1−π1 ) p0



 q if αi ≥
r
0

(2.10)

1−(1−β)(1−π2 )γ−(1−β)(1−γ)λnc (1−π1 )(1−π2 ) q


β − (1 − β)(1 − γ)λrnc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 ) p
p ≥
⇒
β + (1 − β)π2 λrnc (1 − π1 )

λrnc (1−π1 )p


 0 if αi <
β+(1−β)π2 λrnc (1−π1 ) q
d1
qi =
λrnc (1−π1 )p


 q if αi ≥
r
0

(2.11)

β+(1−β)π2 λnc (1−π1 ) q

Figure (A.2) in appendix (A.1) can help us understand this demand function.
From a non-criminal’s perspective, λrnc , and p0 are exogenous to all non-criminals
at this stage. λrnc is determined at the second stage, where all individuals make an
occupational choice. In equilibrium, λrnc will be equal to the number criminals in the
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economy. At this stage, it is useful to determine which non-criminal has her property
stolen. The value of this variable relative to β/[(1 − β)(1 − π1 )(1 − π2 )] determines
the non-criminal’s response to an increase in the price of a stolen durable good p0 .
We can think of β/[(1 − β)(1 − π1 )(1 − π2 )] as the ratio of the time that criminals
allow non-criminals to enjoy a new durable good when non-criminals buy the good
at the third round of decisions and the expected time that the government allows
individuals to enjoy the stolen durable good after transactions have taken place in
the secondary illegal market. This expected time will be determined by the government’s incapability of recovering stolen property at both of its interventions. Hence,
if this ratio is “large”, we can say that non-criminals have a “safer” environment
to enjoy their new durable goods relative to the environment they have to enjoy
their demanded stolen property. In contrast, if this ratio is small, we can say that
non-criminals has a “riskier” environment to enjoy their new durable goods.
Consequently, we can interpret this ratio as an index of risk. Alternatively, we also
can interpret this ratio as an index of the efficiency or inefficiency of the government’s
interventions. When this ratio is larger (smaller) than λrnc , this condition can be
interpreted as implying that the probability of a durable good being stolen is smaller
(larger) than the risk posed by government with its interventions. As a result, if the
government’s interventions increase the equilibrium price of a stolen durable good by
posing more risk on participating in this illegal activity, non-criminals will increase
(decrease) their demand of new durable goods at this third round of decisions.
As we can see in figure (A.2), the extend to which all these cases apply heavily
depend on the number of criminals and non-criminals in the society. Without these
numbers, we cannot formally determine the aggregate demand for new durable goods
at this round of decisions. Consequently, in the next section, I proceed to determine
these values.
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Second Round of Decisions: Occupational Choice

The final step to solve this model from an individual’s perspective is to find the
conditions under which an individual becomes a criminal. At this stage, individuals
determine their optimal behavior by solving (2.2). The decision of becoming a criminal will depend on what will happen to an individual when she decides to become a
criminal or not, as on how likely a criminal would steal or a non-criminal would get
her property stolen, and on her future decisions having decided one occupation or the
other. Let ρq and ρ0 be the mixed strategy probabilities associated to a non-criminal
i’s optimal decisions of buying a new durable good or not on the third round of decisions. Using equation (2.2) and considering the pure strategies values for ρq , ρ0 , σ q ,
0

σ q , σ sells and σ keeps , we obtain the following preference relation between becoming a
criminal or nor for an individual i with an αi :17
nc  c if αi > ac
(2.12)

nc ∼ c if αi = ac
nc ≺ c if αi < ac ,
where
ac =
A =
B =
=
C =
D =


Ap + Bp0 − λrc f1 π1 + (1 − π1 )π2 f2 σ sells
C +D−E
h
i
 q
r
q
q 0
1 + λnc (1 − π1 )σ ρ + σ ρ
h
i
0
0
λrnc (1 − π1 )σ q ρq + σ q ρ0 + λrc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 )σ sells

f1 π1 + (1 − π1 )π2 f2 σ sells

1 − (1 − β)λrnc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 ) ρq q


0
(1 − β) λrnc (1 − π1 )ρq + ρ0 σ q q + (1 − π2 )σ q q 0

(2.13)

E = (1 − β)λrc (1 − π1 )σ keeps q 0
First, condition (2.13) allows us to identify non-criminals and criminals in the space
αi ∈ [0, 1]. The following proposition summarizes this result.
17

0

This preference relation is reversed for the case σ q = 0, σ q = 0, ρq = 0,ρ0 = 1, σ sells = 0, and
keeps
σ
= 1. This case refers to those individuals who would not buy a durable in neither the last
nor the third round of decisions when non-criminals, and would keep a stolen durable good for their
own consumption when criminals.
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Proposition 3 In an economy inhabited by risk-neutral individuals with the utility
function described in equation (2.1) where the parameter α is distributed as a uniform
random variable in the interval [0, 1], individuals might be organized along the domain
of α according to their occupational choice: low-type individuals will likely become
criminals and high-type individuals will likely become non-criminals for all p0 ≥ 0.
Proposition (3) provides an important result because it tells us the location of the
suppliers of stolen property: those thieves that steal for a revenue. These individuals
have a value of α between zero and [(1 − π2 )p0 − π2 f2 ]/[(1 − β)q 0 ], which is the cutoff
that defines which criminals supply stolen property in equation (2.5).
Equation (2.13) also allows us to characterize the behavior of those criminals who
decide to sell the stolen durable goods. Specifically, criminals would be willing to sell
their stolen property if
p0 ≥

π2 f 2
π1 f 1
+
(1 − π1 )(1 − π2 ) (1 − π2 )

(2.14)

The right-hand side of equation (2.14) represents an expected cost of engaging in
property crime and in handling stolen property jointly for each potential criminal
who reaches the secondary market.
Now, we can determine the aggregate supply of stolen durable goods in the last
round of decisions. But, before entering in this task, a final result must be stated. We
do not know yet if there is an α0 that divides perfectly criminals and non-criminals
in the domain of α. The following proposition provides us with the tranquility that
there is at least one value of α that performs the task:
Proposition 4 In an economy inhabited by risk-neutral individuals with a utility
function as in equation (2.2) where the parameter α is distributed as a uniform random
variable in the interval [0, 1], there is at least one αc for which criminals and noncriminals are perfectly divided along the interval [0, 1]. Additionally, such αc is defined
such that in equilibrium there is always at least one type of criminal: thieves that steal
durable goods for their own consumption.
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Figure (A.3) in appendix (A.1) helps us understand the implications of propositions
(3) and (4) and equation (2.14). There are a multiplicity of equilibria in this model.
The fact that the economy lies in one equilibrium or another depends on the value
that p0 assumes and on its projection onto the α space. It is clear on the graph that
potential suppliers of stolen property are subject to an economic constraint in order
to operate. If this economic restriction is not at least satisfied, potential criminals for
profit become well-behave citizens. However, in equilibrium it seems that there are
always criminals activities: there will always be individuals who steal for their own
consumption.
Figure (A.3) also indicates that the equilibrium under which non-criminals will
tend to coexist will depend on the equilibrium value of the probability of having their
property stolen in the third round of decisions (λrnc ) relative to the index of inefficiency
(defined in section (2.3.2)) and on p0 . As a result, many different cases may arise in
equilibrium depending on the values of αc . I will study some specific cases in section
(2.4.1). In this section, it remains to say that proposition (4) guarantees the existence
of αc .

2.4

Government Policy Variables

The equilibria examined earlier clearly depend on the policy pursued by the government to allocate its law enforcement activities, given by π1 and π2 in the model,
and the penalties associated with the apprehension of criminals, f1 and f2 . In this
section, I examine the possible scenarios that may arise for different values of these
variables. The equilibrium at this stage is formally defined as follows:
Definition 1 Given a set of values for the exogenous parameters {β, q, q 0 , p}  <4+ and
for the government’s controls {π1 , π2 , f1 , f2 }  <4+ , a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilib
rium for equation (2.2) at the second round of decisions consists of a p0∗ π1 , π2 , f1 , f2 |β, q, q 0 , p
≥ 0 such that the following equations are all jointly satisfied at p0∗ :
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nsell
= nqnc
c
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(2.15)

λrnc = Nc = F (αc (p0∗ ))

(2.16)

q,1 0∗
λrc = nq,1
nc = 1 − F (αnc (p ))

(2.17)
0

is the aggregate supply of stolen durable goods, nqnc is the aggregate dewhere nsell
c
mand of stolen durable goods, Nc is the number of criminals in the economy, nq,1
nc is
the aggregate demand of new durable goods at third round, and F (·) is the marginal cumulative distribution function of α which was assumed to be the Uniform Distribution
in the interval [0,1].
Several observations are worth pointing out. First, a non-criminal i’s probability
of having her property stolen, (λrnc ), and a criminal j’s probability of stealing, λrc , are
both endogenous and equal to the proportion of population who engage in criminal
activities and buy a new durable good in the third round of decisions, respectively.
Consequently, both functional forms of these probabilities are model-specific and do
not respond to an ad hoc specification. Second, the aggregate demand of stolen
durable goods will have a variety of functional forms that I will study below. Here, it
is sufficient to note that these functional forms will depend heavily on the value that
λrnc assumes in equilibrium relative to the value of the Index of Inefficiency as well as
on the value of p0∗ . Finally, due to proposition (3) and equation (2.14), it is possible
to derive the following aggregate supply of stolen durable goods:

nsell
c


h
i
 λr (1 − π1 ) (1−π2 )p0 −π0 2 f2 if p0 ≥
c
(1−β)q
=
 0
if p0 <

π 1 f1
(1−π1 )(1−π2 )

+

π 2 f2
(1−π2 )

π1 f1
(1−π1 )(1−π2 )

+

π 2 f2
(1−π2 )

(2.18)

Figure (A.4) depicts graphically this latter equation. Equation (2.18) depends
on three important features: first, the more new durable goods are available in the
economy, the larger the potential supply of stolen durable goods. It is clear that
without new durable goods in the economy, there is not availability of stolen durable
goods in the secondary market. Second, the degree of inefficiency of the government
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in controlling criminal activities help determine their profitability. This effect affects
the slope of the aggregate supply correspondence in figure (A.4). Third, the degree of
inefficiency of the government in controlling criminals activities also help determine
participation in the secondary market. This last effect is observed in the size of the
discontinuity of the aggregate supply correspondence in figure (A.4).

2.4.1

Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria

The first set of equilibria presented contains a situation in which all individuals
who decide to become non-criminals will also buy a new durable good in the third
round of decisions. The following equation presents the aggregate demand for stolen
0

durable goods, nqnc , for these cases:
q0

nnc


h

 λrnc (1 − π1 ) 1 −
h
=
r

 λnc (1 − π1 )

i

p0
(1−β)(1−π2 )q 0
(1−π2 )q0 p−qp0

(1−β)(1−π2 )q 0 q−(1−π2 )q



if p0 ≤ p − (1 − β) q − (1 − π2 )q 0
i

 (2.19)
 if p0 > p − (1 − β) q − (1 − π2 )q 0
0

This demand function also depends on three important factors. First, non-criminals
would not demand stolen durable goods if they had not had their property stolen in
the first place, (λrnc 6= 0). Second, non-criminals would not demand stolen durable
goods if they had not had their property effectively stolen in the first place (λrnc (1 −
π1 ) 6= 0). Finally, when the price of a stolen durable good is larger than p − (1 −


β) q −(1−π2 )q 0 , those non-criminals with the larger marginal rate of substitution for
quality αi will consume again a new durable good in the last round of decisions. This
reduction in the demand of stolen durable goods changes the slope of its aggregate
demand function as can be seen in figure (A.5) in appendix (A.1).

Using equations (2.18) and (2.19) to determine an equilibrium, there are potentially
four crossing points which generate four different equilibria. Point A in figure (A.5)
depicts an equilibrium in which part of the non-criminals who get their property stolen
will buy again a new durable good. Point B in figure (A.5) shows an equilibrium in
which there is not a single non-criminal who buys again a new durable good in the last
round of decisions, but there will be still non-criminals who abstain from buying again
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a durable good (not seen on the graph). Point C shows two potential equilibria: on the
one hand, the upper segment of the aggregate demand might intersect the aggregate
supply at zero. On the other hand, the lower segment of the aggregate demand might
intersect the aggregate supply at the same point.
All these cases generate different equilibrium prices for a stolen durable good, p0 .
There is also a set of values for the aggregate supply and demand of stolen durable
goods for which the equilibrium is not defined. Using equation (2.13) to determine
αc for all these cases, the following set of equations defines an equilibrium for points
like A or B in figure (A.5):
h (1 − π )p0 − π f i
2
2 2
r
=
λc (1 − π1 )
0
(1 − β)q
h
i

p0
 λrnc (1 − π1 ) 1 − (1−β)(1−π
0
2 )q
h
(1−π2 )q0 p−qp0
r
 λnc (1 − π1 )

(1−β)(1−π2 )q 0 q−(1−π2 )q



if p0 ≤ p − (1 − β) q − (1 − π2 )q 0
i


 if p0 > p − (1 − β) q − (1 − π2 )q 0
0

p − π1 λrc f1
i
λrnc = h
r
1 − (1 − β)λnc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 ) q − (1 − β)λrc (1 − π1 )q 0
λrc

=1− h

p − π1 λrc f1
i
r
1 − (1 − β)λnc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 ) q − (1 − β)λrc (1 − π1 )q 0

(2.20)

Solving, we obtain our first set of equilibria for given values of {π1 , π2 , f1 , f2 } and
{β, q, q 0 , p}:
(λrnc )∗
(λrc )∗
(p0 )∗

√
F2 − G ∗ H
F
±
(2.21)
=
G
G
= 1 − (λrnc )∗
(2.22)

r
∗
0
r
∗
(1−β)(λnc ) (1−π2 )q +(1−π2 )π2 f2 (1−(λnc ) )

if (p0 )∗ ≤ cond(p0 )

∗)
(λrnc )∗ +(1−π2 )2 (1−(λrnc )

=
(λrnc )∗ (1−π2 )(q 0 )2 p+(1−π2 )q 0 π2 f2 q−(1−π2 )q 0 (1−(λrnc )∗ )



if (p0 )∗ > cond(p0 )

0 r ∗
2 0
0
r ∗
qq (λnc ) +(1−π2 ) q q−(1−π2 )q (1−(λnc ) )

(2.23)
where,
F =



q − (1 − β)(1 − π1 )q 0 − π1 f1

G = 2(1 − β)(1 − π1 )[(1 − π2 )q − q 0 ]
H = 2[p − π1 f1 ]


cond(p0 ) = p − (1 − β) q − (1 − π2 )q 0
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The following equations define an equilibrium for a point like C in figure (A.5):
0

h

 λrnc (1 − π1 ) 1 −
h
=
 λrnc (1 − π1 )

i

p0
(1−β)(1−π2 )q 0
(1−π2 )q0 p−qp0

(1−β)(1−π2 )q 0 q−(1−π2 )q 0

i




if p0 ≤ p − (1 − β) q − (1 − π2 )q 0

 (2.24)
if p0 > p − (1 − β) q − (1 − π2 )q 0

λrnc

=

p − π1 λrc f1
h
i
1 − (1 − β)λrnc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 ) q − (1 − β)λrc (1 − π1 )q 0

λrc

=

1− h

(2.25)

p − π1 λrc f1
π1 f1
i
−
(2.26)
(1
−
β)(1
− π1 )q 0
r
r
0
1 − (1 − β)λnc (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 ) q − (1 − β)λc (1 − π1 )q

Solving, we obtain
I
(λrnc )∗ = ±
G

√

I2 − G ∗ J
G

π 1 f1
(λrc )∗ = 1 − (λrnc )∗ −
(1 − β)(1 − π1 )q 0
(
(1 − β)(1 − π2 )q 0 if (p0 )∗ ≤ cond(p0 )
(p0 )∗ =
(1 − π2 )γp
if (p0 )∗ > cond(p0 )

(2.27)
(2.28)
(2.29)

where,


(1 − π2 )q 
q − (1 − β)(1 − π1 )q 0 − 1 −
π
f
1
1
q0
qπ1 f1
]
J = 2[p −
(1 − β)(1 − π1 )q 0
I =

This equilibrium is achieved when the price defined in (2.29) does not satisfy the
condition expressed in equation (2.14) above. In order words, the equilibrium price
in this second set of equilibria must induce criminals not to participate in the illegal
secondary market. If this later condition is not satisfied, the equilibrium would lie on
the discontinuous portion of the aggregate supply in which case an equilibrium does
not exist.
Note that equations (2.23) and (2.29) are subject to the same conditions. The
following proposition states the conditions under which each equilibrium is observed.
Proposition 5 The conditions for (2.23) or (2.29) to hold in equilibrium are


(p0 )∗ ≤ p − (1 − β) q − (1 − π2 )q 0 if p ≤ (1 − β)q


(p0 )∗ > p − (1 − β) q − (1 − π2 )q 0 if p > (1 − β)q

(2.30)
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Figure (A.6) is helpful to understand this last proposition. Suppose that a noncriminal has her property stolen. Then, if the price of a new durable good p is
larger than the remaining utility of a new durable good when the good is bought
after criminal activities have taken place (1 − β)q, then she will not buy again a new
durable good in the last round. Instead, she will buy a stolen durable good. When p
is smaller, there are non-criminals who will buy again a new durable good.
Before entering into the analysis of the government’s optimal actions, it is worth
noting that the negative roots of equations (2.21) and (2.27) are not defined when
(1 − π2 )q = q 0 . (1 − π2 )q represents the quality enjoyed by a non-criminal i who gets
her property stolen in the third round of decisions and decides to buy a new durable
good in the last round of decisions. When this quality is equal to the quality that
the same non-criminal would enjoy if she consumed a stolen durable good instead,
q 0 , she is indifferent between q and q 0 in the last round of decisions. This indifference
creates another discontinuity in the negative roots of the equilibrium crime rates of
equations (2.21) and (2.27).

2.4.2

Investigating the Scenarios Under which the Government Operates

The final step in our investigation is to analyze the scenarios under which the
government operates. Let us suppose that the government is only interested in minimizing the percentage of thieves in the economy18 . Thus, equation (2.14) provides the
condition under which the government faces either the equilibrium crime rates found
in equation (2.21) or in equation (2.27). If the equilibrium price of stolen durable
goods is larger than the fixed cost on the right-hand side of equation (2.14), the
secondary market for stolen durable goods exists. In this equilibria, the government
faces two types of thieves: those who steal to re-sell the stolen property and those
who steal to consume it. If the equilibrium price of stolen durable goods is smaller
18

It is clear that the government might have other objectives such as the maximization of a
social welfare function. As I am only interested in determining the environments under which the
government operates when it is interested in reducing the amount of criminals in the economy, I
assume that the government only cares about the crime rate and not about any measure of welfare.
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than the fixed cost on the right-hand side of equation (2.14), the secondary market
for stolen durable goods does not exist. In this equilibria, the government only faces
one type of thief: those who steal to consume the stolen goods.
We can exploit these results to obtain the scenarios under which the government
operates. An interesting relationship to determine is the government’s tradeoff between π1 and π2 for a given crime rate, λrnc . If the condition for the existence of the
secondary market for stolen durable goods is satisfied, both enforcement technologies
π1 and π2 are defined, and help determine the equilibrium of the economy. When
the condition for the existence of secondary markets for stolen durable goods is not
satisfied, π2 is not defined. As a result, the tradeoff between π1 and π2 is only defined
when the secondary market for stolen durable goods exists.
Assuming that the conditions for the existence of the secondary market for stolen
durable goods are satisfied, the following equation is determined, which shows the
tradeoff faced by the government between π2 and π1 for a given value of the crime
rate, λrnc :

π2 =

n

(1−β)(1−π1 )(q−q 0 )(λrnc )2 −[q−(1−β)(1−π1 )q 0 −π1 f1 ]λrnc +(p−π1 f1 )
(1−β)(1−π1 )q(λrnc )2

if p0 ≥

π1 f1
(1−π1 )(1−π2 )

+

π2 f2
(1−π2 )

(2.31)

Equation (2.31) shows the government’s available technology to obtain a crime rate
of λrnc , given the equilibrium price for a stolen durable good, p0 , which also depends
on the value of λrnc in equation (2.23). The sign of the relationship between π2 and π1
in equation (2.31) is easily determined, and is provided in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Given the government’s technology found in equation (2.31), the following two conditions are satisfied:
i . The derivative of π2 with respect to π1 is given by the following equation:

∂π2
=
∂π1

(p−f1 )−(q−f1 )λrnc
(1−β)(1−π1 )2 q(λrnc )2

if p0 ≥

π 1 f1
(1−π1 )(1−π2 )

+

π 2 f2
(1−π2 )

(2.32)
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ii . The sign of the derivative of π2 with respect to π1 is given by the following
equations:

∂π2
∂π1

≥ 0 if (p − f1 ) ≥ (q − f1 )λrnc and p0 ≥

π 1 f1
(1−π1 )(1−π2 )

+

π 2 f2
(1−π2 )

(2.33)

∂π2
∂π1

< 0 if (p − f1 ) < (q − f1 )λrnc and p0 ≥

π 1 f1
(1−π1 )(1−π2 )

+

π 2 f2
(1−π2 )

(2.34)

Proposition (6) states that when the economic conditions for the existence of secondary markets for stolen durable goods are satisfied, the sign of the relationship
between π2 and π1 depends on a simple linear relationship between the difference of
p and f1 and the difference of q and f1 , given a value of λrnc  [0, 1]. If p > q, the
relationship between π2 and π1 is always positive ∀ λrnc [0, 1]. Hence, if a new durable
good has a price larger than its quality, the government has to increase both π1 and
π2 to keep λrnc constant. This only occurs when the price of a stolen durable good
is large enough to create the secondary markets for these goods. As a result, the
government only faces this scenario when the price of a new durable good is large,
and there is a large demand of the good when stolen or a very lax enforcement of
criminal activities.
When the price of a stolen durable good is not large enough to create the secondary
markets for these goods, the relationship between π2 and π1 is not defined. At this
range of prices, π2 does not have any bearing on the equilibrium values of the economy
because the market for secondary markets does not exist, and the only type of thief
that exists is those individuals who steal to consume the stolen good. This occurs
when the fixed costs of supplying a stolen durable good induced by enforcement are
large enough to destroy the secondary market for stolen durable goods, or the demand
of these goods is very low. In any case, the only enforcement technology that has an
influence on the crime rates is π1 at this range of values for p0 .
Two more results can be noted from proposition (6). On the one hand, the effect of
f2 on the relationship between π2 and π1 is indirect. From equations (2.21) and (2.27),
we can see that f2 does not affect the equilibrium values of λrnc directly. The effect of f2
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is through the equilibrium price for stolen durable goods, p0 , and the condition for the
existence of secondary markets. From equation (2.23), we can see that an increase in
f2 increases the equilibrium price for stolen durable goods. From equation (2.14), we
can see that an increase in f2 generates a larger fixed costs of supplying stolen durable
goods. In equilibrium, the effect of f2 is ambiguous. A larger f2 generates a larger
p0 , which increases the likelihood that the government faces the crimes rates obtained
when the secondary markets are functioning. However, an increase in f2 increases the
fixed costs of supplying stolen durable goods, which increases the likelihood that the
government faces the crimes rates obtained when the secondary markets for stolen
durable goods do not exist. On the other hand, if the conditions for the existence of
secondary markets for stolen durable goods are satisfied, f1 >

p−qλrnc
(1−λrnc )

generates that

the relationship between π2 and π1 is always negative ∀ λrnc  [0, 1). As a result, the
government is able to manipulate the slope of the relationship between π2 and π1 by
choosing the value of f1 to belong to the interval that benefits its interests the most.

2.4.3

An example: Changing π1 and π2

Proposition (6) provides the conditions under which a tradeoff between π1 and π2
for the government exists. Outside of the ranges defined by proposition (6), either π2 ,
π1 or λrnc are defined. To this point, the conditions provided do not secure that an
equilibrium actually exists. I conclude our analysis presenting a numerical exercise
where I show that there exists a set of values for the exogenous parameters for which
an equilibrium exists. This example serves us to present the effect of changes in
the values of π1 and π2 on the equilibrium values of p0 and λrnc , as well as on the
equilibrium values of the percentage of thieves who steal a durable good either to sell
or consume it. Before doing that, some conclusions are noted in order to understand
the numerical example presented below.
First, the equilibrium crime rates found in equations (2.21) and (2.27) depends
directly on the values of π1 , π2 ,f1 , q, q 0 , p and (1 − β). The sign of the relationship
between these variables and the crime rates is not clear cut to determine. Additionally,
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despite that the model constructed in this paper contains risk-neutral individuals with
linear utility functions, the relationship between the crimes rates and its determinants
is not linear.
Second, f2 does not affect directly any of the crimes rates found in equations (2.21)
and (2.27). The effect of f2 on the crime rate is indirect. It affects the equilibrium
price for stolen durable goods, p0 , in equation (2.23) and the fixed cost of participation
in the illegal market for stolen durable goods in equation (2.14). As a result, the effect
of f2 on λrnc is ambiguous and only helps determine which crime rate takes place in
equilibrium and weather the secondary market for stolen durable goods exists or not.
Finally, equations (2.21) and (2.27) define four possible equilibrium crime rates
depending on the value of p0 relative to the fixed cost in equation (2.14). It can be
shown that the positive roots found in equations (2.21) and (2.27) for the crime rate
are both unstable. These set of equilibria will exhibit swings of the crime rate that
go from zero to one with small changes in π1 or π2 . In contrast, the negative roots in
equations (2.21) and (2.27) both exhibit crime rates in the [0, 1] interval for all π1 and
π2 in their respective domains. As a consequence, I only present numerical results for
these second set of equilibrium crime rates.
Figure (A.8) presents an example for the equilibrium values of the total percentage
of criminals in the economy, λrnc = nc, the equilibrium price of a stolen durable goods,
p0 , and the composition of the crime rate in terms of the percentage of thieves who
sells and keeps the stolen property. This example assumes that p = 0.10, f1 = 0,
f2 = 0, q = 1, q 0 = 0.8, and β = 0.4. Additionally, figures (A.8a) and (A.8b) presents
the equilibrium values of λrnc and p0 for two values of p, (p  {0.10, 0.12}). The choice
of these values have the following consequences. First, at f1 = 0 and f2 = 0, any
p0 > 0 generates the secondary market for stolen durable goods. Second, q = 1 and
q 0 = 0.8 imply that a stolen durable good has a 20% less quality than a new durable
good. Third, β = 0.4 implies that criminal activities take place at a 40% of the
lifetime of the durable goods and individuals. As a result, there is another 60% of the
lifetime of both the durable goods and individuals to enjoy a durable good, weather
new or stolen. Finally, the discontinuity found in section (2.4.1) for the negative roots
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q−q 0
q
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= 0.2.

Several results are worth noting from this numerical example. First, there exists
at least one equilibrium crime rate λrnc  [0, 1] and an equilibrium price of the stolen
durable goods p0  [0, p = 0.10) for every value of π1 and π2 , given the values of the
exogenous parameters assumed for the example. Figure (A.8a) shows that an increase
in p increases the equilibrium value of λrnc ∀ π1  [0, 1] and π2  [0, 1). Figure (A.8b)
shows that an increase in p increases the equilibrium value of p0 ∀ π1  [0, 1] and π2
 [0, 1). Additionally, when f1 = 0 and f2 = 0, p becomes a lower bound for the
equilibrium crime rate. This lower bound is approached when π1 gets close to 1, ∀
π2  [0, 1). In other words, when the government approaches a situation in which
almost all thieves are captured, there is a potential p% of thieves who are willing to
steal a durable good either to supplement their income or satiate their demand for
the stolen durable good. This strong result is obtained because the financial penalty
of engaging in criminal activities is zero. For values of f1 or f2 larger than zero, this
result does not hold any longer.
Second, the maximum values of the crime rate and the price for stolen durable
goods are both reached at π1 = 0 and π2 = 0. However, their minimum values
are reached at different combination of values of the enforcement technologies. λrnc
reaches its minimum value at π1 = 1, ∀ π2  [0, 1), and p0 reaches its minimum value
at π2 = 1, ∀ π1  [0, 1]. Consequently, π1 is more effective to control individuals from
engaging in theft of durable goods, and π2 is more effective to reduce the equilibrium
price of stolen durable goods.
Third, increments in π1 and π2 generate a reduction in λrnc . This is not true for
its components. On the one hand, an increase in π2 generates an increase in the
percentage of thieves who engage in criminal activities to consume the good, and a
reduction in the percentage of those who wants to sell it. On the other hand, an
increase in π1 generates a reduction in both the percentage of thieves who engage
in criminal activities to consume and sell the good. As a result, an increase in π1
generates a reduction in both components of the total crime rate, whereas an increase
in π2 generates an increase in percentage of thieves who wants to consume the stolen
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durable good. In fact, our numerical example shows that the percentage of thieves
who wants to consume the good is maximized at π1 = 0 and π2 = 1 and minimized
at π1 = 1 and π2 = 0. In turn, the percentage of thieves who wants to sell the good
is maximized at π1 = 0 and π2 = 0 and minimized at π2 = 1, ∀ π1 [0, 1].
In other words, our numerical example shows that π2 has ambiguous effects on the
equilibrium crime rates. On the one hand, an increase in π2 reduces the economic
incentives of thieves to engage in criminal activities for a profit. On the other hand,
an increase in π2 generates that more thieves find profitable engaging in criminal
activities to satiate their consumption. Our numerical example shows that the net
outcome is to reduce marginally the total percentage of thieves in the economy. However, increments in π2 substantially increases the equilibrium percentage of thieves
who seek to consume the stolen durable.
Taken all these numerical results together, a conclusion is obtained: the most
effective policy to reduce the percentage of thieves who engage in theft of durable
goods for a profit is π2 , and the most effective policy to reduce the percentage of
thieves who engage in theft to consume the durable good is π1 . In other words, if the
government wants to minimize the percentage of thieves in the economy who want to
sell the stolen property, it has to focus on controlling the existence of the secondary
market for stolen durable goods. If the government wants to minimize the percentage
of thieves who want to consume the stolen durable good, it has to focus on capturing
thieves in flagranti. However, both policies have to be used together. The reason is
that a large π2 generates a large percentage of thieves who engage in theft to consume
the good. The perfect combination of π1 and π2 is determined when equation (2.32) is
in equilibrium, which will depend on the assumptions about the government’s budget
constraints and the technology that associates every dollar collected in tax revenue
with the government’s enforcement activities.
Before concluding this analysis, figure (A.7) in appendix (A.1) presents the same
numerical example for the government’s technology found in proposition (6). The
figure presents an example where f1 = 0, f2 = 0, p= 0.10, and q = 1. These
values imply that for the range of values of λrnc presented in the figure, (λrnc 

Hernán Botero Degiovanni

Property Crime and Secondary Markets

34

[0.10; 0.11; 0.12; 0.13; 0.14; 0.15; 0.16], the relationship between π2 and π1 is always
negative. The figure also shows that this relationship is not always defined for the
entire domain of π1 for a given value of the crime rate, λrnc . Additionally, the graph
shows that when λrnc ≤0.10, the relationship between π2 and π1 is not defined either.
In other words, given the values for the exogenous parameters assumed for this example, there is not a combination of π2 and π1 that allows the government to reach a
crime rate lower than λrnc = 0.10. This result was expected because 0.10 is equal to
the price of a new durable good assumed for this example, which was encountered to
be a lower bound for the crime rate in figure (A.8) for the same numerical values of
the exogenous parameters used to compute figure (A.7).

2.5

Conclusions

In this paper, I extend a model of property crime by incorporating a market for
illegal goods. The secondary market is formed by individuals who rationally decide to
become criminals, to steal durable goods, and to sell them in this market, and by noncriminals who demand stolen goods. The model develops a few additional elements.
First, criminal activities take place because individuals target durable goods either
for re-selling or for consumption. Second, criminals activities take place because there
is a potential demand for stolen property. This demand is composed of individuals
buying stolen property willingly. Finally, I assume that the government performs
two crime control activities: it captures thieves in flagranti and controls the illegal
transactions that take place in the secondary markets for stolen durable goods.
In this simplified framework, the following results are obtained. First, under certain
conditions individuals with low preferences for the durable good may have incentives
to engage in criminal activities: they would steal goods and sell them in the secondary
market. Second, depending on the combination of law enforcement activities put in
place by the government, individuals with a “low-middle” preference for the durable
good would become criminals, steal goods, and keep them for their own consumption.
Finally, some non-criminals that are subject to crime and lose their property may have
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incentives to replace the stolen good by purchasing it in the secondary illegal market.
This last conclusion is consistent with the fact that even though individuals openly
complain about property crime, if the price of stolen goods is low enough, they may
have incentives to purchase illegal goods, indirectly supporting and encouraging illegal
activities and more crime.
A noteworthy result of this simplified model is that non-criminals who do not
purchase a new durable good only exist in equilibrium when there are not criminals
who are willing to engage in criminal activities for a profit. This occurs in equilibrium
due to a combination of three assumptions: on the one hand, non-criminals are
assumed to be able to buy stolen property only when the secondary market for stolen
durable goods are functioning. On the other hand, those non-criminals who decide
to buy durable goods in the last round of decisions face a utility cost in terms of the
consumption of durable goods. As the economy is assumed to be uniquely inhabited
by risk neutral individuals, the combination of these three assumptions make noncriminals maximize their utility when they only buy new durable goods in the second
round of decisions. In order for non-criminals who do not buy a new durable good to
exist when there are criminals in equilibrium, a more general model must incorporate
a richer dynamic setup where non-criminals also have the secondary markets for
stolen durable goods functioning at the beginning of their lives. It also must include
individuals with a different risk aversion, which implies that income effects also must
be incorporated into the analysis.
From a policy perspective, the model presented in this paper contains several
important insights. First, the government can manipulate the costs associated to
crime to destroy the incentives for the secondary markets to exist. These costs make
part of a participation cost that criminals internalize in their decisions, which might
lead them not to participate in the illegal secondary markets for stolen durable goods.
Second, when the costs of participation in the illegal secondary market for stolen
durable goods are low enough to allow criminals to create markets for stolen property,
the most effective policy that the government has to reduce the total crime rate is
to capture criminals in flagranti. Third, if the government is unable to maintain a
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high rate of in flagranti captures, the most effective policy to reduce the incentives
for secondary markets for stolen durable goods to exist is to focus public resources on
capturing criminals when they are selling stolen property in the secondary markets
for stolen durable goods. However, this policy has to be combined with in flagranti
captures because when the government only focus on controlling illegal transaction
in the secondary market for durable goods, this policy might incentive the criminals
to engage in theft to satiate their own demand for durable goods.
As a whole, this model confirms some of the ideas behind why criminals engage in
theft of durable goods contained in the criminology studies of property crime. The
model presented in this paper underlines three factors as the most important to determine what makes a good “hot” for criminals: Valuable, Enjoyable and Disposable.
When a durable good has a large price relative to its price as stolen, criminals might
engage in theft of this good to either supply it or consume it.

37

Chapter 3
Optimal Drug Supply Control:
The Relationship between Drug
Addiction and Property Crime
3.1

Introduction

There are many reasons why drug supply control policies are common in many
Western societies. One reason is that statistical, historical and anecdotal evidence
show a positive correlation between drug addiction and property crime. Narcotics
are special commodities with a minimum consumption requirement that might induce drug consumers to property crime when unsatisfied. A model of endogenous
occupational choice is used to determine the optimal percentage of drugs that the
government has to seize in order to minimize the number of thieves in the economy.
Minimum drug consumption requirements affect the way individuals value their
income. According to Cozzi, 2006, a drug user might feel “unhappy” if her income is
not sufficiently “high” to cover her minimum drug consumption requirement. This
unhappiness might lead the user to become a risk-lover who is willing to accept a low
expected income from criminal activities to engage in property crime to supplement
her minimum drug consumption requirement. In this environment, optimal drug
control policies that reduce the availability of narcotics in the economy might generate
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two effects: On the one hand, the government might generate more thieves because
a more expensive minimum drug consumption bundle might induce more addicts to
engage in property crime. On the other hand, an increase in the price of drugs might
decrease an addict’s marginal valuation of an extra dollar for drug consumption. If
this effect predominates over the minimum drug consumption cost effect, addicts
might be induced to reduce their property crime rates. The final effect will depend
on the income and addiction distributions of the economy.
Given the complexity of the relationship among addiction, income distribution and
crime, the model used in this paper is based on four assumptions: first, there is a
parameter that captures the preference for the unique (composite) drug commodity
in the economy, which has an exogenous discrete distribution composed of three
categories: zero, light, and heavy preferences1 . This distribution helps determine
the number of people in each category and their optimal drugs consumption level
per income level. Second, there is also a parameter that captures the minimum
drug consumption requirement that corresponds to the individuals’ addiction levels.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the addiction parameter distribution is indirectly
determined by the drug preference parameter distribution, which implies that the
addiction distribution is also composed of three categories: zero, light, and heavy
addiction levels. In this economy, I also assume that individuals live one period to
focus the attention on the government’s incentives to optimally control the supply of
drugs in the presence of structural drug consumption and addiction that might lead
to property crime. As a result, the addiction distribution generates levels of addiction
that the model would otherwise fail to obtain endogenously by a lack of a dynamic
setting.
Third, there is an income distribution captured by a positive skewed Kumaraswamy
distribution function, which is assumed to be independently distributed from the
1

Note that there is a fundamental distinction between the definitions of weak and strong preferences in microeconomics and the definitions of light and heavy preferences used in the text. Weak
and strong preferences refer to a topological preference relationship that determines whether a single
individual weakly or strongly prefers a consumption bundle to another with different quantities for
the same goods. Light and heavy preferences refer to the intensity of attraction of two individuals
for the same consumption bundle.
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distribution of the drug preference parameter. This implies that there are all levels of
income at every drug preference category. Finally, individuals can optimally decide
whether to supplement their income with property crime or not. These last two
assumptions permit to optimally determine the number of individuals who engage in
property crime, given the income, drug preference, and addiction distributions.
In this economy, the government can decide what percentage of the drug commodity to seize in order to minimize the percentage of thieves2 . This decision is performed
in two scenarios: in the first scenario, the government decides the amount of drugs to
seize without any budget constraint. In the other scenario, the government’s decision
is subject to a budget constraint and a balanced budget requirement. Additionally, it
is assumed that the government can use the income from the fines paid by captured
thieves to finance its enforcement activities. In this sense, jail costs are not considered, and the government’s optimal decision is not affected by these extra costs of
enforcement. Hence, the model is only able to capture the deterrence effects and not
the incapacitating effects of enforcement.
The results indicate that when the government is not subject to a budget constraint and its objective is to minimize the percentage of thieves in the economy, the
government must allocate all the resources on controlling thieves and zero on controlling the supply of drugs. The reason is simple: drug supply controls increase the
price of drugs, which in turn increases the individuals’ incentives to commit property
crime. Hence, when the government is not subject to a budget restriction, the best
government’s strategy is to capture as many thieves as possible without inducing
addicts to property crime through increases in the price of drugs. When there is a
2

This assumption might not the best one to capture the real world dynamics of some drug markets. In many countries such as the U.S., the government also spends on capturing drug consumers.
However, there are many other countries, such as Portugal or Colombia, where the consumption
of drugs is a legal activity but the production of drugs is an illegal one prosecuted by the government. The model constructed in this paper abstract from the expenditure made by the government
to capture drug users. As a result, it is aimed to capture the dynamics of the drug markets of
countries such as Portugal or Colombia. To capture the U.S. reality more appropriately, the model
needs to be slightly adjusted to incorporate the expenditure made the government to capture drug
users. However, given the fact that the estimated percentage of drug users captured by the U.S.
government is only 0.5% (See Caulson et al., 2011), the model presented in the text might also be
a good approximation for the U.S. reality assuming that the expenditure to control drug users is
highly inefficient to have a bearing on drug users’ criminal decisions.
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budget constraint and a minimum expenditure requirement for the government, the
government must spend resources on both controlling thieves and the supply drugs.
This result is due to a balanced budget and minimum expenditure requirements: as
the technology to capture thieves is expensive, it is optimal for the government to
supplement its budget with the fines from captured addicts who get induced to crime
by the optimal drug supply control policies. With sufficient revenue to spend on
controlling thieves, it is optimal for the government to subsidize the consumption of
drugs.
The novelty of this model revolves around at least three aspects: first, despite
the intense debate on drug control policies, there is not a formal model that studies
the government’s optimal decision to control drugs, when this policy might induce
addicts to commit property crime. To my knowledge, this model is a first approach to
a formal analysis of that decision using game theory. Second, the existing models of
crime do not consider a minimum consumption requirement to model the incentives
that individuals have to commit property crime. The model presented in this paper
can be easily extended to incorporate other types of commodities with a minimum
level requirement, which might induce people to crime when unsatisfied. Third, the
Kumaraswamy distribution that captures the income distribution is a novelty in the
economics of crime. This function is very versatile and permits to parameterize
the skewness in the income distribution. This parametrization was used to perform
comparative static analysis on income bias distribution improvements. In this regard,
this model introduces a versatile distribution function that might help study other
phenomena of crime, where the income distribution skewness needs to be manipulated
parametrically.
Using this model, two comparative static analysis exercises are performed. In the
first exercise, the technology of drug seizure is improved. This generates that the government destroys the drug more easily. This improvement generates two changes: one
the one hand, the government increases the amount of resources devoted to seizing
drugs relative to the amount of resources devoted to controlling thieves. That happens until the government becomes more efficient at seizing drugs. On the other hand,
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the government reduces the amount of resources spent on controlling thieves, generating a larger total percentage of thieves in equilibrium. A second exercise involves
increasing the parameter that captures the income distribution skewness, generating
a more centered income distribution. This exercise presents a very insightful and
counterfactual result: when there is sufficient revenue to optimally control thieves,
the government subsidizes the consumption of drugs in order to reduce the incentives
of addicts to engage in property crime.
This paper is organized as follows: section (3.1) is the introduction. Section (3.2)
presents a short literature review on the relationship between drug addiction and
property crime. Section (3.3) presents the model without a budget constraint for
the government, and the respective results. Section (3.4) introduces a budget constraint and enforcement technologies for the government. It also presents the results
associated to these new restrictions. Section (3.5) contains the comparative analysis
exercises. Section (3.6) concludes the paper and section (A.2) contains the appendix.

3.2

Literature Review

Drug supply control policies seem to be based on the criminal career paradigm that
results from criminology studies on criminal careers. This paradigm is well summarized by Blumstein et al., 1986 and Blumstein et al., 2003. According to this view,
drug consumption generates an incentive for consumers to engage in criminal behaviors when they cannot afford the minimum consumption requirement that drugs seem
to have.

Despite the intense debate about the influence that drugs have on triggering a criminal career in criminology studies, few work has been done using the new tools of
economics. Cozzi, 2006, for example, builds a model populated by infinitely-lived
individuals who can supplement their income with property crime and drug dealing.
He aims to indirectly estimate the percentage of the U.S. property crime that can
be explained by hard drug consumers, who prey on society to satiate their drug con-
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sumption minimum requirement. His results show that predatory crime to finance
addiction explains 26% of U.S. property crime in 1996.

Similarly, Entorf and Winker, 2008 test whether the consumption of drugs is statistically significant to explain property crime in the German States. They find that the
proxies for drug consumption are all statistically significant for all major property
crimes considered. Dobkin and Nicosia, 2009 exploit a unique data set in methamphetamine hospital admissions during a major supply disruption in California in 1995
to test whether a drug supply disruption reduces the costs associated with drug consumption. The authors find that the intervention accomplished many of the expected
outcomes of drug supply control policies. It increased methamphetamine prices from
30 to 100 dollars per gram, decreased supplied purity from 85% to 25%, reduced
methamphetamine-related drug treatment center admissions in 35%, declined the
share of arrestees testing positive for methamphetamine in 55% and felony arrests
for methamphetamine possession and sale fell in 50%. However, the intervention
increased robberies in 17.9% and consumption was not totally interrupted because
heavy consumers temporarily substituted methamphetamine with other drugs or consumed the low-quality product available in the market. Also, pre-intervention values
were reached again 4 months after the intervention.

All these studies indicate a positive correlation between drug consumption and property crime. Regardless the bulk of policy advices from these studies requesting policy
intervention to reduce availability of narcotics, there is not, to my knowledge, a formal model that investigates the optimal amount of drugs that the government must
seize to minimize the amount of thieves in the economy. Instead, the analysis of
drugs in economics has been mainly circumscribed to testing the rational addiction
hypothesis proposed by Becker and Murphy, 1988. They define a good as addictive
when it generates reinforcement –the more you consume an addictive good, the more
you want to keep consuming it–, and tolerance –the more that you consume the good,
the lower your future utility given the amount of future consumption. In the view
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of Becker and Murphy, 1988, individuals are rationally addicted. This implies that
in the presence of addictive goods, individuals recognize the addictive nature of the
goods they consume. However, individuals still consume those goods considering their
full price. In other words, individuals take into account the current and future costs
of addiction to consume additive goods.

Since its publication, the model of Becker and Murphy, 1988 became the standard
approach to modeling addictive processes. Some attempts have been made to study
optimal drug supply control policies in the context of this model. Caulkins et al., 2001
study the optimal choice of enforcement vs treatment in an environment with a single
type of drug consumer and a predetermined addiction process for the representative
consumer. Their results indicate that the combination of both expenditures depends
on at which phase of the addiction process the society is: if the epidemic is initiating and control begins early, it is optimal to use large amounts of enforcement and
treatment to cut short the epidemic. When the epidemic is mature, it is optimal to
spend more resources on treatment than on enforcement, even though both programs
receive positive amounts of resources. In this paper, the government’s objective is to
minimize the consumption level of drugs, which is assumed to represent a fraction of
the total social costs induced by drug consumption.

Even though drug addiction models do not explicitly consider the incentives of addicts
to commit property crime, several lessons can be learned from these models. These
lessons will be used in the next sections to incorporate the crime decisions of addicts
in a model of crime. The first lesson is that the drug consumption distribution appears to be stable from cohort to cohort, at least in the U.S. and the main European
Countries of which information is available3 . In other words, the percentage of individuals who consume drugs tends to be constant over time in most countries where
data use exists for long periods of time, such as the U.S.. Cozzi, 2006 shows that the
3

See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2012b for historical data on drug
use in the world.
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distribution of drug initiation and drug prevalence in the U.S. for a series of years
seems to overlap one on top of the others. This implies that human beings seem to
replicate the same behavior with respect to drugs from cohort to cohort. Musto, 1991
argues that drug consumption is not a late 20th century phenomenon but that has
been a common practice since the invention of the most consumed “illegal narcotics”
of the modern times. He argues that today’s consumption and prevalence rates resemble those of the 1920’s in the U.S.. As a result, drug consumption simply follows
a cyclic process where at times there are more consumers and at other times less, but
the long-run proportion of drug consumers in the population tends to be stationary.

Second, the consumption of drugs seems to have three groups clearly differentiated:
zero, light and heavy drug consumers. Behrens et al., 1997 study a model in which
they investigate the optimal amount of prevention of light users vs treatment of heavy
users during the course of a drug epidemic. In this model, the authors show the different drug consumption paths followed by consumers when they have different degrees
of addiction. They emphasize the importance of controlling for this feature of addiction because heavy users are the individuals with larger propensity to engage in
deviant behaviors derived from their drug consumption, which might involve property
crime.

Third, low income might induce drug addicts to property crime. Blumstein et al., 2003
show how criminal careers are usually triggered by a combination of low income and
heavy addiction to drugs. Leshner, 1997 shows that heavily addicted low-income
users usually spend a fraction of their income to cover the subsistence level of legal
goods and the remaining on narcotics. In that sense, drug consumption might force
consumers to behave sub-optimally when their income does not cover their minimum
drug consumption requirement. As a result, these consumers have the largest likelihood to engage in criminal activities.

Finally, all addiction models assume that initiation into drugs is exogenously given.
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There are usually two alternatives used to model initiation. The first alternative is
used by Becker and Murphy, 1988, who assume that consumers start a path of consumption due to a negative shock, like being laid off or losing a relative, that triggers
an initial stock of consumption that affects future drug consumption decisions through
a sort of “addiction function”. The other alternative is used by Behrens et al., 1997
and Caulkins et al., 2001 based on the historical paper written by Musto, 1991. They
assume that drug consumption can be thought of as an epidemic, which implies that
initiation might be modeled using an exogenous function that takes the number of
initial contaminated individuals as given.

3.3

Model without a Budget Restriction for the
Government

3.3.1

Preliminaries

In order to understand the problem faced by the government, a simple graphical example might help us lead the discussion, which is based on the literature summarized
in section (3.2). Figure (3.1) presents four cases where increases in the drug prices
generate both an increase and a decrease in property crime. Each graph presents the
indirect utility function of an individual –on the y-axis–, as a function of her level of
income –on the x-axis. Consequently, each point on any of the lines drawn in figure
(3.1) represents the subjective optimal valuation that the individual gives to each of
her feasible levels of income. Additionally, each graph presents the decision of an
individual of becoming a criminal or not. In the graph, w0 represents the income of
an individual who has not yet decided to become a criminal. wh and wl represent the
income the individual would obtain if he became a criminal or not, respectively. wb
is the expected income of engaging in criminal activities.
From this graph, several features are worth mentioning. First, wh and wl depend
on several factors, among which the income distribution is one of their main determi-
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nants. As a result, wh can either be larger or smaller than wl . The most relevant case
for crime is the one is which wh is larger than wl . In this case, individuals might find
it profitable to engage in criminal activities when their income is low enough to induce
them to commit crime. Second, the indirect utility functions can be either positive or
negative. Following the argument laid out by Cozzi, 2006, a positive indirect utility
is interpreted as indicating that the individual is “happy” with the consumption level
induced by her income. A negative indirect utility indicates that the individual is
“unhappy” with her income level. According to the argument of Cozzi, 2006, addicts
feel unhappy when they cannot afford the minimum level of drug consumption that
they have accumulated throughout their lifetime. In the paper written by Cozzi, 2006,
when individuals are in the negative part of their indirect utility functions, they can
either engage in criminal activities or stop consuming drugs, depending on an exogenous distribution of age that determines weather an individual makes one decision
or the other. In the argument of Cozzi, 2006, older individuals seem to opt out of
drug consumption, whereas younger individuals tend to engage in criminal activities.
However, at any point in time, the government always face an exogenously determined
proportion of individuals willing to engage in criminal activities when they have an
income that makes them feel “unhappy”.
Third, the individual has a minimum income level that makes her feel “happy”.
In the presence of addiction, this minimum income level is determined by the cost of
the individual’s minimum drug consumption requirement bundle, which is valued at
the equilibrium drug market price. Fourth, minimum drug consumption requirements
usually generate that addicts value an extra dollar of income differently when this
extra income falls within the happiness region than when it falls within the unhappiness region. In other words, addiction generates kinked indirect utility functions, with
different slopes at the unhappiness and happiness regions. The kink point is located
at the minimum income level induced by addiction. Additionally, the value of the
slopes depend on the drug price and the parameters that capture the preferences for
consuming drugs in the economy. It is expected that highly-addicted individuals are
more subjectively affected with increases in drug prices. As a result, their minimum
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income level and indirect utility slopes are more reactive to changes in the drug prices.
Fifth, if indirect utility functions are kinked and linear, individuals might either
be risk-lovers, risk-neutrals or risk-averse. The type of agent the government has to
handle with depends on the slope of the indirect utility function at the happiness
and unhappiness regions. If the slope of the indirect utility function is larger at
the happiness region, individuals become risk-lovers when their income falls within
the unhappiness region. If the slope of the indirect utility function is smaller at
the happiness region, individuals are risk-averse. If the slopes are the same in both
regions, individuals are risk-neutrals in the entire domain of the individual’s feasible
income.
Finally, if indirect utility functions are kinked and linear, drug control policies that
increase the equilibrium drug price have three diverging effects: it might increase, reduce, or not affect the equilibrium percentage of thieves in the economy. Figure (3.1a)
presents an example where an increase in the drug price generates an increase in the
crime rates. In this figure, the individual has an initial income, w0 that is larger than
the expected income obtained from criminal activities, wb . Before intervention4 , the
individual does not engage in criminal activities because she does not find profitable
doing it, (w0 <wb ). After intervention, wl falls within the unhappiness region of income. As this individual is a risk-lover at this region, an increase in the drug price
makes wb an acceptable bet for the individual. This occurs because the individual
starts accepting an expected income from criminal activities larger than or equal to
wB . At this income, the individual obtains the same expected utility from engaging
in criminal activities than at the sure outcome. As wb > wB , the individual becomes
a criminal with increases in the drug price.
4

Before the government increases the drug price from p1d to p2d in the graph.
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(b) Optimal Drug Control that do
(a) Optimal Drug Control that Increase Property Crime,

p1d <p2d

not Affect Property Crime, p1d <p2d

(c) Optimal Drug Control that Re-

(d) Optimal Drug Control that Re-

duce Property Crime, p1d <p2d

duce Property Crime, p1d <p2d

Figure 3.1: Relationship between Property Crime, Drug Addiction, and Optimal
Drug Control Policies
Figure (3.1b) presents an example where an increase in the drug price does not
generate an increase in the crime rates. If agents do not find it profitable to engage
in criminal activities, they will simply not engage in criminal activities. For these
individuals, the economic incentives are the most important determinants of their
criminal decisions. The most interesting cases are shown in figures (3.1c) and (3.1d).
Figure (3.1c) presents an example where optimal drug policies result in a risk-loving
individual becoming a non-criminal when she is a criminal in the first place. If the
minimum income level induced by addiction changes less than the slope of the indirect utility function in the happiness region, drug control policies combined with the
appropriate economic incentives for criminals reduce the crime rates of the economy.
Figure (3.1d) presents an example where risk-neutral thieves becomes risk-averse noncriminals. Notice that drug control policies generate a reduction in crime when they
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make individuals more risk-neutral or risk-averse. In other words, the minimum income level induced by addiction must react less to changes in the drug price than the
slope of indirect utility function in the happiness region of income.
The final effect of drug control policies depend on the distribution of addiction and
income in the economy. In the section (3.3.2), a model of crime is presented where
individuals can endogenously decide to become criminals or not. In that economy,
the government is able to reduce the availability of narcotics in the market. Given
the income, drug attraction, and addiction distributions, the model studies the optimal behavior of the government to control drugs when this policy might incentivize
individuals to commit crime. This subsection is concluded underlining that the answer is not a priori an easy one for at least two reasons. On the one hand, there is
not a priori a reason to assume that the slope of the indirect utility function in the
unhappiness region of income is larger than, equal to, or smaller than the slope of the
indirect utility function in the happiness region. The model presented below shows
that when individuals have lexicographic preferences for the consumption of drugs,
and the same parameter captures their attraction for drugs and their addiction, individuals always have an indirect utility function with a larger slope in the happiness
region than in the unhappiness region. Figure (3.1c) shows that even in this case the
government can generate an increase in the drug price that reduces the crime rates of
the economy. This occurs when the equilibrium drug price is large enough to make
individuals become nearly risk-neutral in their entire domain of their feasible income.
On the other hand, the effect of the interrelation between income, drug attraction,
and addiction levels on the crime rates is not a simple one to determine. Some assumptions on this relationship are necessary in order to give a definitive answer on
the effect of drug control policies on property crime.
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The Model

Drug Demand
The literature reviewed in section (3.2) and the discussion in section (3.3.1) offer
several insights to model the relationship between drug addiction and property crime.
One alternative is used by Cozzi, 2006 to study how much property crime is explained
by hard drug addiction in the U.S.. The model developed in this paper shares a series
of methodological assumptions with the model developed by Cozzi, 2006, but it differs
in the focus of the analysis. The main features of the framework used in this paper
are briefly explained below.
The economy is populated by N individuals, where N is normalized to 1 for simplicity. Each individual lives one period of life. In models of drug addiction, individuals
usually live for several years. As the focus of those models is on the dynamic decisions
of the same addicts throughout their life time, it is compulsory to consider several
years in the analysis. Here, the main interest is to study the optimal response of
the government to a possible structural feature of consumption. Despite that drug
addicts might make diverging decisions with respect to becoming a criminal or not
throughout their life time, drug addicts’ experiences seem to repeat from one cohort
to the others. So, at any point in time, there is a potential similar distribution of addicts, with similar addiction levels, that can be incentivized to property crime in the
same way. Should the government pursue drug supply policies that reduce the availability of drugs in the market in the presence of a stationary or structural addiction
distribution in the economy?
The first attempt to answer the latter question assumes that individuals make
a one-time decision. This assumption is equivalent to performing the analysis in
the last period of life of a cohort who already knows their drug consumption and
addiction distributions. Hence, this assumption is innocuous as far as individuals
base their criminal decisions on today’s optimal utility function, disregarding future
arrays of utility that derives from criminal decisions. In that sense, this modeling
strategy extends the model constructed by Imrohoroglu et al., 2000 by incorporating
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a minimum drug consumption requirement that places consumers on an “unhappy”
or “dissatisfactory” path of utility when income is below the necessary level to cover
the minimum drug consumption requirement.
The model proposed in this paper is based on figure (A.9) in appendix (A.2). In
this economy, individuals are heterogenous along two dimensions. Every individual i
receives from nature a parameter i that captures her preference for drugs. Following
Behrens et al., 1997, there are three types of individuals in the economy: individuals
with zero (i = 0), light (i = ), and heavy (i = ) preferences for the single (composite) drug commodity available in the market. The marginal probability density
function of i is:

f (i ) =




 ni =0

if i = 0

ni =
if i = 


 n
i = = 1 − ni = − ni =0 if i = 

(3.1)

where ni = , ni = , and ni =0 represent the percentage of people in the economy
who have heavy, light, and zero preferences for the consumption of drugs. Since
this probability density function is independent of income, there are all levels of
income at every preference category. This is assumed because a priori there is no
evidence that support that income is a good explanatory variable for initiation into
drug consumption (see Ritter and Chalmers, 2011)5 . A more comprehensive analysis
would include different specifications for the correlation between income and drug
consumption. This analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper. Consequently,
it is left as future research.
Every individual i also receives from nature a parameter wi that determines her
income. Income is assumed to follow a Kumaraswamy distribution, where the pdf of
5

In the argument laid out by Becker and Murphy, 1988, income might help explain drug addiction in the economy. However, this occurs due to a inter-temporal income effect. Once individuals
initiate into the consumption of drugs (which occurs due to exogenous factors such as when individuals get laid off or divorced) and are “hooked” to consuming them, income might trigger a
larger addiction in the future due to the fact that rich people might spend more resources on illegal
narcotics today, depending on whether these commodities are normal or inferior goods from the
individuals’ perspective. However, initiation into drugs is not per se necessarily positively correlated
with income.
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this distribution is expressed as:



0
if wi < 0



(α2,w −1)
(α1,w −1) 
w
i
fw (wi ) =
)α1,w
if 0 ≤ wi ≤ wmax
α1,w α2,w i α1,w 1 − ( ww
max
wmax



 0
if wi > wmax

(3.2)

where α1,w and α2,w are two parameters that help determine the skewness and kurtosis of the Kumaraswamy distribution respectively and wmax is the maximum income
available in the economy. A good feature of using the Kumaraswamy distribution to
proxy the income distribution of the economy is that there is a range of values for
α1,w and α2,w that generate a Kumaraswamy distribution function that resembles the
income distribution of real economies. The Kumaraswamy distribution function also
allows to manipulate the income distribution skewness and kurtosis parametrically.
These features are exploited in section (3.5) to perform numerical comparative static
analysis. In appendix (A.2), figure (A.10) shows an example in which the distribution
of the population is organized by income and three levels of drug addiction.
In turn, individuals can also engage in theft to supplement their final income.
Following Imrohoroglu et al., 2000 and Cozzi, 2006, it is supposed that a successful
thief steals from her victim a fraction of the mean income, ηw, as a customary rule,
where 0 < η < 1. Also, a thief finds a victim with a probability λr and the government
captures her with a probability πT . As a result, a thief steals ηw with a probability
λr (1−πT ) and steals nothing with a probability 1−λr (1−πT ) . In turn, a non-thief who
has her income successfully stolen losses the same fraction ηw. She gets her income
stolen when she encounters a thief, which occurs with a probability λgr . Consequently,
a non-thief has her income successfully stolen with probability λgr (1 − πT ) and does
not have her income successfully stolen with a probability 1 − λgr (1 − πT )6 .
Given i and wi , each individual i solves the following problem:
6

Thieves’ actions are assumed to be non-violent. As a result, thieves perform their actions in a
way that only affects non-thieves economically, without infringing on them any psychological cost
by violence.
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1
 (1 −  )cθ +  (d − a  )θ θ if I j ≥ p a 
d  i
i i
i i
 i
i
Ui =
1
 θ
i (di − a i )
if 0 ≤ Iij < pd a i
Ii0 = wi (1 − τ ) = ci + pd di

s.t.

s.t.

with
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with prob. (1 − λr )

Ii1 = wi (1 − τ )(1 − f ) = ci + pd di with prob. λr πT

(3.3)







Ii2 = wi (1 − τ ) + ηw = ci + pd di with prob. λr (1 − πT ) 
)
Ii0 = wi (1 − τ ) = ci + pd di with prob. 1 − λgr (1 − πT )
Ii3 = ci + pd di
with prob. λgr (1 − πT )

 w (1 − τ ) − ηw if p(w ≥ ηw )
i
i
(1−τ )
3
Ii =
ηw
 0
if p(wi < (1−τ
)
)
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if T hi = 1

if T hi = 0

where ci represents the demand of individual i of the numerarie good. For simplicity, the price of the numerarie is set equal to pc = 1. di is the drug demand of
individual i. pd is the drug price. Iij represents any of the net income levels Ii0 , Ii1 , Ii2
and Ii3 . τ is the income tax rate and f is the fine paid by thieves when captured,
which is supposed to be a fraction of the thief’s income. a i represents individual i’s
minimum drug consumption requirement or addiction level. a is assumed to be equal
for every individual i in the economy. As a result, the addiction level of individual i
depends on her preference for the drug, i . T hi represents individual i’s decision of
becoming a thief. If T hi = 1, individual i is a thief, and her expected budget constraint is represented by the set of equations with the label T hi = 1 in equation (3.3).
If T hi = 0, individual i is not a thief, and her expected budget constraint is represented by the set of equations with the label T hi = 0 in equation (3.3). θ(0, 1) is the
parameter of the CES function that captures the elasticity of substitution between ci
and di .
Notice that Ui depends on Iij . When Iij is larger than pd a i , individual i’s utility
is captured by a CES utility function. At this range of values for Iij , individual i
maximizes her utility subject to any of the two sets of budget constraints of equation
(3.3). Consequently, the indirect utility function of the CES function represents the
happiness region of net income in figure (3.1). However, when Iij is below pd a i , the
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CES function is not defined. In this range of values for Iij , addicts can still consume
if Iij ≥ 0. However, they set their legal consumption to their subsistence level, which
is 0 for the numerarie, and their remaining income is spent on drugs. As a result,
a linear function that depends uniquely on the value that di assumes captures the
unhappiness region of income. In this sense, Ui captures the argument laid out by
Leshner, 1997 regarding the way low-income drug users set their drug consumption
habits to their income availability. This assumption implies that individual i exhibits
lexicographic preferences with respect to her net income7 .
In turn, the valuation of individual i when she is in the unhappiness region of
1

income depends directly on iθ . A larger i implies a negative valuation, which occurs
to those individuals with a large attraction for drugs. As a result, drug control
policies might affect more to these type of individuals. Also notice that individual i’s
net income is never negative. This is assumed because there is not a feasible outcome
at a negative net income. Hence, if an individual has an income below ηw and is a
non-thief who gets her income stolen, she will lose her disposable income and consume
at her minimum feasible consumption point, (ci = 0, di = 0).
Drug Supply
Equation (3.3) determines the drug demand for individual i. This equation will
be used below to determine the aggregate drug demand of the economy. That task
will be performed later on. Until now, nothing has been said about the drug supply
side, and the income generated in this sector. As the main interest of the paper is on
property crime in the presence of drug addiction, it is assumed that the economy has
the following exogenous drug supply function:

ST (pd , πc ) = (1 − πc )As pσd s
7

(3.4)

It can be proven that with the lexicographic preferences assumed for the individuals of this
economy, the price-elasticity of drugs demand is 1% on both the happiness and unhappiness regions
of income. As a result, all the numerical results presented below are not based on the assumption
that individuals exhibit a price-inelastic drugs demand –common assumption made in this literature
to support strong claims about the consequences of drug policy.
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where ST (pd , πc ) represents the drug supply at the price pd and the percentage
of drug seized by the government’s drug control policies, πc . As is a productivity
parameter, and σs is the price-elasticity of the drug supply function. It is assumed
that As and σs are both exogenous parameters. The profits obtained in this industry
are also assumed to belong to individuals outside of the economy. Consequently,
drug supply policies affect the incentives of addicts to engage in criminal activities
through the effect of πc on the equilibrium price. That policy will be analyzed in
sections (3.3.5) and (3.4.3).

3.3.3

The Solution

Before analyzing the optimal behavior of the government, it is necessary to find
the solution for each individual. Equation (3.3) is the individual i’s problem. This
problem applies for every individual i with an income wi and a preference parameter
i . The preference parameter also determines the minimum level of drug consumption
that the individual wants to consume, a i . When i > 0, individual i’s utility function
is kinked at the value a i . As a result, individual i’s problem must be solved according
to her economic capacity to reach that minimum drug consumption level. If her
net income Iij is larger than pd a i , she will be able to maximize her utility without
considering the discontinuity on her utility function. Otherwise, individual i’s optimal
decision involves a corner solution where ci = 0, and di =

Iij
pd

for 0 ≤ Iij ≤ pd a i .

Then, let’s initially find out the equilibrium values of ci and di when Iij > pd a i .
To do that, let’s take First Order Conditions (FOC) to equation (3.3) with respect to
ci and di , assuming a value of Iij > pd a i . This results in the following equilibrium
equations:

h
i
1
 1−θ
j
Ii − pd a i
(1 − i )pd
ci (pd ; {i , Iij }) =
1
 1
(1 − i )pd 1−θ + i1−θ pd
1
1
 1−θ
1−θ j

I
+
(1
−

)p
a i
i
d
i
di (pd ; {i , Iij }), = i
1
1
 1−θ
(1 − i )pd
+ i1−θ pd

(3.5)

(3.6)
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Equations (3.5) and (3.6) can be used to determine the indirect utility function of
each individual i given Iij > pd a i . Performing that operation, and combining the
results for the indirect utility functions encountered when Iij ≤ pd a i , the following
kinked indirect utility function is obtained:
(
Vi (Iij , i )

=


Iij − pd a i A0 (pd ; i ) if Iij ≥ pd a i

Iij − pd a i A1 (pd ; i ) if 0 ≤ Iij < pd a i

(3.7)

where A0 (pd ; i ) and A1 (pd ; i ) are two variables defined in equations (A.1) and
(A.2) in appendix (A.2). Equation (3.7) defines an expected indirect utility function
for each Iij , which uses the income distribution to determine the probabilities that
individual i is on any of the two indirect utility functions in equation (3.7). Using
the income distribution defined in equation (3.2), and the fact that Iij assumes the
values Ii0 , Ii1 , Ii2 , and Ii3 in equation (3.3), it is possible to determine the following
expected indirect utility functions, which are the expected payoffs represented at the
end of the extensive-form representation tree in figure (A.9):

e
U1,i
(wi , i ; pd , τ, f ) 


e
W hen T hi = 1
U2,i (wi , i ; pd , τ, ηw)


e
U3,i
(wi , i ; pd , τ ) 

e
U4,i
(wi , i ; pd , τ ) 


e
W hen T hi = 0
U5,i (wi , i ; pd , τ, ηw)


U e (w ,  ; p , τ ) 
6,i

i

i

(3.8)

(3.9)

d

where each of these expected indirect utility functions are defined in equations
e
(A.4), (A.5), (A.6), (A.7), (A.8), and (A.9) in appendix (A.2). It is clear that each Uj,i

depends on wi , i , pd and τ , but some payoffs change according to the occupational
choice of individual i. We can use these payoffs to compute the expected utilities
of individual i in the two occupations to determine for which values of wi and i ,
individual i becomes a thief.
Using the matching and enforcement probabilities defined in the section (3.3.2),
we can compute the following expected payoffs for individual i in each occupational
choice:

Hernán Botero Degiovanni

Optimal Drug Supply Control

i
h
e
e
e
E(T hi = 1|wi , i ) = λr πT U1,i + (1 − πT )U2,i + (1 − λr )U3,i
h
i
e
e
e
E(T hi = 0|wi , i ) = λgr πT U4,i
+ (1 − πT )U5,i
+ (1 − λgr )U6,i
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(3.10)
(3.11)

As a result, individual i becomes a thief when the following condition is satisfied:

E(T hi = 1|wi , i ) − E(T hi = 0|wi , i ) > 0

(3.12)

We can rearrange equation (3.12) in terms of wi . To do that, we can use the fact
that in equilibrium λr + λgr = 1, a condition that will be explained below in section
(3.3.4). Here, we can exploit this condition to determine the percentage of thieves in
the economy in terms of wi . By doing that, equation (3.12) can be rearranged in the
following way:

wi >
wi ≤

B1 pd a i −B2
B0 (1−τ )
B1 pd a i −B2
B0 (1−τ )

= g(i ; λgr , pd , πT , τ, ηw, f ) if B0 > 0
= g(i ; λgr , pd , πT , τ, ηw, f ) if B0 ≤ 0

(3.13)

where B0 , B1 and B2 are defined in equations (A.10), (A.11), and (A.12) in appendix (A.2). Equation (3.13) defines the ranges of values of wi for which individual i
finds profitable to become a criminal, given the value of i . This equation determines
points such as point B in figures (3.1a) and (3.1c), or point J in figure (3.1c). In
other words, equation (3.13) determines incomes such as wB and wB 0 in figures (3.1a)
and (3.1c) for which the individuals find profitable engaging in criminal activities.
Notice that equation (3.13) defines a range of values for wi for which individuals
find profitable to engage in criminal activities depending on the sign of B0 . If B0 is
negative, equation (3.13) determines that the poorest individuals in the economy will
engage in criminal activities. If B0 is positive, the richest individuals will engage in
criminal activities. Despite that this second result is unusual, it cannot be ruled out
a priori from the final equilibrium. As a result, this possibility will be considered in
the analysis, regardless of the fact that in equilibrium, B0 might never be positive.
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Equation (3.13) also helps determine the equilibrium demand of drugs, which will
depend on the equilibrium percentage of thieves in the economy. Before analyzing the
concept of equilibrium used, it is necessary to determine individual i’s drug demand,
di . This demand helps determine the equilibrium drug price, pd , which affects the
function g(i ; · · · ) in equation (3.13). Individual i’s drug demand is also a kinked
function. It will depend on the values that Iij assumes, which, in turn, depends on wi
and the occupational choice of the individual. Then the analysis is split to determine
all segments of each individual i’s kinked drug demands. Let’s start the analysis
computing the expected demand of each individual i at every occupational choice,
given the values of Iij . To attain that, we must differentiate between individual i’s
consumption when Iij is larger than a pd i and when it is smaller. Let us call di (Iij )
and di (Iij ) to individual i’s drug demands when net income is larger and smaller
than a pd i , respectively. di (Iij ) is the same as in equation (3.6), given a value for
Iij . di (Iij ) =

Iij
.
pd

Hence, using the income distribution in equation (3.2), and the net

incomes in equation (3.3), we get the following expected demand functions for each
value that the net income Iij assumes:
dei (Ii0 )

=

dei (Ii1 )

=

dei (Ii2 )

=

dei (Ii3 )

=


pd a i
)
di (Ii0 ) + di (Ii0 ) − di (Ii0 ) p(wi ≤
(1 − τ )

p
a
d  i
di (Ii1 ) + di (Ii1 ) − di (Ii1 ) p(wi ≤
)
(1 − τ )(1 − f )

pd a i − ηw
di (Ii2 ) + di (Ii2 ) − di (Ii2 ) p(wi ≤
)
(1 − τ )


pd a i + ηw 
ηw
di (Ii3 ) + di (Ii3 ) − di (Ii3 ) p(wi ≤
) p(wi >
)
(1 − τ )
(1 − τ )

(3.14)
(3.15)
(3.16)
(3.17)

These four expected demands apply to both occupational choices of individual i.
She will be on any of these four expected demands depending on her occupational
choice, the matching probabilities, and the government’s intervention to stop or help
her. Taking into account the latter factors, we can determine the expected drug
demand of individual i according to her occupational choice in the following way:
(
Die

=



(1 − λgr ) πT dei (Ii1 ) + (1 − πT )dei (Ii2 ) + λgr dei (Ii0 ) if T hi = 1

1 − λgr (1 − πT ) dei (Ii0 ) + λgr (1 − πT )dei (Ii3 )
if T hi = 0

(3.18)
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Equation (3.18) concludes the analysis from the individual i’s perspective. Equations (3.13) and (3.18) determine the behavior of every individual i in the economy
in terms of crime and drug demand. Both sets of equations, when aggregated, help
determine simultaneously the equilibrium amount of thieves and drug demanded in
the economy. In the next section, the equilibrium concept used to determine those
values is explained.

3.3.4

Definition of Equilibrium

Figure (A.9) shows that each individual i has two decisions: an occupational choice
and a consumption decision. These choices vary from individual to individual according to the values that wi and i assume. In aggregate, there is a pair of values for
these two variables that determine the equilibrium percentage of thieves and drug
demand in the economy. These equilibrium values also depend on the values that the
government’s control variables assume. Definition (1) clearly establishes the equilibrium conditions for this economy. To understand and construct that definition, some
more structure is needed.
Equations (3.13) and (3.18) depend on the values of wi and i . However, i assumes discrete values. As a result, we can compute functions that help determine the
equilibrium percentage of thieves and the drug demand for each category of i , which
depend only on the income distribution. To determine theses functions, we must
note that equation (3.13) depends on the sign of the variable B0 , which is defined
in equation (A.10) in appendix (A.2). B0 does not depend on wi , but depends on
i and the government’s controls, which might affect its sign. Taking the latter into
account, we can construct non-linear functions for the equilibrium conditions of the
percentage of thieves and drug demand that depends on the income distribution, the
values of i , and the value of B0 in the following way:
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 n R wmax
if B0 > 0
i g(i ;λgr ,pd ,πT ,τ,ηw,f ) fw (wi )dwi
(3.19)
=
R
 n g(i ;λgr ,pd ,πT ,τ,ηw,f ) fw (wi )dwi if B0 ≤ 0
i 0
hR

wmax
e

if B0 > 0
n


i
g(i ;λgr ,pd ,πT ,τ,ηw,f ) Di (i |T hi = 1)fw (wi )dwi +


i

R

 g(i ;λgr ,pd ,πT ,τ,ηw,f ) De (i |T hi = 0)fw (wi )dwi
i
0
hR
(3.20)
=
g(i ;λgr ,pd ,πT ,τ,ηw,f ) e

ni 0
Di (i |T hi = 1)fw (wi )dwi + if B0 ≤ 0



i


 R wmax
De (i |T hi = 0)fw (wi )dwi
g(i ;λgr ,pd ,πT ,τ,ηw,f )

i

∀ i = {0, , }, and ni = {ni =0 , ni = , ni = }. Equation (3.19) indicates the percentage of individuals with a preference parameter i that finds profitable engaging
in theft. Equation (3.20) shows the drug aggregate demand for all individuals who
have a preference parameter i , regardless of their occupational choice. These two
equations will help determine the equilibrium values below. We can now formally
state the equilibrium conditions for the economy:
Definition 1 Given a set of values for the exogenous parameters {θ, a , As , σs , η}8 
<5+ and for the government’s controls {πc , πT , f, τ }  [0, 1], a Nash Equilibrium for

equation (3.3) consists of a drug price, pd πc , πT , f, τ |ρ, a , As , σs , η ≥ 0, and a per
centage of thieves, NT πc , πT , f, τ |ρ, a , As , σs , η , that solve the following equations
simultaneously:

NT (pd , πT , τ, ηw, f ) =

X

NTi (i ; λgr , pd , πT , τ, ηw, f )

(3.21)

Dei (i ; λgr , pd , πT , τ, ηw, f ) = ST (pd , πc )

(3.22)

i {0,,}

DT (pd , πT , τ, ηw, f ) =

X
i {0,,}

λgr =
λr =
NN T
NT
+
N
N

8

NT
N
NN T
N

= N = 1 = λr + λgr

(3.23)
(3.24)
(3.25)

I could include among the exogenous parameters those for the distribution functions in equations
(3.1) and (3.2). For the sake of exposition, they are taken as part of the distributions. As a result,
those parameters are implied when the distributions are used in the computation of the equilibrium.
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where NTi and Dei are defined in equations (3.19) and (3.20) respectively, and ST (pd , πc )
is the drug supply function defined in equation (3.4).
Two points are worth noting in Definition (1). First, equations (3.23) and (3.24)
define the equilibrium conditions for the matching technologies. Equations (3.23)
indicates that, in equilibrium, a non-thief i’s probability of having her property stolen
must be equal to the percentage of thieves in the economy. Equations (3.23) says that
a thief i’s probability of stealing must be equal to the percentage of non-thieves in the
economy. Taken together, the latter functional forms are model-specific and do not
respond to an ad hoc specification. In turn, equation (3.25) imposes the condition
that the percentage of thieves plus the percentage of non-thieves must be equal to
one, which implies that the matching probabilities must also sum up 1 in equilibrium,
λgr + λr = 1. This condition was used in section (3.3.3) to determine equation (3.13).
This latter equation gives rise to equations (3.19) and (3.20), which are used to
determine the equilibrium percentage of thieves, NT , in equation (3.21). As a result,
the equilibrium conditions of NT and pd can be determined using only equations (3.21)
and (3.22), subject to λgr = NT and given the values for the exogenous parameters
and the government’s control variables. NT and pd can be used to determine DT and
ST , and the values for NTi and Dei , ∀ i = {0, , }.
Second, as the model has either time or a dynamic sequence of movements, the
equilibrium solution is a simple Nash Equilibrium. This equilibrium concept determines that we must find a pair of values for NT and pd , contingent on every possible
value of the government’s control variables, {πT , πc , τ, f }, and the exogenous variables
of the model,{θ, a , As , σs , η}. See Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991 for a thorough analysis
of this equilibrium concept. The results are presented in the next section. As the set
of equations defined by equations (3.21) and (3.22) are highly non-linear, numerical
methods are used to determine the solution. For the sake of exposition, the analysis of
the results will extensively make use of figures to understand the equilibria, without
formal proofs of the results presented.
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Results

Definition (1) determines the conditions under which an equilibrium for NT and
pd is reached. This definition does not impose any restriction for the government.
Hence, there is a pair of equilibrium values, (NT , pd ), per each value of {πT , πc , τ, f }
in their respective domains. To determine the final output, we must analyze each of
its components. Section (3.3.5) analyzes the equilibrium condition in equation (3.21),
and section (3.3.5) does it for the equilibrium condition in equation (3.22). As these
equations define a system of non-linear equations, numerical methods were needed to
reach the solution. To compute the equilibria, values for the exogenous parameters
were assumed, which are presented in table (A.1) in appendix (A.2). From now on,
any numerical result will be based on these values, unless otherwise indicated.
Before entering into the numerical analysis, two important results are presented.
These results are based on the discussion presented in section (3.3.1), and will help
understand the numerical results obtained in the following sections. The first result
is associated to the slopes of the indirect utility function in the happiness and unhappiness regions found in section (3.3.1). Equation (3.7) presents the indirect utility
function for each individual in the economy. In this equation, the happiness and
unhappiness regions are determined by the net income. When Iij is larger than the
value of the minimum drug consumption requirement, pd a i , individuals feel happy
with their income level. When Iij is smaller, individuals feel unhappy. If an individual
i is not attracted to drugs so that i = 0, she will never be unhappy, and always be
risk-neutral. Based on equation (3.7), the following proposition is obtained:
Proposition 1 If individuals in the economy have the utility function defined by
the lexicographic preferences in equation (3.3), the indirect utility function found in
equation (3.7) for the unhappiness region will always have a smaller slope than the
indirect utility function found in equation (3.7) for the happiness region.
Proposition (1) provides with a very useful result. It states that when individuals
exhibit lexicographic preferences of the type defined in equation (3.3), the government
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will always face risk-lover individuals with an unhappiness region increasing with the
equilibrium drug price. Proposition (1) can be proved very easily comparing the value
of A0 (pd ; i ) with the value of A1 (pd ; i ), which are the slopes of the indirect utility
functions found in equation (3.7). These two variables are defined in equations (A.1)
and (A.2) in appendix (A.2). Performing basic algebra, it is seen that A0 (pd ; i ) >
A1 (pd ; i ) ∀ i < 1 and pd > 0. Another important result associated to the slopes of
the indirect utility functions is the following:
Proposition 2 If individuals have the indirect utility function defined by equation
(3.7), the following result holds ∀ i  [0, 1) and pd > 0:
δA1 (pd ; i )
δA0 (pd ; i )
<
δpd
δpd

(3.26)

Proposition (2) states that when individual exhibits the utility function defined in
equation (3.3), the slope of the indirect function defined in the unhappiness region
will change faster with changes in pd than the slope of the indirect function defined in
the happiness region. As a result, drug control policies will never be able to incentivize
individuals to become either risk-neutral or risk-averse individuals when they have
the preferences defined in equation (3.3).
Proposition (2) presents an important result because it says that the numerical
results found in the following sections are based on the decision of risk-lovers. Given
the preferences defined in equation (3.3), should the government optimally control
the availability of narcotics in the markets? The following sections present numerical
examples where the answer is no. In the next section, it is analyzed numerically the
existence of an equilibrium crime rate given a fixed value for the drug price, pd . In
the next one, it is analyzed numerically the existence of an equilibrium drug price,
given a fixed value for the crime rate, NT .
Multiple Equilibria
Equation (3.21) defines the equilibrium condition for NT . This equation depends
on both endogenous variables, pd and NT = λgr . As a result, the solution to this
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equation involves a fixed-point for NT , for every value of pd and the government’s
control variables. See Stokey and Lucas, 1989 for a formal analysis of fixed-point
problems and their solutions. Given that equation (3.21) satisfies the conditions for
having at least a fixed-point solution for NT , the following result is stated:
Result 1 Given a set of values for the exogenous parameters {θ, a , As , σs , η}  <5+
and for the government’s controls {πc , πT , f, τ }  [0, 1], there are two equilibrium values NT1 (pd , πc , πT , f, τ ) and NT2 (pd , πc , πT , f, τ )} for the total percentage of thieves that
make equation (3.21) be in equilibrium, per value of the drug price, pd . Additionally,
these two values satisfy the following conditions:
1. NT1 (pd , πc , πT , f, τ ) < NT2 (pd , πc , πT , f, τ )

2.

δNT1 (pd ,πc ,πT ,f,τ )
δpd

> 0 and

3.

δNT1 (pd ,πc ,πT ,f,τ )
δπc

=

δNT2 (pd ,πc ,πT ,f,τ )
δpd

δNT1 (pd ,πc ,πT ,f,τ ) δpd
δpd
δπc

4. ∃ π T (pd , f, τ )  [0, 1]

∀ {πc , πT , f, τ }[0, 1]

and pd  <+ .

< 0.

and

δNT2 (pd ,πc ,πT ,f,τ )
δπc

=

δNT2 (pd ,πc ,πT ,f,τ ) δpd
.
δpd
δπc

∀ πT [0, π T (pd , f, τ )]:
1

NT1 (pd , πc , πT , f, τ )= N T (pd , πc , π T (pd , f, τ ), f, τ ) and,
NT2 (pd , πc , πT , f, τ )=N 2T (pd , πc , π T (pd , f, τ ), f, τ ).

Instead of providing a formal proof of Result (1), a graphical exposition is used
to exemplify its results. Figure (A.11) depicts equation (3.21) along the πT and NT
dimensions, for pd  {1, 3}. Figure (A.11) also depicts the values of NT for which
equation (3.21) is in equilibrium, which occurs when both sides of the equation are
equal. If we redefine equation (3.21) as a non-linear equation in two unknowns, the
redefined non-linear function is in equilibrium when it crosses the zero plane at the
{NT , πT } space. The equilibria stated in Result (1) is represented by points a and
b in figure (A.11). At these two points, there are two values of NT that make both
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sides of equation (3.21) equal, given the specific values of πT , τ , and f . Figure (A.11)
also shows that there is a pair of values for NT that makes equation (3.21) be in
equilibrium, for every value of πT and pd .
The values represented by points a and b in figure (A.11) also show the result in
Numeral 1 in Result (1). In other words, if point a represents NT1 and b represents NT2
in Result (1), it is clear that NT2 > NT1 . This is also true for every value that connects
a and b along the zero plane on the {NT , πT } space for different values of πT . Figure
(A.12) in appendix (A.2) replicates selected layers of figure (A.11) for different values
of πT and pd . In this graph, the result of Numeral 1 in Result (1) is more evident.
There are two values of NT that makes equation (3.21) be in equilibrium. These
two numbers are always apart, being the solutions at the right-hand side of point
b in figure (A.12) always larger than the solutions at the left-hand side of point a
in the same figure. Consequently, Numeral 1 in Result (1) enables us to define NT1
as the low-(value) equilibrium and NT2 as the high-(value) equilibrium for the total
percentage of thieves or total criminal rates.
The results of Numeral 2 and 4 in Result (1) are also evident in figure (A.12).
Numeral 2 states that when pd increases, the low equilibrium increases and the high
equilibrium decreases. As a result, a variation in the drug price generates divergent
effects on the criminals rates at these two equilibria. Numeral 4 states that there is a
lower bound for πT that generates an upper bound for the low equilibrium criminal
1

rate, N T , and a lower bound for the high equilibrium criminal rate, N 2T . The lower
bound π T (pd , f, τ ) depends on the values of {f, τ } and the drug price, pd . Hence,
there will be one π T for every equilibrium drug price and values of {f, τ }. These two
results are shown in figure (A.12). The graph shows 6 layers that are scattered in
pairs. Each pair represents the redefined non-linear function of equation (3.21) for a
value of πT and two values for the drug price, pd  {1, 3}. In this graph, it is clear
that an increase in price from 1 to 3 generates a marginal increase in NT1 and an
almost negligible decrease in NT2 . The graph also shows the upper and lower bounds
to which NT1 and NT2 tend with increases in πT and pd .
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Notice that equation (3.21) does not directly depend on the value of πc . Hence, the
effect of πc will be captured through its effect on the drug price, which increases the
cost of the drug consumption bundle for the consumers. Hence, another important
result that can be derived from equation (3.21) is stated in Numeral 3 in Result (1).
The effect of drug control policies on crime rates depends on the effect of these policies
on the equilibrium price. Given Numeral 2 in Result (1), if
and

δNT2 (pd ,πc ,πT ,f,τ )
δπc

δpd
δπc

> 0,

δNT1 (pd ,πc ,πT ,f,τ )
δπc

>0

< 0, and the opposite otherwise. This result is important because

it will help explain the effects of πc studied in section (3.4).
Equilibrium Drug Demands and Prices
To determine the full equilibrium of pd and NT , the optimal behavior of equation
(3.22) needs to be considered. Equation (3.22) determines a common clearing market
condition for the drug market. In this equation, the most interesting function to
analyze is the drug demand function, because the drug supply is exogenously given
by equation (3.4). The following result arises from equation (3.22):

Result 2 Given a set of values for the exogenous parameters {θ, a , As , σs , η}  <5+
and for the government’s controls {πc , πT , f, τ }  [0, 1], there is at least a drug price,
p∗d , that makes equation (3.22) be in equilibrium per value of the crime rate, NT .
Result (2) helps assure that there is at least an equilibrium price for the system
of equations defined by equations (3.21) and (3.22), per value of NT . Yet, the result
does not say anything about p∗d being the price that determines both criminal rates
found in Result (1), {NT1 , NT2 }. Then, the equilibrium values to determine are those
that satisfy both Results.
Figure (A.13) in appendix (A.2) shows an aggregate drug demand along the dimensions of πT and NT . The graph shows that there is one value for the aggregate
drug demand per value πT and NT . As a result, as the drug supply is not affected by
either πT , f or τ , there will be a drug supply that crosses at a single point the demand
for drugs at every value of NT . This is true for any combination of πT and NT . Our
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task is now to find those values that clear equations (3.21) and (3.22) simultaneously.
This is performed in the next section.

Unrestricted Optimal Drug Supply Control

Taking into account the results of sections (3.3.5) and (3.3.5), the final equilibria for
pd and NT can be computed. Using the Results (1) and (2), the following result is
obtained:
Result 3 Given a set of values for the exogenous parameters {θ, a , As , σs , η}  <5+
and for the government’s controls {πc , πT , f, τ }  [0, 1], there is a equilibrium drug
price, p∗d , and a pair of crime rates {NT1 , NT2 } such that the following two conditions
are simultaneously satisfy:

NT1 (p∗d , πT , τ, f ) ≡

X

NTi (i ; NT1 , p∗d , πT , τ, f )

(3.27)

NTi (i ; NT2 , p∗d , πT , τ, f )

(3.28)

Dei (i ; NT1 , p∗d , πT , τ, f ) ≡ ST (p∗d , πc )

(3.29)

Dei (i ; NT2 , p∗d , πT , τ, f ) ≡ ST (p∗d , πc )

(3.30)

i {0,,}

NT2 (p∗d , πT , τ, f )

≡

X
i {0,,}

DT (p∗d , πT , τ, f )

=

X
i {0,,}

DT (p∗d , πT , τ, f )

=

X
i {0,,}

Result (3) indicates that there is an equilibrium price, p∗d , for every pair of equilibrium values for the crime rates, NT1 and NT2 , that clears equation (3.21). Additionally,
it also indicates that either crime rate, NT1 or NT2 , can be used to determine the equilibrium price, p∗d , that clears equation (3.22). Notice that Result (3) does not say
anything about the properties of these equilibrium values, especially for the case of
πc . The reason is that it is not always clear-cut how to sign the derivatives of these
equilibrium equations with respect to their arguments without having an explicit
function for computing the derivatives.
However, the effects of πc can be studied numerically. Figure (A.14) presents an
example for the equilibrium values for NT , (NT1 , NT2 ), for all values of πc and πT in
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the [0, 1] interval, given fixed values for the other control variables of the government,
{τ = 0.07, f = 0.20}. The graph shows that the low crime rate, NT1 , decreases with
larger values of πT , and the high crime rate, NT2 , increases with πT . In the figure, it
is also shown the upper and lower bounds for the values of NT found in Result (1). It
is clear that NT2 is not a common outcome of real life economies. It is unclear under
which conditions an equilibrium of this type arises. However, NT1 appears to be the
type of equilibrium of real economies. From now on, the results will be analyzed only
for the low crime rate, NT1 .
In turn, the effect of πc on NT1 is unclear in figure (A.14). There are two factors
for this result: on the one hand, it seems as the graph does not show a change in
the crime rate with increases in πc . This is due to the scale of the changes. As the
effect of πc on the crime rates is through the drug price, changes in pd generate small
changes in NT . When these changes are depicted in a single graph, their effects almost
disappear. On the other hand, the increase in πc does not always generate an increase
in the percentage of thieves in the economy. A priori, an increase in πc might have
diverging effects on the crime rates due to its effects on the equilibrium drug price as
was discussed in section (3.3.1). Figure (A.15) shows another instance in which drug
control policies might reduce the crime rates of the economy. The discussion laid out
in section (3.3.1) might help understand this result. In this economy, when individuals
are on the happiness or unhappiness regions of their linear indirect utility function,
they compare the expected incomes of becoming a criminal or not disregarding their
addiction levels. The only factor that matters is the probability that both lottery
outcomes are within the same region. In this case, the expected income of becoming
a criminal is larger than the expected income from becoming a non-criminal for the
individuals who have the following income:

wi <

ηw(1 − πT )(λr − λgr )
(1 − τ )λr πT f

(3.31)

This value increases with ηw, τ , and the number of non-criminals, λr , and decreases
with the other factors. If λr is low, this bound might also be low, depending on the
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values of f , πT and τ . This bound does not directly depend on the value of pd .
Hence, drug control policies do not affect directly the decisions of individuals in this
case. When the outcomes of becoming a criminal or not do not fall within the same
income regions in figure (3.1), equation (3.31) does not apply any more. I computed
an equivalent bound for an income level wi given a value of i in equation (3.13).
The sign of the change of this equation with respect to their arguments cannot be
determined as easily as for the case of equation (3.31). However, equation (3.13)
shows two very interesting results. On the one hand, this equation depends on the
value that pd assumes. That was not the case for equation (3.31). As a result, drug
control policies affect directly the economic incentives of criminal activities in the
total equilibrium. On the other hand, it can be proven from equation (3.13) that
the effect of changes in the drug price might have diverging effects on the economic
incentives of addicts to engage in criminal activities. The sign of the derivative of
the right-hand side of equation (3.13) will depend on how much this function react
to changes in a i pd 9 . If this change is large when pd changes, individuals will be
incentivized to crime even though the economic revenue from criminal activities is
not very large. This is especially true for highly-addicted individuals.
Figure (A.15) plots NT1 in terms of πc , divided by groups of addiction. The graph
shows that increases in the drug control rate, πc , lead all three categories to increase
their crime rates. However, there is a sufficiently high value of πc that leads lightlyaddicted individuals to reduce their criminal rates, while highly addicted individuals
increase their rates to their highest, per value of f and τ . The total outcome is a
compounded rate composed of the reactions of all three categories.
From figure (A.15), three comments are in order: first, despite that there are some
values of πc for which lightly-addicted individuals might decrease their crime rates,
9

In fact, the derivative of the right-hand side of equation (3.13) with respect to pd is positive if
the following condition is satisfied:
pd a i >

δB0
2
B0 ( δB
δpd ) − B2 ( δpd ) − B0 B1 a i
δB0
1
B0 ( δB
δpd ) − B1 ( δpd )
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the case depicted in figure (A.15b) is just a special case for the effect of πc on NT .
In general, all types of addicts tend to increase their crime rates with increases in
πc . At least, that is true for the numerical example presented in this paper. Second,
individuals with zero addiction also increase their crime rates with increases in πc . A
priori, these individuals are not directly affected by the drug supply control policy.
However, this policy directly affects the other two categories, especially the heavilyaddicted individuals. The reaction of individuals with zero addiction to increases in
the percentage of thieves in the other two categories of addiction is also to increase
their crime rates. This a feature of the crime model laid out in equation (3.3). The
crime rate presents inertia because individuals find profitable engaging in criminal
activities when many other individuals are also performing these activities. Finally,
it is notorious in figures (A.14) and (A.15) that a πc > 0 always increases the crime
rates relative to πc = 0. In other words, the government always increases the crime
rates with a marginal increase in πc , from πc = 0 to πc > 0. This is true even for the
case πc = 1. The latter gives rise to the following result:

Results 4 Let NT1 (πc , πT , τ, f ) and p∗d (πc , πT , τ, f ) represent the equilibrium values
that solve equations (3.21) and (3.22), respectively. If the objective of the government
is to reduce the total percentage of thieves in the economy, NT1 (πc , πT , τ, f ), not subject
to a budget constraint, there is a π T (πc , τ, f )  [0, 1] such that, ∀ πT ≥ π T , and ∀ {τ, f }
 [0, 1], NT1 reaches a minimum value of zero at πc = 0.
Result (4) determines the government’s optimal behavior in terms of the drug supply control policy, πc . It states that, if the government aims to reduce the percentage
of thieves in the economy, the best strategy is to spend all its resources on capturing
thieves and not on controlling drugs. The reason can be extracted from Result (4)
and figure (A.15). If the government’s actions increase the economic incentives of
addicts to engage in criminal activities, the best strategy for the government is to
maintain those incentives at their minimum levels. That occurs when πc = 0.
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The latter intuition is numerically confirmed in figure (A.16). The graph depicts
a set of layers for the optimal low crime rate, NT1 , along the dimensions of πT and πc ,
for several values of f and τ . The graph shows several features already commented:
first, there is a π T (πc , τ, f ) for each of these layers such that the minimum value for
NT1 is reached at πc = 0. Those minimum points are shown by Min Point in figure
(A.16). Second, the special cases depicted in figure (A.15) are represented by the
Area A in figure (A.16). It is clear that there are some values of f and τ for which
a high value of πc generates a decrease in the percentage of lightly-addicted thieves.
However, the graph also shows that those points are special cases. In fact, there is
a maximum point for NT1 at the points πc = 1 and πT = 0, ∀ {f, τ }  (0, 1]. In
order words, the maximum percentage of thieves is reached, for all values of f and τ
in the (0,1] interval, when the government spends all its resources in controlling the
supply of narcotics, and nothing on capturing thieves. At these points, all categories
of addiction have the largest possible crime rates.
The latter occurs because the equilibrium price is not large enough to induce
individuals to become non-criminals with drug control policies10 . A final result for
this section is shown in figure (A.17). This graph shows the drug equilibrium prices,
pd , along the πT and πc dimensions, for the same values of f and τ as in figure (A.16).
It also shows the equilibrium prices when the high crime rate, NT2 , is considered for
the same values of the government’s control variables. The graph shows that these
two sets of equilibrium price values are very similar for both equilibrium crime rates.
This was expected from Result (2). As there is a single value of pd for every pair
of equilibrium crime rates, (NT1 , NT2 ), the equilibrium prices for both crime rates are
the same. The graph also shows that πc affects more the equilibrium price than πT .
That was also expected because πc affects directly the availability of drugs in the
market, whereas πT only imposes the costs to criminal activities, without directly
10

This result might be partially to the assumption that individuals in this economy follow a CES
utility function, which implies that the price-elasticity of drug demand is 1%. The exploration of a
more general utility function that captures a more general price-elasticity of drug demand is needed
to determine the extend to which this result depends on the CES utility function. That task is left
for future research.
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influencing the results in the drug market. Notice that the largest equilibrium price
value depicted in figure (A.17) is around 2.7. This value is small relative to the needed
price to induce addicts to become more risk-neutral, as was argued in section (3.3.1).
The needed price value for the numerical values of the exogenous parameters assumed
in this paper is larger than 3.5.

3.4

Model with a Budget Restriction for the Government

Result (4) secures an equilibrium outcome for the government in terms of πT and
πc , for every value of f and τ . However, governments are usually not free to spend all
what they want, on what they want as they have budgets constraints. That is why it
is introduced the government’s budget in this section to determine its optimal drug
policy in the presence of a budget.

3.4.1

The Model: The Budget Constraint of the Government

In order to determine the optimal behavior of the government subject to a budget
constraint, some more structure is needed. Several assumptions are made for this
purpose. First, it is assumed that the government has the following functional forms
for the enforcement variables:

aT r T
1 + aT rT
ac rc
=
1 + ac rc

πT =

(3.32)

πc

(3.33)

where equations (3.32) and (3.33) are known as predatory functions or functional
responses in Ecology. These functions are also used in the economics of crime to
model the predation activities of the government. For an example in the use of these
functions, see Mejia, 2008 who uses an alternative functional form to determine the
interdiction policies of the Colombian government in its war against narcotics. rT
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and rc are the amount of resources spent by the government on capturing thieves and
drugs respectively. aT and ac capture the productivity of these predatory functions.
Larger values of aT and ac imply that the government is more effective at capturing
thieves and drugs, respectively, for the same levels of expenditure, rT and rc . In this
setup, πc can be interpreted as a tax if positive and a subsidy if negative. The reason
is that πc acts as an indirect tax that captures a percentage of drugs in the market.
A πc > 0 indicates that the government must seize a percentage of drugs. A πc < 0
indicates that the government must increase the availability of drugs in πc %.
I also assume that thieves or drug consumers face fines but no jail time. When
the government captures a thief, it charges a fine f to her, which is a percentage of
the thief’s income. I also assume that the government uses the income of the fines,
apart from the income raised from income taxes, to finance its expenditure on rT and
rc . Given these assumptions, the government’s budget constraint can be expressed in
the following way:


rT + rc = τ w + (1 − τ )f (1 − λgr )

X


ni wT (i )

(3.34)

i ={0,,}

where,

wT (i ) =
wT (i ) =

R wmax
g( ;··· )

i
R wmax

wi fw (wi ) if B0 > 0

w f (wi ) if B0 ≤ 0
g(i ;··· ) i w

(3.35)

Equation (3.35) represents the mean income of thieves with a drug preference
parameter of i . This function also depends on the value of B0 , as the set of indirect
utility functions in equation (3.7). Equation (3.34) implies that the government’s
budget constrain depend on an income tax, τ w, charged to all individuals in the
economy, regardless of their occupational choice. Equation (3.34) also depends on
the expected income obtained by the government from fines charged on thieves when
captured. This expected income depends on the thieves’ income, net of what the
government charges for income tax.
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Taking into account this budget constraint, the government’s minimization problem can be expressed in the following way11 :

min

{πc ,πT ,f,τ }

s.t

αT NT∗ (πc , πT , f, τ ) + (1 − αT )[rT + rc ]
 X
rT + rc = τ w + (1 − τ )f (1 − λgr )

(3.36)
ni wT (i )



(3.37)

i ={0,,}

Equation (3.36) represents the government’s objective function. This function is
composed of the optimal total percentage of thieves, given the values of the government’s control variables, and the amount of resources spent on enforcement activities.
αT is an exogenous parameter in the [0, 1] interval. This parameter captures the ponderation that the government gives to controlling thieves. Figures (A.18) and (A.19)
show examples of equations (3.36) and (3.37). Three points are worth noting here:
first, the government is able to obtain more relaxed budget constraints with increases
f and τ . This implies that the government is able to reach larger values of both πc
and πT with increments in f and τ . Second, the budget constraint is defined for all
possible values of NT , among which the equilibrium values are also counted. Figure
(A.18) shows the budget constraints using the low crime rate found in Result (1),
NT1 . The graph shows that the projections of the budget constraint onto the NT1
space decrease with increments in f . Thus, the government accomplishes two objectives increasing f : the government is able to reach larger values for both enforcement
technologies, and the equilibrium crime rates are smaller.
Finally, figure (A.19) shows the government’s maximization problem for three budget constraints, and for a ponderation αT = 0.5 in its objective function. On the
graph, it is clear that there is a region generated by large values of πT and small
values of πc for which this function appears to have a minimum. However, that minimum seems not be the point found in Result (4). Before analyzing the equilibrium
values obtained, the following section introduces the definition of equilibrium when
the government is subject to a budget constraint.
11

An alternative government’s objective function might involve maximizing a social welfare function. No attempt is made to perform such an exercise.
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Definition of Equilibrium

When the budget constraint for the government is introduced, Definition (1) does
not apply any longer. Using the budget constraint defined in equation (3.34) and the
objective function defined in equation (3.36), the new definition of the equilibrium is:
Definition 2 Given a set of values for the exogenous parameters {θ, a , As , σs , η, aT , ac , αT }
 <8+ , a Nash Equilibrium for equations (3.3) and (3.36) consists
of a drug price,

∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
pd πc , πT , f , τ ≥ 0, a percentage of thieves, NT πc , πT , f , τ , and the government’s
optimal controls,{πc∗ , πT∗ , f ∗ , τ ∗ }, that solve the following equations simultaneously:

∗
NT (p∗d , πT
, τ ∗, f ∗)

=

X



∗
NTi (i ; λgr , p∗d , πT
, τ ∗, f ∗)

(3.38)

∗
Dei (i ; λgr , p∗d , πT
, τ ∗ , f ∗ ) = ST (p∗d , πc∗ )

(3.39)

i {0,,}
∗
DT (p∗d , πT
, τ ∗, f ∗)

=

X
i {0,,}

NT
N
NN T
N

λgr

=

λr

=

NN T
NT
+
N
N

=

N = 1 = λr + λgr

=


τ w + (1 − τ ∗ )f ∗ (1 − λgr )

∗
rT (πT
) + rc (πc∗ )

(3.40)
(3.41)
(3.42)
X


∗
ni wT (i ; πc∗ , πT
, f ∗, τ ∗)

(3.43)

i ={0,,}
∗
{πc∗ , πT
, f ∗, τ ∗}



∗
∗
argmin{αT NT∗ (πc∗ , πT
, τ ∗ , f ∗ ) + (1 − αT )[rT (πT
) + rc (πc∗ )]}

(3.44)

where NTi and Dei are defined in equations (3.19) and (3.20) respectively, and
ST (pd , πc ) is the drug supply function defined equation (3.4). rT (πT∗ ; aT ) and rc (πc∗ ; ac )
are two functions derived from equations (3.32) and (3.33), respectively.
Equations (3.38) to (3.42) in Definition (2) are equivalent to those encountered
in Definition (1). The additional restrictions are those related to the government’s
values. It is now required that the government’s control variables are in equilibrium.
That equilibrium is defined by a set of values for πc , πT , f , and τ that minimizes the
government’s objective function defined in equation (3.36), subject to the balanced
budget constraint in equation (3.43). In the next section, the equilibrium for this
economy is encountered and exemplified for a set of values of the exogenous parameters. With that equilibrium at hand, two comparative static analysis were performed
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in section (3.5). In the first exercise, the value of ac , the productivity parameter of
the drug enforcement technology πc defined in equation (3.33), is increased. In the
second, α1,w is increased. α1,w is the parameter that captures the skewness of the income distribution. Increasing α1,w improves the income distribution in the economy.
Then, section (3.5) also studies the effect of income distribution improvements on the
crime rates, and the government’s optimal decisions.

3.4.3

Results: Restricted Optimal Drug Supply Control

Definition (2) determines the conditions for an equilibrium to exist. Notice that
the set of equations in the definition are defined for all the equilibrium values of
NT . In Result (1), two values for NT were found to be equilibrium values per value
of pd , and the government’s control variables. In the sequel, the results for the low
crime rate, NT1 , are only presented. Based on Definition (2), the following result arises:

Result 5 Let NT1 (πc , πT , τ, f ) and p∗d (πc , πT , τ, f ) represent the equilibrium values that
solve equations (3.38) and (3.39). If the objective of the government is to minimize
equation (3.36), using NT1 (πc , πT , τ, f ) as the crime rate objective, subject to the budget
constraint in equation (3.37), the following two conditions are satisfied:
i. ∃ Θ1 ⊂<8++ such that ∀ {θ, a , As , σs , η, aT , ac , αT }  Θ1 :

πc∗ (θ, a , As , σs , η, aT , ac , αT )
πT∗ (θ, a , As , σs , η, aT , ac , αT )
τ ∗ (θ, a , As , σs , η, aT , ac , αT )

(


(0, 1]
argmin{Equation (3.36)}

f ∗ (θ, a , As , σs , η, aT , ac , αT )
ii. ∃ Θ2 ⊂<8++ such that ∀ {θ, a , As , σs , η, aT , ac , αT }  Θ2 :

(3.45)
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πT∗ (θ, a , As , σs , η, aT , ac , αT )
τ ∗ (θ, a , As , σs , η, aT , ac , αT )

(


(3.46)

argmin{Equation (3.36)}

f ∗ (θ, a , As , σs , η, aT , ac , αT )
(
πc∗ (θ, a , As , σs , η, aT , ac , αT ) 

(0, 1]

77

(−1, 0]
argmin{Equation (3.36)}

Result (5) provides the solution for the government’s problem in equations (3.36)
and (3.37). It states that there is at least two types of solutions: one type is composed
of strictly positive values of the government’s control variables. The other is composed
of strictly positive values of the government’s control variables, except for πc∗ . Here,
πc∗ is negative. If πc is understood as a proxy for a tax rate on the drug composite
commodity, a positive πc∗ is a tax and a negative πc∗ is a subsidy. Hence, Numeral i
in Result (5) indicates that πc∗ is a tax in equilibrium, and Numeral ii indicates that
πc∗ is a subsidy12 .
Figures (A.20) and (A.21) show an example for Numeral i in Result (5), which
solve the system of equations in Definition (2). The equilibrium is shown from two
perspectives. Figure (A.20) shows the solution from above the objective function, and
figure (A.21) does it from below. Point A on both graphs indicate the equilibrium
point. At this point, all the control variables are strictly positive.
Using the parameters in table (A.1) to perform the numerical analysis, it is encountered that the drug policy variable is positive, but small. The equilibrium value
for πc∗ = 0.0159. This value is computed for a series of changes in certain parameter
values in the next section. Before entering into that analysis, it is noted here that the
graphs show that πc∗ is strictly positive due to the government’s budget requirements.
When the government also aims to minimize the amount of resources spent on enforcement activities, the chosen equilibrium points will represent those expenditure
12

These results were found using numerical approximations. The method used to obtain these
results is a build-in function in MATLAB called fgoalattain, which uses a sequential quadratic
programming (SQP) method with non-linear constraints to attain the solution. Using this method,
the restriction πc = 0 was imposed to obtain the solution. The solver never converged to this lower
bound when its optimal solution was πc∗ < 0.
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concerns. The point shown in the graph considers a budget ponderation of αT = 0.5.
As the point that minimizes NT1 requires to set a high value of πT , as was found
in Result (4), budget considerations force the government to control the availability
of drugs in the market. The reason is that more thieves provide more resources to
spend when captured. As πc increases the equilibrium drug price, as was seen in figure (A.17), a larger p∗d induces more individuals to crime, increasing the government’s
resource availability for a given value of πT∗ . This is especially true for low values
of πc . At those points, marginal increments in this variable always generate positive
changes in the crime rates of all categories.

3.5

Comparative Statics Analysis

Result (5) provides a useful solution that can be exploited in several manners. In
this section, two exercises of comparative static analysis are performed. The first
exercise changes the value of ac and is presented in section (3.5.1). The second
exercise consists of changing α1,w , the parameter that captures the income distribution
skewness. This second exercise is presented in section (3.5.2).

3.5.1

Technological Improvement in πc

Table (3.1) presents the equilibrium values of NT , pd , and the government’s control
variables for changes in ac . It also presents the equilibrium values of the percentage of
thieves, the aggregate drug demand and the government’s income sources per category
of addiction. Except for the drug demand, supply, and price values, all results are
expressed in percentage points. The results in table (3.1) are computed using the
numerical values of the exogenous parameters of table (A.1), allowing ac to change
from 1 to 3.04. This implies that it is easier for the government to seize drugs in the
market with each increment in ac . At the initial equilibrium, the government is more
effective at capturing thieves than seizing drugs (ac = 1 < aT = 2). Once ac > 2, the
government becomes more effective at seizing drugs. The results in table (3.1) are
also presented for three values of αT  {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}. A low value of αT implies that
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the government ponderates the number of thieves less than its expenditure level in
its objective function. A high value implies the opposite.
The results in table (3.1) show that the exercise performed in this subsection
belongs to the type of equilibrium found in Numeral i in Result (5); regardless the
value of αT , πc∗ is always positive and increases with larger values of ac . The intuition
behind these two results is simple: On the one hand, Result (4) stated that the
government’s best strategy to minimize the percentage of thieves in the economy is
to spend a large amount of resources on πT . However, when the government faces
a budget constraint, that maximum value of πT is not always an attainable point.
As a result, the government is forced to seek other sources of income to finance its
enforcement activities. A positive πc∗ induces addicts to crime through its effect on p∗d .
As a percentage πT∗ of thieves is captured and the government uses the fines charged
on them to finance its enforcement activities, it is optimal for the government to
induce addicts to crime to supplement its income.
The latter intuition is confirmed when the equilibrium values of πc∗ for the different
values of αT are compared. A larger value of αT reduces the value of πc∗ . This implies
that when the government ponderates the equilibrium value of the crime rate more
than the expenditure levels, πc∗ tends to be smaller, inducing less addicts to crime.
The latter generates a smaller total amount of thieves because non-addicts are also
incentivized to reduce their crime rates.
On the other hand, table (3.1) also shows that increments in ac lead the government
to change the percentage of resources dedicated to seizing drugs, which increases πc∗ .
That variation depends on the value that ac assumes relative to that of aT . When
ac < aT , an increment in ac induces the government to increase the percentage of
resources spent on rc relative to rT . Once the government becomes more effective
at seizing drugs than at capturing thieves, the percentage of resources dedicated to
seizing drugs are reduced and the percentage spent on controlling thieves increased.
However, the drug control policy keeps receiving an important proportion of the
budget when ac > aT .
When the government has a minimum expenditure requirement along with a min-
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imum crime rate concern, the best strategy is to find the cheapest combination of
enforcement expenditure that minimizes the government’s objective. When ac increases, πc becomes a relatively cheaper alternative, which also helps raise revenue
indirectly through the fines on captured thieves who are induced to commit property crime by a larger drug price, pd . As an increase in pd moderately increases the
crime rate, the government is able to redistribute resources from the thief-controlling
activity, πT , to drug-seizing activity, πc , without increasing the value of its objective function. However, that redistribution reaches a maximum point. When the
government becomes more effective at seizing drugs than at capturing thieves, the
best strategy is to increase the resources spent on controlling thieves again. The
reason is that every dollar spent on rc generates more thieves than it increases the
efficiency of the budget redistribution. As a result, more resources are needed on the
thief-controlling activity in equilibrium.
In sum, minimum expenditure requirements incentivize the government to control
narcotics in the market. In this model, that optimally occurs because the government can use the fines obtained from captured thieves to finance its enforcement
activities when it is subject to a budget constraint. When the government is less
efficient at seizing drugs, the government spends more resources on capturing thieves
than on controlling drug availability. Once the government starts becoming more
efficient at seizing drugs, the percentage of resources spent on seizing drugs starts
to increase. When the government becomes more efficient at seizing drugs than at
capturing thieves, the percentage of resources spent on seizing drugs decreases, and
on controlling thieves increases. However, the percentage of resources spent on the
drug control policy is always larger with increments in ac .
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Income Distribution Improvement

In contrast to the results presented in the previous subsection, the exercise presented here belongs to the type of equilibrium found in Numeral ii in Result (5). Table
(3.2) presents the results for the second comparative static exercise performed. In this
case, the value of α1,w is changed from 1.4 to 2.2. Figure (A.22) depicts the income
distributions of all the values of α1,w presented in table (3.2) organized by addiction
category. The graph shows that all income distributions becomes more centered with
larger values of α1,w . That is, each increment in α1,w induces to improvements in the
income distribution of the economy.
Table (3.2) presents three results worth noting: first, improvements in the income
distribution of all categories of drug addiction reduce the crime rate in general. This
occurs despite the fact that the potential amount of resources to steal increases with
w. Second, income distribution improvements generates that the government obtains
larger amount of resources from captured thieves in equilibrium, which leads the
government to reduce the equilibrium values of f ∗ and τ ∗ .
Finally, when α1,w is sufficiently large, πc∗ becomes a subsidy. This occurs because
income improvements increase the equilibrium drug price, p∗d . When the government
has enough revenue to spend on the thief-controlling activity, it becomes optimal for
the government to try to incentivize addicts not to engage in criminal activities by
subsidizing the availability of drugs in the market, which helps reduce the equilibrium
drug price. To accomplish that goal, the government dedicates part of its budget to
increase the supply of drugs in the market. That budget is appropriated to the amount
of resources dedicated to controlling thieves. This result is counterintuitive to any
previous analysis on drugs. In previous analysis, the government always controls
drugs in equilibrium. In this model, it is optimal for the government to subsidize
the consumption of drugs because it reduces the incentives of addicts to engage in
criminal activities.
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Table 3.2: Equilibrium Values of the Economy for Changes in α1,w

100

97.16

2.84

6.43

93.57

rc

100

8.58

0.84

1.84

5.91

91.42

8.96

100

7.55

0.73

1.65

5.16

rT

T = IT τ + IT f
IG
G
G

Tf
IG
=

8.19

92.45

18.01

w

=

1.66

1.97

f∗

τ ∗w

0.46

1.11

17.28

24.01

24.62

1.985

0.009

1.975

1.975

0

∗
πT
πc∗
τ∗

IGi

Tτ
IG

1.925

STp = STc + ST

0

0.021

0.554

Di =

Di =0
P

1.904

0.554

1.348

Di =

STc

1.420

0.575

ST

11.26

12.05

pd

1.904

3.39

3.68

i {0,,} Di

DT =

1.61

1.71

0.597

16.26

17.45

NT∗
NT

NT
NT0

1.72

1.56

α1,w

Hernán Botero Degiovanni
83

Hernán Botero Degiovanni

3.6

Optimal Drug Supply Control

84

Conclusions

Drugs are special commodities. They seem to generate a minimum consumption
requirement in their consumers. This minimum requirement might incentivize addicts
to engage in property crime. A model of crime is used to determine the optimal
amount of resources that the government must spend to control drugs in the market
in order to minimize the percentage of thieves in the economy.
The analysis is performed under two scenarios. In the first scenario, the government’s objective is to minimize the total percentage of thieves in the economy not
subject to a budget constraint. In the second scenario, the government faces a budget
constraint and aims to minimize the enforcement expenditure apart from the crime
rate.
The numerical results computed in this paper indicate that when the government
does not face a budget constraint, the best strategy is to spend only on capturing
thieves and not on seizing drugs. The reason is that drug control policies increase the
equilibrium drug prices, which increases the addicts’ incentives to engage in property
crime. By spending nothing on controlling drugs, the government keeps the economic
incentives of addicts to engage in criminal activities at its minimum levels. This
occurs because the government is not able to induce an equilibrium drug price that
makes drug addicts become more risk-neutral with changes in pd .
In contrast, when the government faces a budget constraint, and there is a minimum expenditure requirement, the best strategy for the government is to control a
positive percentage of drugs in the market. The reason is that the government is able
to supplement its budget with the income obtained from captured addicts engaged
in crime. When the government has sufficient funds to control the optimal percentage of thieves in equilibrium, the best strategy of the government is to subsidize the
consumption of drugs. This occurs because income improvements increase the equilibrium price of drugs, but it does not occur to a point in which individuals become
risk-neutral, so that the economic incentives of enforcement have a larger influence on
individual’s criminal decisions. At the equilibrium values encountered for pd , people
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are incentivized to commit crime. Hence, it is optimal for the government to reduce
those incentives through increasing the availability of drugs in the market.
The results in this paper are mainly based on numerical exercises. As such, their
validity only applies as long as the numerical values chosen resembles real economies.
As this exercise was never attempted, the results in this paper serve as an academic
curiosity. When individuals are drug addicts which make some of them become risklovers, the government is not able to generate an equilibrium drug price that reduces
the crime rates of addicts for at least the high range of values that were assumed for
the exogenous parameters of this model.
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Chapter 4
The Effects of Drug Enforcement
on Violence in Colombia 1999–2010
4.1

Introduction

Illegal markets for narcotics are usually correlated positively with violence1 . This
correlation has elicited an intense debate because it is still unclear whether violence
creates the incentives for the illegal markets for narcotics to exist or viceversa, and
who are the main perpetrators of such violence. In this debate, the effects of the
government’s enforcement activities on the violence generated in these markets have
generally been underestimated. I argue that drug enforcement has first– and second–
order effects on the violence generated in these markets, especially in source countries2 .
In those countries, the government engages in prosecuting activities that sometimes involve military expenditure to enforce prohibition. As prohibition applies to
commodities supplied by decentralized markets, drug dealers are able and willing to
use their profits to fight back the government’s prosecuting activities. This military power also allows them to solve their potential commercial disputes violently, if
needed. This is called the drug war in source countries. Thus, the first-order effect
1

Violence is generally measured as the rate of homicides or displacement per 100, 000 inhabitants.
A source country is defined as a country that has historically produced narcotics. For a list of
illicit drugs and source countries, see CIA, 2013.
2
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refers to the direct violence that results from the government and drug dealers’ military expenditures on the drug war. The second–order effect refers to the violence
that emerges from the drug dealers’ military expenditure on their drug war. This war
occurs due to the absence of a legal system where drug dealers can solve their commercial disputes pacifically and drug markets exhibiting contracting environments
with high transaction costs induced by enforcement.
To test the latter hypotheses, I use information on violence, drug and drug enforcement variables from Colombia during the period 1999 − 2010. Since 1999, Colombia
has formally embarked in a program called “Plan Colombia”, aimed at reducing the
amount of cocaine produced and distributed in the country and overseas. This program involves, among others, the use of military tactics to incentivize Colombians not
to participate in the cocaine market. As a result, the Colombian central government
has declared all citizens who decide to produce narcotics and use force to fight back
its drug enforcement activities as military targets.
To test the effects of the government’s drug enforcement military activities, it
would be ideal to use a set of measures that permits to compare the levels of military expenditures of all participants in the drug war per municipality. However,
the Colombian vice–president’s office only collects information on drug enforcement
and drug war outcomes for every municipality of the country. With that multiplicity
of measurement units and, in certain cases, same–purpose variables, three problems
arise.
First, some drug enforcement and drug war variables are almost perfectly spatially
correlated. This correlation generates a multicollinearity problem that results in estimations with erratic and statistically insignificant estimates associated with those
variables. Second, even if we are able to orthogonalize those variables, their estimated
coefficients might be affected by their measurement units, which makes the estimates’
magnitude meaningless and unreliable. If we decide to use single measures that proxy
for the drug war military expenditures, it is a priori unclear which variables are more
appropriate to proxy for those expenditures. When we find a way to categorize and
organize them, it is again unclear how to interpret the measurement units of the re-
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sulting proxies due to the measurement units diversity of the variables that compose
them. Finally, some of the proxies for drug war military expenditure are endogenous
to the proxies for violence.
The simplest way to circumvent the first two problems is to construct a set of
indices that proxy for the government’s and drug dealers’ military expenditures. The
methodology proposed in this paper to compute these indices permits to categorize
municipalities according to the government’s military expenditure against drug dealers (Eradication Index), drug dealers’ military expenditure against the government
(Anti-Eradication Index) and drug dealers’ military expenditure against other drug
dealers (Drug Dealers’ War Index). The methodology employed allows me to compute
these indices having similar measurement units, which make their estimated coefficients objectively comparable. Additionally, as these indices are computed such that
they are all in the unit interval and the regressands are expressed in logarithms, the
indices’ estimated coefficients indicate the average percentage in which the violence
rate increases in the municipalities with the largest military expenditure relative to
those with zero military expenditure on drug war.
To overcome the last problem, I employ a joint strategy: On the one hand, I use
the strategy proposed by Mejia and Restrepo, 2011 to disentangle the real effects of
drug production on enforcement variables. Due to technological reasons associated
with the quality of terrain, climate and locational characteristics of the Colombian
territory, cocaine production is more productive at low altitudes. The strategy of
Mejia and Restrepo, 2011 consists of running a 2SLS model using the altitude per municipality as an exogenous source of variation in the first stage to determine how much
violence is explained by the Colombian drug war. I argue that given the Colombian
government’s centralized structure in drug enforcement decision making and policy
application, two other sources of variation can be used: the distance of a municipality
to Bogotá, the country’s capital, and to the capital of departamento 3 in which it is lo3

A departmento is similar to a U.S. state, but differs from an administrative viewpoint. A state
has a constitution apart from the national constitution, whereas a departmento follows the single
set of rules determined by the national constitution and legislature. After the constitution of 1991,
Colombia initiated a decentralization process that involved the appropriation by departmentos and
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cated. A priori, there is no reason why drug enforcement variables are correlated with
municipalities’ altitude and distances to capitals other than by a technological issue
associated with cocaine production. To control for potential omitted variables that
also help explain violence in the Colombian municipalities, I run a panel data Spatial
Durbin Model, which helps control for fixed, temporal and geographical factors.
On the other hand, using the latter sources of variation and the idea that drug war
military expenditures are determined by the municipalities’ spatial and geographical
characteristics for cocaine production, I am able to reclassify municipalities according
to their spatially-determined drug war military expenditures. As this reclassification
does not use violence variables to estimate the proxies to recompute the indices, any
correlation between the recomputed indices and violence variables can be understood
as a causal correlation.
My results suggest that the Colombian violence is explained by both the central
government’s drug enforcement activities and the actions taken by drug dealers to
fight back that enforcement. Furthermore, that violence is also explained by the efforts exerted by those groups to control the territory, where they not only produce
narcotics but also extract the rents from other natural resources (such as gold and
petroleum). Additionally, I find that the war among drug dealers has also an important effect on the levels of violence in Colombia. Drug dealers use violent methods to
resolve their conflicts, affecting both the homicide rate and the displacement rate in
the country.
This paper is organized as follows: section (4.1) is this introduction. Section (4.2)
presents a short overview of the theoretical relation among drugs, drug enforcement,
and violence. Section (4.3) presents the data used to test my hypotheses, with an
emphasis on the spatial characteristics of the data used. Section (4.4) explains the
empirical strategy pursued to test my hypotheses. Section (4.5) presents the results.
Section (4.6) concludes the paper and section (A.3) contains the appendix.
municipalities of their property taxes. However, both the police and the army are financed with
national taxes and their prosecuting activities are decided entirely at the national level.
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Theoretical Background
A General Perspective

Illegal markets for narcotics are usually associated with violence. This correlation
has triggered an intense debate on who generates such violence and whether violence
really leads to the production of narcotics or viceversa. The empirical evidence on
this correlation is mixed, and three competing hypotheses have emerged as possible explanations for this regularity. A first hypothesis states that it is violence that
generates the production of narcotics. Using a unique data set on Western Casualties in Afghan territory during the war against the Taliban regime after the 9/11,
Lind et al., 2012 argue that the rise in Afghan opium production since 2002 can be
explained by the deterioration of the social and economic infrastructure that emerged
after the war. They argue that the conflict made “illegal opportunities more profitable as they increase the perceived lawlessness and destroy infrastructure crucial to
alternative crops”(p. 1).
These authors use as an exogenous measure of conflict the number of western soldiers killed in Afghan territory, who, they argue, had nothing to do with drug eradication activities. They claim that the conflict against the Taliban generated a negative
externality that led many Afghan farmers to produce heroin. Dı́az and Sanchez, 2004,
using information from Colombian municipalities for the period 1994 − 2000 and spatial econometric methods, show that the geographical intensification of conflict in
Colombia, measured as the number of attacks perpetrated by irregular groups such
as FARC, ELN and AUC 4 , is the principal cause of the expansion of illegal crops of
coca and poppy plants in the country. The authors demonstrate the close geographical correlation between the illegal groups’ presence and the production of cocaine in
the municipalities in which they operate.
In both studies similar doubts linger. On the one hand, why are these “rebel”
4

FARC (Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) are
both leftist guerilla groups, and AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) is a right-wing paramilitary group.
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groups also located in geographical areas with coca or poppy crops and the largest
homicide rates? Aren’t these groups directly involved in the production of narcotics
to budget their war, for which they also fight back the government’s eradication
activities? On the other hand, why do individuals recur to the production of drugs?
And why is this production profitable when anything else is not?
In regards to the first doubt, Lind et al., 2012 cannot disregard the possibility
that heroin production might have been generated by the need of the Taliban for
a quick revenue, which they called drugs-for-arms hypothesis. The same applies
to the Colombian guerrillas and paramilitary groups and their involvement in the
cocaine traffic5 . If the drugs-for-arms hypothesis is true, this would imply that the
relationship between violence and the production of narcotics is biunivocal: when a
group in conflict needs a quick and secured source of revenue, they may recur to the
production of narcotics to obtain it, even if unintended in the first place, which in
turn generates more violence. Such violence might be associated with the military
expenditure of those groups to accomplish their political goals or defend their territory
from the government’s eradication activities. Thus, the politically-motivated violence
is the only one that can be ascribed to the first hypothesis, as the other is triggered
by the existence of narcotics in that territory and the intention of the government to
eradicate it militarily.
As the first hypothesis does not give a satisfactory answer to the latter questions,
a second hypothesis arises in the literature: the production, transportation, distribution, and retailing of drugs generate violence. This hypothesis relies on the fact
that illegalization leaves drug dealers without a legal system to resolve their commercial and legal disputes. Caulkins et al., 2006 argue that drug dealers use violence to
resolve disputes and secure geographical positions in the retail market for narcotics.
They argue that those individuals who have a larger propensity to use violence secure themselves the safest places on the retail market, which is where drug enforcement has the smallest probability to affect them negatively. As for a source country,
5

see LeoGrande and Sharpe, 2000 and Thoumi, 2002 for a detailed analysis of the evolution of
the illegal markets for narcotics in Colombia and its effects on violence.
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Angrist and Kugler, 2008, using a similar data set as Dı́az and Sanchez, 2004, state
that the productivity of soil and the geographical location of Colombia create huge
incentives for illegal groups to exploit these resources to produce illegal goods such
as cocaine. Hence, municipalities with a significant production of cocaine are more
violent. This relation is explained by the competition among rival groups, who compete for a share in the market, and with the government, who plays a predatory
game with these groups. In this literature, the production of drugs is an endogenous
variable that depends on the amount of enforcement and military capabilities of irregular groups to fight back the prosecuting agencies and their rival competitors (See
Mejia and Posada, 2008 and Mejia, 2008 for papers that develop this idea).
In a recent paper, Mejia and Restrepo, 2011 propose an identification strategy
to disentangle the causal relationship between the existence of illegal markets and
violence. Based on several insights about the technological features of the production
of cocaine in Colombia provided by Mejia and Rico, 20106 , these authors use the
altitude of a municipality to proxy for the productivity of the cultivation of the coca
plant. The underlying idea is that the plant produces more cocaine when harvested
between 0 and 1700 meters above the sea level. As a result, if the existence of illegal
markets has a real causal effect on violence, a 2SLS strategy that uses the altitude of
each municipality might help uncover such a relationship. They show, using a panel
of Colombian municipalities, that the existence of illegal markets for cocaine has a
positive effect on the level of violence in Colombia.
From the paper written by Mejia and Restrepo, 2011 two drawbacks can be pointed
out. On the one hand, altitude might also be correlated with drug enforcement activities of the Colombian government, and not only with what drug dealers do to gain
a market share in the Colombian cocaine market. Hence, we must also control for
enforcement activities of the Colombian government to be able to use the production
of cocaine as a proxy for the violence generated by drug dealers in the illegal markets
for cocaine. On the other hand, it is unclear why drug dealers have to resolve disputes
violently when they can agree not to. In other words, illegality is not a sufficient con6

See Gootenberg, 2008 for a thorough analysis of cocaine production in the Andean Countries.
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dition to secure a violent outcome. Mirron, 2001 argues that not all illegal activities
generate violence or even an illegal market for them. He argues that there must be
something else that induces both the illegal markets and violence to coexist. Using
a panel of countries in which gun control data exist, he suggests that “differences in
the enforcement of drug prohibition are an important factor in explaining differences
in violence rates across countries”(p. 615).
Mirron, 2001 relies on two factors that must be satisfied in order for illegal markets
to exist and generate violence. First, a banned activity must generate huge amounts
of resources to its suppliers. And second, enforcement activities are high, making
transaction costs in the illegal markets sufficiently high as to impede drug dealers
use of coasean-type mechanisms to resolve their possible commercial disputes. The
Colombian case satisfies both conditions: Colombian regions have a huge comparative
advantage in producing goods that the rest of the world is highly interested in demanding at relatively high prices even when illegal. This powerful financial incentive
generates that illegal groups try to create a public good —i.e., security for the production of drugs— in the most suitable regions. Additionally, enforcement efforts by the
Colombian government have been relatively high, especially since “Plan Colombia”
was enacted and put into action in 1999.
The last two hypotheses insinuate that the bulk of violence is explained by what
drug dealers do against each other. However, the drug war also implies that the enforcement agencies engage in prosecuting activities and military actions against drug
dealers, especially in source countries. For instance, “Plan Colombia” is the archetypal case of enforcement activities by the government that involve the use of military
tactics and methods to eradicate the production and manufacture of narcotics (see
Acevedo et al., 2008 and GAO, 2008). This program has received good evaluations
by its overall effects on the reduction of violence in Colombia, especially in the reduction of homicides of people younger than 29 years old (see Barón, 2009). Nonetheless,
is it possible to assure that the government’s drug enforcement actions do not have
an effect on violence?
I argue that they do. There are two type of effects that enforcement activities
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have on violence: first–and second–order effects. A first–order effect is, for instance,
the number of soldiers and police officers as well as the number of drug dealers who
die in the drug war. This is an effect of enforcement because this violence occurs
usually in the course of the eradication activities performed by the government, in
which they use military tactics to reach the areas where production is taking place.
As rebel groups obtain sufficient funds from the traffic of a highly demanded illegal
commodity, when the government performs eradication activities, its enforcement
agencies are threatened by military machinery that eventually reach them mortally
too7 . The second–order effect is the number of drug dealers who get killed in their
drug war. This is an effect of enforcement because illegality and high enforcement
efforts place wealthy drug dealers in an anarchic contractual environment where the
death and displacement of people seem to be the common results.

4.2.2

A Simple Model

To clarify ideas, let us suppose that we have the economy laid out in section (A.3.1).
In that economy, we could split municipality j’s rate of violence8 in the following way:

vj = β1 Mjg + β2 Mjr + β3 Mjir + rest

(4.1)

where β1 Mjg represents the proportion of violence that is attributed to the government’s drug enforcement military expenditure in municipality j, Mjg . β2 Mjr represents
the proportion of violence that is explained by the drug dealers’ anti-enforcement military expenditure in municipality j, Mjr . β1 Mjg + β2 Mjr is called in section (4.2.1) the
first–order effect of enforcement. Finally, β3 Mjir represents the proportion of violence
7

If violence is measured as the rate of forcefully displaced people, the first–order effect is the number of civilians that are displaced by both the eradication and anti-eradication activities performed
by both groups involved in the drug war.
8
The rate of homicides and displacement per 100, 000 inhabitants will be used below as proxies
for the rate of violence. In the next section, the composition of both rates are explained. Here, I
will use violence as a generic term to refer to those empirical estimates of violence.
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explained by drug dealers’ military expenditure to control the territory to produce
drugs, Mjir . This is called the second–order effect of enforcement.
If we had perfect and reliable information on Mjg , Mjr and Mjir and each category
in which vj can be divided, including the categories of our interest, we could easily
determine the values of β1 , β2 and β3 by solving simple linear equations for each
municipality. However, such information is unavailable, at least for Colombia. vj is
only available at aggregated levels, and there is only information on drug enforcement
and drug war outcomes. In the next section, I explain the information available. In
this one, two consequences of such a lack of perfect information on drug war military
expenditures and violence variables are emphasized: on the one hand, β1 , β2 and
β3 will have to be estimated using regression analysis. The latter implies that these
betas will represent average values for the time period considered.
On the other hand, we need to control for three factors to obtain reliable estimates
of the betas: first, we must control for vj ’s over-counting. Second, proxies for Mjg ,
Mjr and Mjir must be constructed allowing for objectively comparable and reliable
estimates. They also must represent the fact that Colombian drug military expenditures have a geographical component that must be accounted for. Finally, some of
the available proxies for Mjg , Mjr and Mjir are endogenous to the proxies for violence.
Consequently, we must find an exogenous source of variation that determines those
military expenditures, which is at the same time uncorrelated with the used proxies
for violence.
In the next section, I describe my strategy to circumvent the problems associated
with the military expenditures measurement. In section (4.4), I explain the empirical
strategy to tackle the endogeneity and over-counting problems. There, I also explain
the strategy used to obtain the exogenous proxies for military expenditures that take
into account their spatial components.
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The Data
Sources and Variables

To test the model laid out in equation (A.24), I use the homicide rate per 100, 000
inhabitants as a proxy for violence. These rates are collected by the Colombian vice
president’s office, and are a compilation of violent homicides that occurred in each of
the 1122 municipalities of the country during the period 1999-2010 9 . Each of these
rates contains the number of individuals who were assassinated violently. It includes
police officers, soldiers and prosecutors as well as any other individual who dies violently in each municipality. In this regards, the Colombian vice president’s office does
not keep separate records of each of the categories that compose the total homicide
rate of every municipality. Consequently, as a measure of violence, it includes more
homicides than can actually be ascribed to the drug war. In the empirical strategy
section, I explain how I handle this problem.
As a robustness check of my results, I also use the number of forcefully displaced
people per municipality that the same source collects to compute the rate of displacement per 100, 000 inhabitants for each municipality. The source defines an individual
as forcefully displaced when the person is forced to migrate within the national territory because her life, security, and/or freedom are at stake due to the military actions
of any of the groups involved in the conflict (i.e., guerrillas, AUC, drug dealers or the
government’s forces themselves). Because of the latter definition, I can also test
whether the geographically-located drug enforcement activities of the central government are generating displacements or these are only the result of the existence of
drugs as Mejia and Restrepo, 2011 claim.
I use information on drug enforcement outcomes collected by the vice–president’s
office to proxy for the Colombian government’s drug enforcement military expenditure on every municipality. This data set contains information on the amount of coca
9

For an analysis of the sources, its quality, and possible explanations about their discrepancies,
see: Restrepo and Aguirre, 2007. For the official definition of the variables used in this paper, see:
Vice-Presidencia de Colombia, 2012 (Spanish Version).

Hernán Botero Degiovanni

The Effects of Drug Enforcement on Violence

97

crops hectares that Colombia’s prosecuting agencies eradicated either manually or by
aspersion in the period 1999 − 2010. It also includes the number of performed operations in each intervened municipality to eradicate the number of declared hectares.
This data set also contains information on the number of destroyed labs dedicated
to the production of narcotics in the same period. Since 1999, the Colombian vicepresident’s office also started to collect information on the amount of attacks initiated
by the government’s enforcement agencies, such as the army or the police, against illegal groups. These groups include drug gangs and politically-motivated groups, such
as FARC, ELN or AUC, also known to be involved in the production of narcotics.
To my knowledge, the number of attacks initiated by the government has never
been used to proxy for drug enforcement activities of the central government in Colombia. Figure (4.1) shows that this omission is not a minor one. The graph depicts the
Colombian homicide rate and the logarithm of the coca crops of the municipalities
with high10 and low levels of government attacks. From the graph, it is clear that
municipalities with more military attacks by the government have substantially larger
homicide rates and coca production than municipalities with fewer of them.
Apart from the endogeneity problem associated with using the previous variable
as a proxy for the Colombian government’s drug enforcement military expenditure,
running all these variables together also results in a multicollinearity problem because
some of them are almost perfectly correlated. There are several ways to avoid this
issue. One way is to perform a principal component analysis to orthogonalize these
variables. Another way is to perform a common factor analysis, which determines
the least number of factors that can account for the common variance of the set of
enforcement variables (See Comrey, 1973 and Hair et al., 1992 for analysis on these
methods). As both methods depend on the variables’ measurement units, it is unclear
the measurement units of the resulting proxy, which affects the way I interpret the
estimated results of drug enforcement variables on violence.
10

To compute figure (4.1), a municipality was defined as a high-government-attacked municipality
when it was included in the upper tail of the distribution of the number of attacks initiated by the
government against irregular groups (defined by the 70th percentile of the distribution or above).
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Another methodology to circumvent the multicollinearity problem is the one used
by the Index of Economic Freedom, which summarizes in a single measure 10 variables
exhibiting a potential multicollinearity problem if used together11 . Caudill et al., 2000
argue that when the variables to compute an index are trying to proxy for a single dimensional variable, indexing and common factor analysis give equivalent results when
their estimated proxies are used in regression analysis. However, indexing is simpler
and indices can be computed such that they allow for objectively comparable estimates in regression analysis, avoiding the issue of the measurement units presented
in the other two methodologies. Besides, Index Theory

12

allows us to assure that

an index has the following two properties: first, it is able to capture the distribution
of any compact set used to create the index, converting the moments’ units of the
domain set into the index units. Second, the correspondence that maps the domain
set into the index numbers affects the accuracy of the index to capture the domain
set distribution.
Bearing that in mind, I construct the following Eradication Index:

P6

IE,i
18
i

(4.2)



3 if
V ari > percentile(ai , 70)




 2 if percentile(a , 30) < V ar < percentile(a , 70)
i
i
i
=

1 if
min(ai ) < V ari < percentile(ai , 30)




 0 if
V ari = 0

(4.3)

IE =
where13 ,

IE,i

where ai is a non-zero vector composed of the elements of V ari , and V ari is any
of the 6 aforementioned variables used to compute this index.
11

Beach and Kane, 2008 presents an analysis of the Index of Economic Freedom
See Hájek, 2009 for a mathematical analysis of the properties of indices.
13
The choice of the percentile values to construct these indices are based on the distributions of its
composing variables. However, my results are not sensitive to small changes in the threshold values
for each category.
12
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Figure 4.1: Homicide Rate and Coca Crops divided by Intensity of Government’s
Attacks

Several features are worth noting about the latter index. First, the index-composing
variables are split between those municipalities with zero and strictly positive drug
enforcement outcomes. This implies that my initial comparison will be between these
two categories. Second, the highest possible score for a municipality is 1814 . Thus,
IE  [0, 1]. Third, if I run the model laid out in equation (A.24), using IE to proxy
14
There are six variables. If a municipality scores 3 in all 6 enforcement variables (i.e., it is located
in the 70th percentile or above in the distributions of all the index composing variables), it will score
18=6x3.
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for the government’s drug enforcement military expenditure and the regressands in
logarithms, β1 IE would measure the percentage in which a municipality’s violence
rate changes with an enforcement level of IE relative to a municipality with zero
enforcement. To clarify the latter idea, let us assume that we have a municipality’
violence rate v expressed in logarithms. This v assumes different values depending on
which level of drug war intensity a municipality has. If the latter possibility is true,
let vIE =1 and vIE =0 represent a municipality’s violence rate with a drug enforcement
index of 1 and 0, respectively. Ceteris paribus, β1 can be expressed as follows:

β1 = vIE =1 − vIE =0 = β1 (IE = 1 − IE = 0)
As the v’s are expressed in logarithms, β1 represents the percentage in which the
violence rate changes by going from IE = 0 to IE = 1. As a result, if β1 is positive, it
means that drug enforcement increases in β1 % the Colombian municipalities’ violence
rate. If β1 is negative, it means that drug enforcement decreases that rate in the
same percentage. Fourth, IE possesses 18 possible values, permitting to measure
exhaustively the different eradication levels produced by the government across the
country. If we wanted to determine the change in the violence rate’s growth rate
explained by moving IE from one eradication level IEi to a higher one IEj , we would
simply perform the algebraic operation β1 (IEj − IEi ).
The vice–president’s office also collects information on the number of attacks perpetrated by irregular groups against official buildings, such as police stations or military
bases, and official forces, such as the police or army. This variable has traditionally been used to proxy for the geographically-located military activities of irregular
groups in Colombia. In fact, this is the main variable that Dı́az and Sanchez, 2004
use to test whether violence increases cocaine production. According to paper written
by Dı́az and Sanchez, 2004, this variable might be endogenous to the existing proxies
for violence. Apart from this endogeneity problem, I could also construct an index
for this variable to obtain comparable estimates with those of the previous index. As
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the following Anti–Eradication Index:
if

irreattacks > percentile(a, 70)

if percentile(a, 30) < irreattacks < percentile(a, 70)
if

min(a) < irreattacks < percentile(a, 30)

if

irreattacks = 0

(4.4)

where a is again a non-zero vector composed of the elements of irreattacks, and
irreattacks is the number of attacks perpetrated by irregular groups against the government’s security forces. This index satisfies similar features to the ones mentioned
for the previous index. In this case, β2 represents the highest possible percentage
change in the violence rate that is explained by the irregular groups’ highest level
of military expenditure against drug enforcement (IAE =1). As in the previous case,
if I wanted to determine the change in the violence rate’ growth rate explained by
j
i
moving IAE from one eradication level IAE
to a higher one IAE
, I would again simply
j
i
perform the algebraic operation β2 (IAE
− IAE
).

In turn, Mejia and Restrepo, 2011 use the coca cultivation figures from SIMCI15 to
proxy for the drug dealers’ war. The vice–president’s office also collects information
on two other variables that I argue also capture that war: the number of massacres
committed by irregular groups in their regions or areas of influence, and the number
of incidents and accidents with mine fields. These two variables are also available
from 1999 to 2010, and they are computed taking into account how closely they are
related to the conflict among irregular groups in Colombia. In that sense, massacres
are defined to be perpetrated by irregular groups in their conflict on their areas of
influence16 , and mine fields appear to be used by irregular groups to protect their
coca, marihuana and poppy fields17 .
Running these variables together also results in a multicollinearity problem as in
the eradication index case. Following the same logic laid out for that index, I construct
15

Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilı́citos– A United States Office for Drugs and Crime
in Colombia. See its web-site: UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2012a.
16
See Human Right Watch, 2010 for a thorough analysis of the possible causes, main perpetrators,
and main modus operandi in which massacres are committed in Colombia.
17
see Human Right Watch, 2007 for a thorough analysis of guerrilla use of landmines in Colombia,
and its consequences on the civil population.
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the following Drug Dealers War Index:

P3
IDW =

i

IDW,i
9

(4.5)

where,

IDW,i



3 if
V ari > percentile(ai , 70)




 2 if percentile(a , 30) < V ar < percentile(a , 70)
i
i
i
=

1 if
min(ai ) < V ari < percentile(ai , 30)




 0 if
V ari = 0

(4.6)

where ai is again a non-zero vector composed of the elements of V ari , and V ari is
any of the 3 variables mentioned above used to compute this index. In this case, β3
would represent the highest percentage change in the violence rate that is explained
by the drug dealers’ highest level of military expenditure on drug war (IDW =1). As in
the previous cases, if I wanted to determine the change in the violence rate’s growth
j
i
to a higher one IDW
,
rate explained by moving IDW from one eradication level IDW
j
i
I would again simply perform the algebraic operation β3 (IDW
− IDW
).

Finally, it should be pointed out that all those variables might be correlated because
they occur in municipalities where there is an insufficient central government presence,
its rule of law is very scarce and there are huge economic opportunities to produce
narcotics without the pressure of enforcement. I include as controls for the central
government’s presence the square kilometers per capita of a municipality18

19

, the

logarithm of its population, its distance20 to Bogotá and to its capital of departmento.
18

The idea behind this instrument is that a larger area per capita indicates a smaller police
presence, which reduces the efficiency of the government’s enforcement activities. As a result, a
larger area per capita signifies a worse institutional presence, which implies a better location for
producing illegal narcotics with a smaller probability of capture.
19
An alternative measure would be the local government’s public expenditure. However, that
information is not available at the municipality level, avoiding me to use it as an instrument.
20
The distances expressed in miles or kilometers are not available for every municipality. Moreover,
for some municipalities their distances changed because roads were built or improved during our
period of analysis as a policy response to cocaine production. As a result, I use the coordinate
system of every municipality expressed in degrees to construct a measure of distance for each of
them. As such, this system does not take into account the possible natural barriers that make a
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These two last variables do not vary across years, which makes them not the best
control variables for a panel. Additionally, it is untrue that distance captures correctly
the institutional strength of a region. Given the centralized structure of Colombian
military expenditure21 , there are regions with larger economic power that attract more
resources on security from the central government. Thus, I computed the following
two variables:


DepGDP
1
∗
1 + dbogotamuni
BogotaGDP

1
DepGDP
= 1−
∗
1 + dcapitalsmuni
BogotaGDP

dbogotai = 1 −
dcapitalsi

(4.7)
(4.8)

where dbogotamuni and dcapitalsmuni are the distances of municipality i to Bogotá and the capital of departmento in which municipality i is located, respectively.
BogotaGDP is the Bogotá’s 2010 real GDP and DepGDP is the 2010 real GDP of
the departmento in which municipality i is located both measured by DANE22 .
The values of dbogotai and dcapitalsi are between 0 and 1. The closer a municipality is to Bogotá and its capital city of departamento, the closer dbogotai and
dcapitalsi are to 0. To define proximity, these measures take into account the economic importance of the departamento in which municipality i is located relative to
that of Bogotá. For instance, when I look at figures (A.23) and (A.24)23 in appendix
(A.3), I realize that a municipality in the southern departamento of Amazonas is as
far away from Bogotá than a municipality located in the northern departamento of La
municipality inaccessible. However, it still can capture the relative distance of a municipality to the
main capitals, where most of the military bases are, and from which military attacks are planed and
executed, which is precisely what I want to control for.
21
See Avella, 2009 for an analysis on the historical Colombian public expenditure levels and institutional organization.
22
DANE(Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadı́sticas) is the official center that collects
colombian socio-economic information.
23
The maps presented in figure (A.24) were taking from SIGOT (Sistema de Información Geográfica para la Planeación y el Ordenamiento Territorial) website, which is the official site where
the Colombian central government publishes the country’s spatial and geographical information. The
GDP information at the municipality level is not available for all the municipalities of the country
for the period of analysis, and the average of the rural property size per municipality is only available
for 1101 municipalities (out of 1122) for 2007 and 2009. Due to this lack of information, I was not
able to include these two variables as instruments to control for the potential of a municipality to
produce coca crops.
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Guajira. However, La Guajira is economically richer than Amazonas. My measures
are able to differentiate the relative importance of those two municipalities through
the relative weight that La Guajira’s and Amazonas’ GDPs have on that of Bogotá24 .
It is clear that the distance measures computed in equations (4.7) and (4.8) are
not the best proxies to capture the institutional strength of a municipality relative to
Bogotá or its capital of departmento, which is assumed to determine its assignment of
security forces to eradicate coca leaves by the Colombian central government . The
reason is that accessibility might also be an important factor to determine whether
a municipality is good for the production of coca leaves, and to determine whether
the Colombian central government dedicates resources to eradicate coca crops in that
municipality. Unfortunately, there is not a good measure of accessability for every
municipality of the country, and a radial distance seems not to be a bad instrument
to capture institutional presence within a departamento and the country. At least,
that seems to be true for coca crops production in Colombia and the prosecuting
activities that the government has followed to eradicate this production.
Coca production in Colombia has historically taken place in municipalities with
large rural opportunities for the crop. These municipalities are usually located far
away from the capital cities where the rural property size is larger and income lower
relative to those of the main capital cities. The latter can be seen when we compare
the average of the rural property size in figure (A.24a) and the GDP by departamento
in figure (A.24b) with the drug dealers war index25 in figure (A.26c) in appendix
(A.3), where we realize that coca production is mainly taking place far away from
the main capital cities of the country where the average of the rural property size
is larger and in departamentos with a smaller GDP relative to that of Bogotá’s.
24

In the regression results presented below, the distance variables were used as indicated in this
section. However, several alternatives were pursued. One alternative is to compute them only using
the GDP ratios. As there is only GDP information by departamento, one solution is to assume that all
the municipalities of a single departamento had the same GDP. This alternative provided statistically
insignificant estimates for the unique distance variable computed because all the variability gained
using the distance variables proposed in the text is lost within a single departamento. As a result,
it losses explanatory power because it is useless to explain the huge differences that exist within a
single departamento in terms of cocaine production and violence.
25
This index is mainly determined by the production of coca leaves and the number of accidents
and incidents with mine fields.
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Additionally, the pattern of the average of the rural property size indicates that the
average of the rural property size in a municipality increases in a sort of radial way
the farther the municipality is from the main capital city of the departamento in
which the municipality is located as well as the farther it is from Bogotá. As a result,
if a municipality’s rural property size average and income are good predictors for its
potential to have coca production, the distance variables computed in equations (4.7)
and (4.8) also seem a good alternative to capture that potential because they capture
the radial development that take place in most of the departamentos of the country,
which also increase the potential for the production of coca crops. In fact, when I
run a simple OLS regression of the logarithm of coca crops size against the distance
variables computed in equations (4.7) and (4.8), the following results are obtained26 :

log(crops) = −5.15∗∗∗ + 2.49∗∗ dbogota + 5.64∗∗∗ dcapitals

(4.9)

If equation (4.9) adequately captures the relationship between the logarithm of
coca crops and the distance variables27 , it indicates the percentage in which the coca
crops production increases in municipalities that are far way from Bogotá and their
capital of departamento. Thus, the most distant municipalities from Bogotá have
a 2.49% more coca crops production and the most distant municipalities from their
capital of departamento have a 5.64% more coca crops production. In this sense, coca
production seems to be taken place in distant municipalities from the main capital
cities. Consequently, if the government also follows a similar logic with respect to
the eradication of narcotics as the one followed by coca producers, I argue that the
distance variables might also help determine the assignment of security forces by the
Colombian central government to eradicate and control the production of narcotics on
a municipality because the military machinery and tactics used by the government
26

(***) indicates that the estimated parameter is statistically significant at 1% and (**) indicates
that the estimated parameter is statistically significant at 5%.
27
It is obvious that the estimated parameters of equation (4.9) are not perfectly estimated because
there is an omitted variable bias in their estimation. A similar regression analysis is performed in
table (A.6) controlling for this omitted variable bias. The result obtained in that table (not shown
in the table) is similar to the one obtained in equation (4.9). Thus, the results of equation (4.9)
are indicative of the positive correlation between coca production and distance from capital cities in
Colombia.
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can be applied to most of the country, without having accessability a determining
influence on the decision whether to eradicate or not on a municipality difficult to
access.
Table (A.2) in appendix (A.3) presents a summary table for the variables used in
this study. Two points are worth noting about table (A.2). On the one hand, the
values presented on the table are averages of the variables for the period 1999 − 2010.
When I observe the 5 summary numbers for the three indices, which summarizes their
distributions, two characteristics are observed: first, the distributions of the eradication (IE ) and drug-dealers-war (IDW ) indices are both positively skewed. This implies
that most of the Colombian municipalities are categorized as being of low-enforcement
and low-drug-dealers-war levels. I also can observe that the maximum values in the
average distributions of IE and IDW are 0.81 and 0.71, which implies that there was
not a single municipality that received central government’s drug–enforcement and
drug-dealers-war activities in every year of the data set. Consequently, there were
municipalities in which those drug outcomes were more common, while for most of
the municipalities, those drug activities took place rather intermittently during the
period of my data set. Second, the distribution of IAE is, in contrast, negatively
skewed, with a median value of zero. Besides, the maximum value in the IAE average distribution is 1. Consequently, anti-eradication activities were concentrated in
a reduced amount of municipalities, while for most of the municipalities, those drug
activities never took place.
On the other hand, I do not include variables that control for income or labor
market variables because the information on these variables is deficient or nonexistent.
Sometimes, the proxies used in some studies are endogenous to the homicide rate or
of poorer quality than normal. To overcome such a deficiency in information, I will
run a panel data Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) with fixed and temporal effects. This
model helps control for omitted variables not included in the regressions, which can
be useful to explain the violence in Colombian municipalities. In the next subsection,
I argue that spatial methods are necessary to run these regressions and in section
(4.4), I present my identification strategy to test my hypotheses.
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A spatial correlation

An extensive literature documents the spatial correlation of the homicide rate and
the existence of drugs in Colombia (Mejia and Rico, 2010, Dı́az and Sanchez, 2004,
Holmes et al., 2006; & Gootenberg, 2008). Figures (A.25) and (A.26) in appendix
(A.3) show averages for the main variables used in this paper. On the top of each
graph, I present the average of the logarithm of the homicide and displacement rates
per municipality for the period 1999 − 2010. A first characteristic I can observe on
these maps is that not all municipalities present homicides or forcefully displaced
people during this period. On all maps, the blue color represents a value of zero for
the variable under examination. The small cluster of southern municipalities close
to the Amazon region28 and another on the west coast are the only ones with zero
homicides during the period. The same happens with the rate of displaced people,
which exhibits a smaller cluster of southern municipalities with zero values. These
regularities might occur because those municipalities are mostly uninhabited. Most
of the terrain of those municipalities comprises natural reserves and, in some cases,
is difficult to access.
Second, in general I observe that the country presents both high homicide and
displaced people rates in almost its entire territory. However, there are municipalities
in which the situation is worse. In figures (A.25a) and (A.25b), the red color indicates
a spatial concentration of the violence variables in specific regions of the country.
The most problematic ones are close to Venezuela, Panamá, and Buenaventura Port,
located on the Pacific coast, which are all exit points used by irregular groups to
smuggle cocaine overseas29 .
Third, figures (A.25c), (A.25d), (A.26c), and (A.26d) present the drug war indices
as defined in the previous sub-section. On the maps, I observe that the indices are
also spatially concentrated with a larger proportion of Colombian municipalities exhibiting a value of zero in all three indices. In this case, a key point can be noted:
both the Eradication Index (figure (A.25c)) and the Drug Dealers War Index (fig28
29

See figure (A.23) for a detailed map of Colombia and its main international frontiers.
See the Moran I’s tests below.
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ure (A.26c)) are more spatially concentrated around the areas in which most of the
homicides and displacements take place; whereas the Anti-Eradication Index is less
scarcely concentrated around the same areas. However, all three indices are spatially
correlated with both endogenous variables to a certain degree30 . This fact is confirmed
when I analyze table (A.3) in appendix (A.3), where I rank the main variables of this
study by departamento. In this table, I observe that there are departamentos with
high values in both endogenous variables and all three indices; for example, Guaviare,
Caqueta, Arauca and Putumayo, among others.
It is worth noticing that the indices’ maps confirm the intuition about the indices
average distributions laid out in section (4.3.1). On the one hand, it is clear on the
maps that anti-eradication activities are taking place on clusters of municipalities.
Those clusters are located in the South –Meta, Guaviare, Caquetá and Putumayo
departmentos–, Northeast –Arauca, Norte de Santander and Cesar departmentos–,
Northwest –Bolivar, Sucre, Córdoba and Antioquia departmentos–, and Southwest –
South of Choco, Valle del Cauca, Cauca and Nariño departmentos. Additionally, when
I compare those clusters with the altitude per municipality shown in figure (A.26d),
it seems as if Colombian anti-eradication activities were geographically located at the
bottom of the main mountain chains that crosses Colombia31 . On the other hand,
Eradication and Drug Dealers War Indices are scattered around over almost the entire
country, both exhibiting many small municipalities on the top of the mountain chains
with zero values. It is also clear on the maps that these last two indices are also
geographically distributed relative to the Colombian mountain chains. It seems that
the altitude and distance to Bogotá are good exogenous sources of variation to explain
all three indices’ variability. In the next section, I explain how to exploit them to
30

If we compute Moran I’s tests to tests whether these variables are spatially correlated, the following results are obtained: 0.14, 0.12 and 0.13 for the correlation between the logarithm of homicide
rate and the eradication, anti-eradication and drug dealers war indices respectively, and 0.26, 0.17
and 0.28 for the correlation between the logarithm of the displacement rate and the eradication,
anti-eradication and drug dealers war indices, respectively, being all these tests statistically significant at 1%. In order to compute these indices, I use the 5-nearest neighbors contingent matrix.
The numbers obtained for the Moran I’s tests indicate that there is a spatial correlation between
the dependent variables and the drug war indices.
31
One chain goes from Nariño (South) to Santander and Norte de Santander (Northeast), and the
other from Nariño to Antioquia (Northwest).
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obtain exogenous proxies for the drug war indices.
Finally, I observe that all those variables exhibit a high spatial autocorrelation. In
table (A.2) in appendix (A.3), I compute Moran I’s test32 for each of the variables
used in this study. This test indicates that when determining the causal correlation
among those variables, I must also include controls for the spatial autocorrelation
that they exhibit. In the following section, I also explain how I perform that task.

4.4

The Empirical Strategy

My main interest is to test whether drug enforcement has an effect on violence in
Colombia. To attain that, my empirical strategy consists of three stages: first, I run
the following model under the same idea proposed in equation (A.24):

v = β0 + ρW v + Xβ + W Xθ + 

(4.10)

where v represents a (N*T)x1 vector containing any of the two endogenous variables used in this study: the logarithm of the homicide or the (forcefully) displaced
people rates, both per 100, 000 inhabitants. N = 1122 is the number of Colombian
municipalities and T = 12 is the number of years used for estimation. X is a (N*T)x7
matrix containing the following variables: IE , the Eradication Index proposed in equation (4.2); IAE , the Anti-Eradication Index proposed in equation (4.4); and IDW , the
Drug Dealers War Index proposed in equation (4.5). X also contains some institutional controls such as the logarithm of the population, municipality area per capita,
and the “distance” of each municipality to Bogotá and its capital of departamento
as defined by equations (4.7) and (4.8) respectively. Following Anselin, 1988 and
LeSage and Pace, 2009, I include in the estimations W y and W X to proxy for omitted variables that might help explain the variability of the endogenous variables but
for which there is not information available. W is a spatial weight matrix constructed
using the 5 nearest neighbors of each municipality33 .
32
33

I also use the 5-nearest neighbor contingent matrix to compute these tests.
A common problem in spatial econometrics is the choice of the aggregation level used to con-
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As all the variables in X vary across time, equation (4.10) can be estimated including fixed or time effects, where the parameters associated to the indices 34 are the
main parameters of interest. However, in this specification some of the variables used
to compute all three indices are endogenous. Specifically, the number of military attacks initiated by the central government against irregular groups, which is one of the
main variables used to compute IE , is endogenous to the violence rates. These attacks
are performed by the army and police, who consider the level of violence as well as the
required level of coca eradication in each municipality, to perform their enforcement
activities in a municipality. This is in contrast to the other 5 variables used to compute IE , which are performed by Policı́a Antinarcóticos35 . Mejia and Restrepo, 2011
argue that coca crops, which is one of the variables used to compute IDW , are also endogenous to the level of violence. I argue that massacres and incidents and accidents
with mine fields, the other two variables used to compute IDW , are also endogenous
to the levels of violence in Colombia. Following Mejia and Restrepo, 2011, I must
find an exogenous source of variation that helps explain those variables but at the
same time is uncorrelated with either the homicide or displacement rates.
These authors use the altitude per municipality to proxy for the existence of illegal
markets for cocaine in Colombia. They point out that, for technological reasons
related to soil and climate conditions, coca plants provide larger concentrations of
struct the weight matrices. I tried three different combinations of weight matrices: 5, 10, and 15
nearest neighbors. My results show that when I increase the number of neighbors considered, the
estimated first- and second-order effects of section 4.2.2 above become slightly stronger for all three
indices. These results might be explained by the fact that the municipalities with the worse drug
war and violence outcomes tend to be in departamentos with large extensions of territory and few
municipalities, such as Guaviare (4), Putumayo (13), Vichada (4), Arauca (7), and Guainı́a (9). All
these municipalities are more likely to be close neighbors in econometric terms, when the number of
neighbors considered to construct the weight matrix increases. Consequently, throughout the presentation of the econometric model and the results, I always refer to or use the 5-neighbor contingent
matrix. This matrix allows me to capture the neighbors’ influence on a municipality, without taking
into account neighbors from distant departamentos for those special cases.
34
The parameters β1 , β2 and β3 of 4.1.
35
Antinarcotics police. This is a police unit that follows a source of information different to the
amount of homicides or displaced people to plan and perform their tasks. They use the number of
crops captured by SIMCI, which are values that are available when coca crops are almost ready for
harvesting, which occurs at least six months after the coca trees are planted (See SIMCI web-site
for technical issues regarding possible delays in coca crops satellite data collection). In that sense,
Antinarcotics police plan their enforcement activities based on a database that might be lagged at
least six months.
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cocaine at lower altitudes. As a result, municipalities located at lower altitudes have
more coca crops and more violence associated to the illegal markets for cocaine that
results from these crops. Mejia and Restrepo, 2011 argue that there is no reason
why the altitude might be correlated with violence other than through its effect on
cocaine production. According to the model laid out in section (A.3.1), this conclusion
is imprecise because cocaine production is also endogenous to the eradication and
anti-eradication military expenditures performed by the central government and drug
dealers in each municipality.
I argue that a municipality’s distance to its capital of departamento and Bogotá,
the measures computed in equations (4.7) and (4.8), also help explain the productivity of coca production in Colombia for two reasons. First, it is more difficult and
expensive to produce coca crops in capital cities or near them due to a stronger
police presence. In these municipalities, the most important economic and public
administrative activities of each departamento take place. This leads the central government to allocate relatively more resources on police to these capital cities. Second,
the Colombian central government organizes and executes its military operations using strategically–positioned military bases. These military bases are located near or
within the capital cities of the most important departamentos 36 . These two features
suggest that the distance of a municipality to its capital of departamento is a good
source of exogenous variation to capture the opportunity costs of cocaine production in Colombia. The spatial analysis laid out in section (4.3.2) indicates that the
distance to Bogotá is also a good source of variation.
Those exogenous sources of variation are used to determine the potential intensity
of attacks targeted to a municipality by drug dealers and the government to perform
anti-eradication and eradication activities as follows:

y = β0 + ρW y + Xβ + W Xθ + 

(4.11)

where y is a (N*T)x1 vector that contains either of the following two endogenous
36

See Dube and Naidu, 2012 for an analysis of the Colombian military operations, the location of
its military bases, and the possible consequences of these military operations on violence.
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variables: the number of attacks initiated by the government against irregular groups
or the number of attacks initiated by irregular groups against the central government’s
security forces. X is a (N*T)x3 matrix containing my exogenous sources of variation.
As the altitude per municipality does not vary over time, I cannot include fixed or
time effects to estimate equation (4.11), because they are perfectly correlated with
my instrument. To control for omitted variables that might help explain any of these
two variables, I also include W y and W X.
I use ŷ = βˆ0 +X β̂ as a proxy for drug enforcement and anti-enforcement activities of
the government and irregular groups. These variables measure the potential intensity
of attacks a municipality might have due to its potential for coca production, given
by its own geographical and spatial position. Notice that I do not include any of
the spatial effects to compute the proxies. Thus, every ŷi is computed only using
the information contained in X for municipality i and the β’s are computed net of
possible omitted variables that also help explain why a municipality receive military
attacks by any of the groups considered.
In turn, I use the proxies obtained in the previous step to estimate the following
model:

y = β0 + ρW y + Xβ + W Xθ + 

(4.12)

where in this case y is a (N*T)x1 vector containing either the logarithm of hectares
of coca crops captured by SIMCI, the number of massacres committed by irregular
groups in their areas of influence or the number of incidents and accidents with mine
fields, which are known to be used to protect the coca crops from being eradicated. X
in this case contains the exogenous sources of variation used in equation (4.11), along
with the proxies for drug enforcement and anti-enforcement activities computed from
the same equation. Again, I include W y and W X to proxy for omitted variables that
might help explain any of the last three variables used to compute IDW .
Using equation (4.12), I use ŷ = βˆ0 + X̂ β̂ as instruments to proxy for the variables used to compute IDW . X̂ does not contain any of the proxies for drug en-
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forcement and anti-enforcement activities computed from equation (4.11). As a result, the computation of IDW is net of those enforcement activities. Also, X̂ β̂ is a
measure that resembles the drug dealers war’ instrumentalized proxy computed by
Mejia and Restrepo, 2011. Thus, my results are directly comparable with those found
by them.
Then, the final stage involves recomputing all indices as explained in equations
(4.2), (4.4), and (4.5), using the proxies found in equations (4.11) and (4.12), with a
slight difference that the vector a in those equations is now composed of the entire
array of values of the computed proxies without a priori division of every array between zero and positive values. With these recomputed indices, I run again the model
laid out in equation (4.10), concluding my empirical strategy. Before analyzing the
results, two points are worth noting: first, the measurement units of the recomputed
indices are entirely comparable with those of the original indices; as a result, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients associated to these new indices is the same.
Second, my methodology to recompute the indices do not bias the estimated results
in any systematic way. The recomputed indices reorganize municipalities according
to their estimated potential to have drug war military expenditures, resulting from
their geographical and spatial location, which is a priori unrelated to violence. As a
consequence, any correlation between these indices and the proxies for violence can
be understood as a causal correlation.

4.5
4.5.1

Results
Initial Results

The lack of information associated to income or labor market variables for the
Colombian municipalities forces me to rely on indirect methods to control for a potential omitted-variable bias in our estimations. This section is based on Elhorst, 2003
and Elhorst, 2012, who formally present the rationale behind running a Panel Data
Spatial Durbin Model to control for this econometric problem. They also present the
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empirical application where they indicate the different existing alternatives to test
whether the spatial and panel data effects controlled for with this model are really of
statistical significance.
A good feature of spatial econometrics methods is that they also allow to use a
municipality’s neighbors information to estimate the effects of the municipality’s drug
war indices on its own violence outcomes. This interrelation also allows to determine
the effect of a municipality’s drug war indices on its neighbors’ violence outcomes.
These effects are called the direct and indirect effects of the drug war indices on
violence, respectively. It is worth noticing that these two effects are conceptually and
quantitatively different from the drug enforcement’s first– and second-order effects
defined in the introduction. The first–order effect of drug enforcement includes the
direct and indirect effects of IE and IAE on violence. The second–order effect includes
the direct and indirect effects of IDW .
The estimation results of equation (4.10) are presented in tables (A.4) and (A.5) in
the appendix (A.3). Table (A.4) presents the estimation results for the logarithm of
the homicide rate; table (A.5) does it for the logarithm of the displacement rate. In
the first column of each table, I present the estimated coefficients provided by MATLAB without including fixed or time effects. LeSage and Pace, 2009 argue that these
estimated coefficients are not the main interest of the spatial econometric analysis,
but the direct, indirect and total effects computed from them. Even though I analyze
the estimated spatial effects, which were computed as explained by Elhorst, 2003, I
follow Elhorst, 2012 in presenting these estimated regression coefficients for the sake
of results completeness.
On columns 2 to 4 of each table, I present the estimated direct, indirect, and total
effects of equation (4.10). In turn, from column 5 to 12 of each table, I present the
same types of results as in the first four columns including fixed, time, and fixed and
time effects, respectively. I also present in each table the tests to ascertain whether
a Panel Data Spatial Durbin Model is the correct specification to estimate equation
(4.10), as explained by Elhorst, 2012. According to Elhorst, 2012, there are two
alternatives to test whether the correct model to run is a panel data Spatial Durbin
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Model(SDM), Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) or a Spatial Error Model (SEM).
There is a common argument underlying both alternatives: the SDM model can be
reduced to either the SAR model or the SEM model. The main difference between the
two alternatives is that one compares the performance of the particular model (SAR
or SEM) with the general model (SDM), and the other compares the performance of
the general model (SDM) with the particular model (SAR or SEM).
The alternative that goes from the particular model to the general model uses
simple LM tests to determine which model better explains the variability of the data.
There are two types of tests to use with this alternative: One type compares the SAR
(or SEM) model with the SDM model without controlling for the possibility that
the data also follows a SEM (or SAR) model jointly with the SAR (or SEM) model.
These tests are labeled LM spatial lag in tables (A.4) and (A.5) in appendix (A.3) for
the comparison between the SAR model with the SDM model and LM spatial error
for the comparison between the SEM model and the SDM model. The other type of
tests to use with this alternative compares the SAR (or SEM) model with the SDM
model controlling for the possibility that the data also follows a SEM (or SAR) model
jointly with the SAR (or SEM) model. These tests are labeled Rob. LM spatial lag
in tables (A.4) and (A.5) in appendix (A.3) for the comparison between the SAR
model with the SDM model and Rob. LM spatial error for the comparison between
the SEM model and the SDM model.
In turn, the alternative that goes the general model to the particular model uses
either Wald or LR tests to determine which model better explains the variability of
the data. In this case, these tests are labeled Wald spatial lag or LR spatial lag in
tables (A.4) and (A.5) in appendix (A.3) for the comparison between the SDM model
with the SAR model and Wald spatial error or LR spatial error for the comparison
between the SDM model with the SEM model. In both testing alternatives, the null
hypothesis is that the data does not follow the SDM model (either the SAR or SEM
models) against the alternative hypothesis that it does follow the SDM model. As
a result, a large value in any of the latter tests indicate that the SDM model better
explains the variability of the data.
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Several results can be derived from table (A.4). First, following Elhorst, 2012, all
tests indicate that the best specification to run equation (4.10) is a Panel Data Spatial
Durbin Model. In other words, there are omitted variables that help explain violence
in Colombia, which are properly captured by W y and W X in equation (4.10). All the
estimated values of ρ in table (A.4) indicate that there is a positive correlation between
municipality i’s homicide rate and the homicide rate of municipality i’s surrounding
municipalities. As a result, there are geographical factors not controlled for with
the fixed or time effects that also help explain the homicide rate in Colombia in the
period 1999−2010. Second, regardless of whether I include fixed, time, or both effects
together, there is a positive correlation between the Eradication Index (IE ) and both
the logarithm of the homicide and displaced people rates in Colombia. The estimated
impact of the Colombian government’s military eradication activities is very stable
across specifications. In section (4.3.1), the interpretation of the estimated results
associated to these indices is explained. There, it is said that β1

37

represents the

percentage change of the violence rate resulting from drug enforcement. As I consider
spatial effects, β1 is estimated by the total spatial effects, composed of the sum of the
direct and indirect effects of IE on v.
Second, tables (A.4) and (A.5) indicate that the government’s drug enforcement
activities generated a total increase in the homicide rate between 1.14% and 2.47%
and a total increase in the displacement rate between 1.02% and 2.84%. According
to these results, the total effects appear to be mainly driven by the direct effects
of enforcement. In other words, it appears that coca eradication activities generate
violence in the municipalities in which they are performed. However, I cannot give
these results a causal interpretation because IE is endogenous to both the levels of
violence and the production of narcotics.
Third, the attacks of irregular groups against the government’s security forces do
generate homicides and displaced people in Colombia. According to table (A.4),
the estimated impact of the irregular groups’ activities on violence is also very stable across specifications. These activities generate an estimated total increase in
37

The parameter associated to the drug enforcement military expenditures of equation (4.1).
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the homicide rate between 0.53% and 1.33% and an estimated total increase in the
displaced people rate between 0.76% and 1.84%. According to these results, when
irregular groups attack a municipality, their actions also affect contiguous municipalities. These attacks are most likely targeted to gain control of the territory. However,
IAE is endogenous to several factors apart from the simple production of cocaine. As
a result, I cannot yet ascertain if these attacks only respond to the interests that
irregular groups have on the territory for cocaine production or other factors, such as
the availability of petroleum or gold.
Finally, the drug war among dealers, captured by IDW , is also positively correlated
with the violence in Colombia, as Mejia and Restrepo, 2011 argue. According to my
preliminary results, the drug dealers’ war generates a total increase in the homicide
rate between 0.61% and 2.77% and a total increase in the displaced people rate
between 2.69% and 7.53%. It is interesting to note that the indirect effects of the
drug dealers’ war is not as stable for the homicide rate than as for the displacement
rate. My preliminary results indicate that the drug dealers’ war affect more heavily
the homicide rate of the municipality where it takes place than the homicide rate
of its surrounding municipalities. In contrast, the drug dealers’ war not only affects
directly the displacement rate of the municipality in which it takes place, but also the
displacement rate of those municipalities around it. Consequently, according to my
preliminary results, people seem to abandon their homes when drug dealers attack
each other in their municipalities of residence, or when they do it in the surrounding
municipalities. However, I cannot give these results a causal interpretation because
IDW is endogenous to the levels of violence, the production of narcotics and the
government’s eradication activities.
To provide a causal interpretation, I perform a 2SLS analysis that is presented in
the next section. Before entering in that discussion, an important point is noted here:
if IE , IAE and IDW really capture the Colombian drug war military expenditures of
all participants in the drug war during the period 1999 − 2010, there were substantial
first– and second–order effects of enforcement in Colombia. The estimated first–order
effect of enforcement derived from tables (A.4) and (A.5) is between 2.27% and 3.00%
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for the homicide rate and between 2.12% and 3.83% for the displaced people rate.
The estimated second-order effect of enforcement is between 0.61% and 2.77% for the
homicide rate and between 2.69% and 7.53% for the displacement rate.

4.5.2

2SLS Results

The results of the first stage of the IV estimations are presented in table (A.6) in
appendix (A.3), which is divided in two parts. The upper part of table (A.6) presents
the estimation results for the number of attacks initiated by the government against
irregular groups and the number of attacks initiated by irregular groups against the
government’s security forces. Thus, it presents the results of equation (4.11) in section
(4.3.1). In turn, the lower part of table (A.6) presents the estimation results for the
logarithm of coca crops, the number of accidents and incidents with mine fields, and
the number of massacres perpetrated by irregular groups in their areas of influence.
These are the results of equation (4.12) in section (4.3.1).
The first column of each set of regression results in table (A.6) presents the estimated coefficients provided by MATLAB. The other 3 columns present the direct,
indirect, and total effects, which were also computed as explained by Elhorst, 2003
and Elhorst, 2012. I also present the tests to determine whether a Panel Data Spatial
Durbin Model is the correct specification to estimate equations (4.11) and (4.12), as
explained by Elhorst, 2012. The estimation results in table (A.6) do not control for
any of the panel data fixed or time effects. The latter is due to two reasons: first,
fixed effects are perfectly correlated with the altitude per municipality, one of the
instruments in those estimations. Second, time effects resulted statistically insignificant.
From table (A.6), several insightful results can be obtained. A first general result
is that a Spatial Durbin Model is the correct specification to estimate equations
(4.11) and (4.12). The latter can be concluded from the tests indicating that these
estimations cannot be reduced to either a panel data SAR or SEM models. This
result might indicate that the government attacks irregular groups not only because
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they are producing narcotics, but also because of their criminal activities, such as
robberies, kidnappings, and the like. The same can be said from irregular groups’
attacks. These groups have an interest in the territory that goes beyond the sole
production of narcotics.
Additionally, the number of attacks perpetrated by both groups is explained by
the altitude in the expected sign. If the altitude really captures the coca crops
productivity, the number of attacks of both groups is explained to some extent by
the potential that municipalities have for cocaine production. In regards to these
attacks, I obtain two interesting results: on the one hand, the direct and indirect
spatial effects of the distance variables are statistically insignificant, but the total
effects are weakly significant for the number of attacks initiated by the government
against irregular groups. It seems that distances to capital cities and Bogotá do not
entirely capture the government’s military attacks against irregular groups. However,
the distance of municipalities to capital cities has some influence on that decision:
the farther municipalities were to Bogotá and the closer they were to capital cities,
the more the government attacked irregular groups in these municipalities.
On the other hand, the distance variables are statistically significant for the irregular groups’ number of attacks; however, the results are mixed. The total effects
of the distance variables indicate that the number of attacks of irregular groups increased when the municipalities were farther from Bogotá and closer to their capital
cities of departamento. These latter results are explained by the estimated direct and
indirect effects of the distance variables. The direct effects indicate that the number of attacks of irregular groups increased when the municipalities were both closer
to Bogotá and their capital of departamento. The indirect effects indicate that the
municipalities’ neighbors were less likely to be attacked when the municipalities were
closer to Bogotá and their capital cities of departamento. This result might indicate that municipalities that were jointly close to capital cities and Bogotá had fewer
attacks by these groups. This latter result is confirmed by the spatial analysis laid
out in section (4.3.2), where we observe that the number of irregular groups’ attacks
have a concentration at the bottom of the mountain chains that crosses Colombia
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from South to Northwest and Northeast. However, in those municipalities that are
really far away from the mountain chains or at the top of them, near to Bogotá, the
attacks were zero during the entire period under examination. That is illustrated, for
example, in the South of Colombia, in spite of being a region entirely dedicated to
the production of coca crops, as indicated in figure (A.25c).
Based on the empirical strategy explained in section (4.4) for equation (4.11), I use
ŷ = βˆ0 +X̂ β̂ to obtain exogenous proxies for the government and irregular groups’ drug
war military expenditures on the Colombian municipalities. As explained in section
(4.4), I use the latter ŷ’s in the estimations of equation (4.12) to obtain net exogenous
measures of the Colombian drug dealers’ war. The regressions of equation (4.12) are
presented in the lower part of table (A.6), where govconthat and irreconthat represent
the proxies for the government and irregular groups’ drug war military expenditures
obtained from equation (4.11).
In regards to the results for the variables used to compute IDW , the total effects of
the altitude indicate that it negatively affects all three variables. That concurs with
the results obtained by Mejia and Restrepo, 2011, who also found out that cocaine
production is negatively related to the altitude per municipality in Colombia. This
result also confirms my intuition that the number of incidents and accidents with mine
fields and massacres are also associated with the altitude in the expected sign. If the
altitude really captures a municipality’s cocaine productivity potential, my results
indicate that mine fields and massacres also seem to respond to the drug dealers’
war that Mejia and Restrepo, 2011 attempt to control for only using coca crops as a
proxy.
The results also confirm my intuition that the military actions of the government
to eradicate narcotics, captured by govconthat’s total effects, have also an effect on
the three variables. Additionally, they show that these actions reduced the number of
hectares of coca produced, reduced the number of mine fields used by irregular groups,
and increased the number of massacres in the country. All the latter results can be
interpreted as follows: first, coca crops showed a downward tendency during the
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period of analysis38 . This was clearly the response of the tougher drug enforcement
policy initiated with “Plan Colombia”.
Second, govconthat’s total effects on the number of incidents and accidents with
mine fields are mostly influenced by govconthat’s indirect effects. The govconthat’s
direct effect indicates that the government’s direct actions to eradicate coca crops in
the affected municipalities increased the incentives of irregular groups to use mine
fields to protect the coca cultivated areas from eradication. The govconthat’s indirect
effect indicates that once an area was totally controlled by the government, this
territorial control reduced the total amount of mine field cases. Finally, govconthat’s
total effects on massacres are weakly statistically significant. This result is mainly
influenced by the govconthat’s direct effects. Thus, it seems that coca eradication
military attacks also increased the incentives for irregular groups to commit massacres
on the municipalities where eradication took place.
When I analyze the total effects of the anti-eradication activities, the results are
less clear-cut to understand. First, irreconthat’s total effects indicate that the irregular groups’ anti-eradication activities reduced the coca crops in Colombia. That result
is influenced by irreconthat’s indirect effects, which implies that when a municipality
was more attacked, their neighbors produced fewer coca crops. This might indicate
that irregular groups made more attacks in those municipalities near to coca production centers subjected to eradication. As irreconthat’s direct effects are statistically
insignificant for coca production and coca production was reduced in the whole period, it seems that the overall effect was that the irregular groups’ attacks did not
attain what they intended to.
Second, irreconthat’s total, direct, and indirect effects on the number incidents
and accidents with mine fields are all either statistically insignificant or weakly significant. This result might indicate that anti-eradication military actions and mine
fields are substitute inputs to protect the coca fields. Finally, irreconthat’s total ef38

For a thorough analysis of coca crops in South America, see the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) website on crops monitoring in the world:
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2013.
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fects on massacres are statistically significant. This result is mainly influenced by
irreconthat’s indirect effects and can be interpreted as that of coca crops. It seems
that irregular groups’ anti-eradication attacks increased the number of massacres in
the municipalities where they attacked, which were in territories where they were
losing influence.
In general, it appears that my empirical strategy gives sound proxies to be used
in the second stage of the IV strategy. I compute these proxies using ŷ = βˆ0 + X̂ β̂
and the estimated coefficients from table (A.6). Table (A.2) in appendix (A.3) shows
summary statistics for the re–computed indices and figure (A.27) presents their maps.
A quick comment is in order: it seems that the procedure to recompute the indices
do not bias in any systematic way their values. However, these new indices have a
slightly different distribution, being IE ’s distribution the most similar to the original
one. Even though, it does not appear that the new indices are re-computed in a way
that favors my hypothesis.
The second IV stage is presented in tables (A.7) and (A.8) in appendix (A.3), which
replicates equation (4.10) and tables (A.4) and (A.5) using the new indices obtained
from equations (4.11) and (4.12) to proxy for the drug war military expenditures.
From tables (A.7) and (A.8), several results are also obtained. First, the tests to
ascertain the type of model to run again indicates that a Spatial Durbin Model
is the best specification for our data. There are omitted factors that help explain
the violence in Colombia different from the drug war variables, which are properly
captured by W v and W X terms in equation (4.10).
Second, my results seem to indicate that the government’s drug enforcement activities do generate violence in Colombia. Based on IˆE ’s total effects on the logarithm
of the homicide and displacement rates, the estimated impact of these actions is positive. According to tables (A.7) and (A.8), the government’s eradication activities
increased the homicide rate between 0.75% and 1.84% and the displacement rate between 0.99% and 5.82%. All these estimates are statistically significant at common
significant levels.
ˆ ’s estimated total effects indicate that anti-eradication activities by irThird, IAE
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regular groups increased violence in Colombia. However, these estimated effects are
not stable across specifications, especially for the homicide rate. My results indicate that the sign and statistical significance of the effect of the irregular groups’
anti-eradication activities varies when I include fixed effects in the estimations. It
seems that the activities that these groups perform on the territory they are fighting
for influence the way in which their actions affect the homicide rate. Fixed effects
might be capturing structural homicides that occur in the territory. There must be
structural homicides that are controlled and determined by these groups. My results
indicate that when these structural homicides are not controlled for, the irregular
groups’ attacks have a statistically insignificant positive direct effect on the municipalities in which they attack and a statistically significant negative indirect effect on
the surrounding municipalities where they attack. This result can be interpreted as
implying that once these groups have gained a sufficient important territorial control
over a set of contingent municipalities, their military actions against the government
to control the territory with the intention to produce cocaine reduce the homicide rate
of the entire area, except where they are attacking. In contrast, when I control for
these structural homicides, their actions to control the territory only affect positively
the homicide rate on the territories where they attack. The latter is not true for the
displacement rate where the effect of the irregular groups’ anti-eradication activities
is always positive across specifications.
ˆ ’s total effects indicate that the drug dealers’ war have mixed effects on
Finally, IDW
violence in Colombia, especially for the displacement rate. According to my results,
ˆ ’s
this war generated a change in the homicide rate between 2.29% and 4.37%. IDW
direct and indirect effects are also rather stable across specifications. They indicate
that the drug dealers’ war increased the homicide rate in the municipalities where
this war took place and the surrounding municipalities as well. The latter is not true
for the displacement rate. In this case, the inclusion of fixed effects also affects the
sign and statistical significance of the drug dealers’ war effects on violence. It seems
that there are structural phenomena that are intertwined with the drug dealers’ war
in the Colombian municipalities which obscure the pure effect of the drug dealers’
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war actual influence on the displacement rate. Once these structural variables are
controlled for with the fixed effects, the total, direct and indirect effects of the drug
dealers’ war on the displacement rate become statistically insignificant and with a
contrary sign to one expected.
In all the results presented in tables (A.7) and (A.8), the inclusion of fixed effects
affected the value of the estimated results. If I assume that the models containing
these effects provide us with the most accurate estimations, as the F tests at the
bottom of tables (A.7) and (A.8) indicate, our results show that drug enforcement has
had important effects on violence in Colombia. Tables (A.7) and (A.8) indicate that
the government’s eradication military expenditure generated an increase of 1.84%
in the homicide rate and 0.99% in the displacement rate. The drug dealers’ war
generated an increase of 4.00% in the homicide rate and 0.16% in the displacement
rate. And, the irregular groups’ anti-eradication activities generated an increase
of 0.14% in the homicide rate and an increase of 0.25% in the displacement rate.
My results indicate that there were substantial first– and second–order effects of
enforcement in Colombia. The first–order effect is 0.98% for the homicide rate and
1.24% for the displacement rate. The second–order effect is 4.00% for the homicide
rate and 0.16% for the displacement rate.

4.6

Conclusion

In this paper, I argue that drug enforcement in a source country does generate
violence, where the latter is measured as rate of homicides or displacement per 100, 000
inhabitants. I use data on drugs from Colombia during the period 1999–2010 to test
this hypothesis. I find that drug enforcement has two effects: first– and second–order
effects. The first-order effect refers to the direct violence generated by the drug war
between the government and drug dealers. When the government spends on military
activities to control the production of narcotics, there are eventually victims that
results from that expenditure. Drug enforcement might also have an impact on the
feeling of security of the inhabitants of the areas where the drug war take place,
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forcing them to move to safer regions where they are not affected by these activities.
However, this is not the only effect of enforcement. As narcotics are supplied by
decentralized markets, drug dealers have the monetary and the military power to
fight back against the government’s drug enforcement activities and against other
drug gangs, with which a pacific resolution of conflicts seems to be simply impossible.
Our results also indicate that Colombian violence derives from factors other than the
country’s drug war. Colombian drug dealers also generate violence not associated to
cocaine production. This happens when drug dealers gain sufficient military power
to control a territory, which generates spillover effects over other activities on which
violence is also used. This is true, for instance, when irregular groups use the profits
of narcotics to fight territorial control in regions with other natural resources such as
gold or petroleum. This also occurs when these groups use their military power to
position themselves as the ultimate regulators of their regions of influence.
A meaningful conclusion reached in this paper is that in Colombia the use of mine
fields is explained by the production of cocaine and the drug enforcement activities of
the central government. As a result, one of the worst consequences of the Colombian
conflict is actually incentivized by the Colombian drug war. Another conclusion is
that Colombian data show that there existed first– and second–order effects of drug
enforcement in the period 1999 − 2010: my results indicate that the first–order effect
is 0.98% for the homicide rate and 1.24% for the displacement rate in the period
1999-2010 and the second–order effect is 4.00% for the homicide rate and 0.16% for
the displacement rate.
As a final conclusion, I cannot claim that the military tactics are the best methods
to completely control the existence of drugs in Colombia. Despite the strength gained
by the Colombian army and police from “Plan Colombia”, there are still Colombians
interested in participating in the production of cocaine. Given the existence of an
international market providing these individuals with funds to fight back the central
government’s security forces, the result is that more Colombians are dying every day
for the war against drugs.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This dissertation presents three cases in which crime is manifested. In chapter
2, I extend a model of property crime by incorporating a market for illegal goods.
The secondary market is formed by individuals who rationally decide to become
criminals, steal durable goods, and sell them in this market, and by non-criminals
that demand stolen goods. The model develops a few additional elements. First,
criminal activities take place because individuals target durable goods either for reselling or for consumption. Second, criminals activities take place because there is a
potential demand for stolen property. This demand is composed of individuals buying
stolen property willingly. Finally, I assume that the government performs two crime
control activities: street control and control on illegal transactions taking place in
secondary markets.
In this simplified framework, I obtain the following results. First, under certain
conditions individuals with low preferences for the durable good may have incentives
to engage in criminal activities: they would steal goods and sell them in the secondary
market. Second, depending on the combination of law enforcement activities put in
place by the government, individuals with a “low-middle” preference for the durable
good would become criminals, steal goods, but keep them for their own consumption.
Finally, some non-criminals that are subject to crime and lose their property may
have incentives to replace the stolen good by purchasing it in the secondary illegal
market. This last conclusion is consistent with the fact that even though individuals
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openly complain about property crime, if the price of stolen goods is low enough, they
may have incentives to purchase illegal goods supporting and encouraging indirectly
illegal activities and more crime.
In chapter 4, I argue that drug enforcement in a source country does generate
violence, where the latter is measured as rate of homicides or displacement per 100, 000
inhabitants. I use data on drugs from Colombia during the period 1999–2010 to test
this hypothesis. I find that drug enforcement has two effects: first– and second–order
effects. The first-order effect refers to the direct violence generated by the drug war
between the government and drug dealers. When the government spends on military
activities to control the production of narcotics, there are eventually victims that
results from that expenditure. Drug enforcement might also have an impact on the
feeling of security of the inhabitants of the conflictive areas, forcing them to move to
safer regions where they are not affected by these activities.
However, this is not the only effect of enforcement. As narcotics are supplied by
decentralized markets, drug dealers have the monetary and the military power to
fight back the government’s drug enforcement activities and other drug gangs, with
which a pacific resolution of conflicts seems to be simply impossible. Our results
also indicate that Colombian violence derives from factors other than the country’s
drug war. Colombian drug dealers also generate violence not associated to cocaine
production. This happens when drug dealers gain sufficient military power to control
a territory, which generates spill over effects over other activities on which violence is
also used. This is true, for instance, when irregular groups use the profits of narcotics
to fight territorial control in regions with other natural resources such as gold or
petroleum. This also occurs when these groups use their military power to position
themselves as the ultimate regulators of their regions of influence.
Finally, I construct in chapter 3 a crime model in which there is a sub-set of
the population who are attracted to drugs, and have a minimum drug consumption
requirement. The numerical results of this chapter indicate that when the government
does not face a budget constraint, the best strategy is to spend only on capturing
thieves and not on seizing drugs. The reason is that drug control policies increase the
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equilibrium drug prices, which increases the addicts’ incentives to engage in property
crime. By spending nothing on controlling drugs, the government keeps the economic
incentives of addicts to engage in criminal activities at its minimum levels. This
occurs because the government is not able to induce an equilibrium drug price that
makes drug addicts become more risk-neutral with changes in pd .
In contrast, when the government faces a budget constraint, and there is a minimum expenditure requirement, the best strategy for the government is to control a
positive percentage of drugs in the market. The reason is that the government is able
to supplement its budget with the income obtained from captured addicts engaged
in crime. When the government has sufficient funds to control the optimal percentage of thieves in equilibrium, the best strategy of the government is to subsidize the
consumption of drugs. This occurs because income improvements increase the equilibrium price of drugs, but it does not occur to a point in which individuals become
risk-neutral so that the economic incentives of enforcement have a larger influence on
individual’s criminal decisions. At the equilibrium values encountered for pd , people
are incentivized to commit crime. Hence, it is optimal for the government to reduce
those incentives through increasing the availability of drugs in the market.
This dissertation contributes to the economic literature in at least three aspects.
First, it constructs a model with which the relationship between durable goods and
crime can be formally analyzed. This model can be extended in a diversity of ways.
For example, it can incorporate more complicated relationships between different
vintages of a durable good and the incentives that individuals have to steal those
vintages. It can also be extended to analyze the optimal response of a durable good’s
producer who produces a good that is targeted by thieves.
Second, this dissertation constructs a model with which the criminal incentives
of addicts are studied. This model shows that when the economy is inhabited by
individuals with lexicographic preferences with respect to the single composite drug
commodity in the economy, drug control policies operate in an environment of risklover individuals who can be induced to crime by their addiction. This model can be
extended to incorporate the dynamic decisions of the same addict in order to study
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the optimal dynamic response of the government to control narcotics when these
individuals make different criminal decisions throughout their lifetime. It can also be
extended to incorporate the optimal response of drug dealers with respect to the level
of addiction in the economy. This analysis might provide with the conditions under
which drug dealers find profitable to either increase or reduce the addiction levels of
the narcotics they produce. It can also be extended to incorporate the response of
the same drug dealers with respect to the diversification of narcotics in the economy.
Finally, this dissertation introduces a set of valid exogenous sources of variation to
test whether drug enforcement increases violence or not. This analysis allows to test
whether a policy targeted to reduce an externality might create another one. This
methodology can be adjusted to study other phenomena that depend on the altitude
per municipality, and the distance from capital cities as explanatory variables.
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APPENDIX
A.1

Appendix: Property Crime and Durable Goods

(a) Extensive Form Representation of
Criminals’ Decisions

(b) Extensive Form Representation of
Non-Criminals’ Decisions

Figure A.1: Extensive Form Representation of the Game

Hernán Botero Degiovanni

Appendix

131

Figure A.2: Non-criminal i’s demand for a New Durable Good at the Third Round
of Decisions

Figure A.3: Possible Sub-Perfect Nash Equilibria organized along the domain of α
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Figure A.4: Aggregate Supply of Stolen Durable Goods

Figure A.5: Aggregate Supply of Stolen Durable Goods

Figure A.6: Possible Social Configurations of the Economy
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Figure A.7: Relationship between π2 and π1 faced by the government for a given
value of λrnc = nc
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(b) Equilibrium p0 for p = 0.10 and p = 0.12

p = 0.12

(d) Percentage of criminals who sells the
(c) Percentage of criminals who keeps the

stolen property

stolen property

Figure A.8: Equilibrium Values of λrnc and p0 for different values of π1 and π2
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Appendix: Optimal Drug Supply Control
Graphs

Figure A.9: The Extensive-Form Representation of the Game

Figure A.10: Population Distribution Organized by Income (wi ) and Drug Preferences
(i )
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Figure A.11: Multiple Equilibria of Percentage of Thieves (NT )

Figure A.12: Multiple Equilibria of Percentage of Thieves (NT )
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Figure A.13: Optimal Aggregate Drug Demand given {pd , NT }

Figure A.14: Aggregate Total Percentage of Thieves
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(a) Equilibrium Percentage of Heav-

(b)

ily Addicted Thieves

Lightly Addicted Thieves

(c)

Equilibrium

Percentage

Equilibrium

Percentage
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of

of

Thieves with Zero Addiction

Figure A.15: Splitting The Total Percentage of Thieves into Addiction Groups

Figure A.16: Aggregate Total Percentage of Thieves for Different Values of {f, t}
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Figure A.17: Equilibrium Prices for Different Values of {f, t}

Figure A.18: Government’s Budget Optimal Constraints for Different Values of {f, t}
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Figure A.19: Government’s Budget Optimal Constraints for Different Values of {f, t}

Figure A.20: Eq. Values for the Control Variables of the Government ({πc , πT , f, τ })
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Figure A.21: Eq. Values for the Control Variables of the Government ({πc , πT , f, τ })

Figure A.22: Eq. Values for the Control Variables of the Government ({πc , πT , f, τ })

A.2.2

Equations

Equations of Section 3.3.3
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(1 − i )

A0 (pd ; i ) =

1
1−θ

θ
1−θ

pd

1
1−θ

+ i
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i( 1−θ
)
θ

pd

(A.1)

1

θ
A1 (pd ; i ) = i
pd

(A.2)
1+θ

A2 (i ) = a i θ

e
U1,i
e
U2,i

=



Ii1 − pd a i

h

A0 (pd ; i ) + p(wi ≤

Ii2 − pd a i

h

A0 (pd ; i ) + p(wi ≤

Ii0 − pd a i

h

A0 (pd ; i ) + p(wi ≤
A0 (pd ; i ) + p(wi ≤
A0 (pd ; i ) + p(wi ≤

=



=



e
U4,i

=



Ii0 − pd a i

h

e
U5,i

=



Ii3 − pd a i

h

e
U3,i

−A2 (i )p(wi <
e
U6,i

B0

=

B1

=

B2

=

=



Ii1 − pd a i

h

(A.3)

i
pd a i
)(A1 (pd ; i ) − A0 (pd ; i ))
(1 − τ )(1 − f )
i
pd a i − ηw
)(A1 (pd ; i ) − A0 (pd ; i ))
(1 − τ )
i
pd a i
)(A1 (pd ; i ) − A0 (pd ; i ))
(1 − τ )
i
pd a i
)(A1 (pd ; i ) − A0 (pd ; i ))
(1 − τ )
i
ηw
pd a i + ηw
)(A1 (pd ; i ) − A0 (pd ; i )) p(wi ≥
)
(1 − τ )
(1 − τ )

(A.6)

i
pd a i
)(A1 (pd ; i ) − A0 (pd ; i ))
(1 − τ )

(A.9)

(A.4)
(A.5)

(A.7)
(A.8)

ηw
)
(1 − τ )

A0 (pd ; i ) + p(wi ≤

i
ηw
) − (1 − λgr )πT f +
(A.10)
(1 − τ )
n
pd a i
pd a i − ηw
(A1 (pd ; i ) − A0 (pd ; i )) (1 − λgr )πT (1 − f )p(wi ≤
) + (1 − λgr )(1 − πT )p(wi ≤
)
(1 − τ )(1 − f )
(1 − τ )

pd a i
ηw
pd a i + ηw o
) − λgr (1 − πT )p(wi >
)p(wi ≤
)
− 1 − λgr (2 − πT ) p(wi ≤
(1 − τ )
(1 − τ )
(1 − τ )
n
ηw
pd a i
A0 (pd ; i )λgr (1 − πT )p(wi ≤
) + (A1 (pd ; i ) − A0 (pd ; i )) (1 − λgr )πT p(wi ≤
) (A.11)
(1 − τ )
(1 − τ )(1 − f )

pd a i − ηw
pd a i
+(1 − λgr )(1 − πT )p(wi ≤
) − 1 − λgr (2 − πT ) p(wi
)−
(1 − τ )
(1 − τ )
ηw
pd a i + ηw o
λgr (1 − πT )p(wi >
)p(wi ≤
)
(1 − τ )
(1 − τ )
"
n

ηw
pd a i − ηw
ηw(1 − πT ) A0 (pd ; i ) 1 − λgr p(wi ≤
) + (A1 (pd ; i ) − A0 (pd ; i )) (1 − λgr )p(wi ≤
(A.12)
)
(1 − τ )
(1 − τ )
#
o
pd a i + ηw
ηw
ηw
+λgr p(wi ≤
)p(wi >
)
+ λgr (1 − πT )A2 (i )p(wi ≤
)
(1 − τ )
(1 − τ )
(1 − τ )

h
A0 (pd ; i ) λgr (1 − πT )p(wi ≤
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Exogenous Parameter Values for the Numerical Exercise
Addiction Parameters





ni =0

ni =

ni =

a

Values

0.25

0.75

0.70

0.20

0.10

3

Income Parameters

α1,w

α2,w

wmax

η

w

Values

1.4

4

25

0.02

7.3641

Mixed Parameters

As

σs

θ

ac

aT

αT

Values

3

0.8

0.55

1

2

0.5

Table A.1: Parameter Values for the Numerical Exercise

A.3

Appendix: The Effects of Drug Enforcement
on Violence in Colombia 1999–2010

A.3.1

The model

The problem
Let us use the following simple model which is based on the paper written by
Mejia, 2008. Let us assume that there are N municipalities in a country. This country is assumed to have a central government authority that determines the set of
rules that each of the N municipalities must follow1 . There are Ng groups who, have
already decided to produce cocaine2 and are willing to engage in an anti-predatory
game (or anti-prohibition activities) against the government, if it decides to engage
in a predatory game (prohibition activities) against these groups. Each of the Ng are
also willing to fight their share in the drug market violently given the contractual
environment in which they have to operate. The government is assumed to have decided to prosecute the production of cocaine, and it’s willing to engage in a predatory
1

Colombia is a presidential regime with a single legislature making policy decisions for the entire
country.
2
These Ng might be purely drug dealers, who produce drugs to simply gain a revenue, or irregular
groups who decide to seek a quick revenue in the production of drugs to supplement their other
sources to accomplish their political objectives. What matters in the sequel is that both drug dealers
and irregular groups spend military resources to produce cocaine, regardless of their objective at
wanting to produce narcotics.
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game to enforce such decision3
In this scenario, if group i decides to produce cocaine in municipality j, it has
ir
to spend Mjr dollars on military activities against the government and Mi,j
dollars

on military actions against the other rival groups in order to seize territory in the
following way:

Li,j = (1 − ρgj )ρir
i,j Lj

(A.13)

where Lj is the amount of territory in municipality j,
ρgj

Mjg
= g
Mj + φj Mjr

(A.14)

is the proportion of land gained by the government when it spends Mjg dollars on
military actions in municipality j against all groups who are willing to spend resources
on military actions on the same municipality, and

ρir
i,j =

ir
Mi,j
+

ir
Mi,j
PNg

k6=i=1

ir
Mk,j

(A.15)

ir
is the proportion of land gained by group i when it spends Mi,j
dollars on military

actions in municipality j against all groups that are seeking to produce on the same
municipality. Equations A.14 and A.15 are called Contest Success Functions, which
are functions widely used in the economic analysis of conflict (see Skaperdas, 1996).
Equation A.14 assumes that

dMjg
dMjr

Mr

= φj Mjg . As a result, a larger φj implies a
j

larger military efficiency of group i’s military expenditure on municipality j relative
to the government’s. In contrast, equation A.15 assumes that each group has the same
military efficiency than the rest in all municipalities of the country. This simplification
is assumed because a priori each regular group can settle down in every municipality,
3

For the sake of our argument, it does not matter whether the government reached this decision
following the median voter preference or the lobby of a single group within the country. What
matters is the government’s willingness to use the army to prosecute the production of cocaine, and
the amount of money it is likely to invest in this activity. Hence, we also assume that the economy
has already solved the social problem of cocaine prohibition, and that there are people who find
profitable to join cocaine “firms”, even if it is illegal, and follow the rules they impose to solve their
internal social problem for coordinating the production of cocaine.
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whereas the colombian government uses military bases to position its military forces
to attack. Not all municipalities have military bases. See Dube and Naidu, 2012
for an analysis on the way colombian government performs its military operations,
the location of its military bases and the possible consequences of these military
operations on violence.
Using equations A.13–A.15, group i’s maximization problem is:

max

ir
Ii,j ,Mjr Mi,j

ir
πi (Ii,j , Mjr , Mi,j
)

Np
X
α 1−α
ir
=
[pd θj Ii,j
Li,j − Ii,j − Mjr − Mi,j
]

(A.16)

j=1

where Ii,j is the amount of resources invested by group i in inputs for the production
of cocaine in municipality j, pd is the international price of cocaine, and Np is the
number of municipalities in which all cocaine producers have decided to invest military
resources to produce cocaine 4 .
The solution
Equation A.16 can be solved in several ways. By its consistency characteristics, we
will find the sub-perfect nash equilibrium of this problem. For an analysis of the characteristics of a sub-perfect nash equilibrium solution, see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991.
To attain that, we will first determine the optimal value of Ii,j and then determine the
ir
for every group i and for every municivalues of Mjr to finally find the values of Mi,j

pality j, in which cocaine producers decide to produce. Thus, we want to determine
the optimal amount of resources in inputs that every group is willing to invest in the
production of cocaine after having already (optimally) invested in war.
Taking first order conditions with respect to Ii,j in equation A.16, we get the
following condition:
4

For simplicity, we assume that if a group i decides to invest military resources in municipality
j, all (Ng -1) remaining groups will also invest military resources in the same municipality. An
alternative derivation would consider the case in which a subset of the Ng invest in municipality j;
however, for our purposes, it is innocuous to assume that all groups behave similarly in terms of
investing in the same municipality j or not.
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1

1

Ii,j = (pd θj α) 1−α Li,j = (pd θj α) 1−α (1 − ρgj )ρir
i,j Lj

(A.17)

Inserting equation A.17 in equation A.16, we obtain the following expression:

ir
πi (Mjr , Mi,j
)

=

Np
X

1

ir
]
[(pd θj ) 1−α σLi,j − Mjr − Mi,j

(A.18)

j=1
α

1

where σ = (α 1−α − α 1−α ). Using equation A.18, we can determine the optimal
ir
ir
, we
. Taking first order conditions to equation A.18 with respect to Mi,j
value of Mi,j

get the following expression:

ir
Mi,j

v
u
Ng
Ng
X
X
u
1
g
ir
ir
t
= (pd θj ) 1−α σ(1 − ρj )Lj
Mk,j −
Mk,j
k6=i=1

(A.19)

k6=i=1

Equation A.19 applies for every group i who decides to produce cocaine in municir
for
ipality j. As a result, equation A.19 can be solved for a symmetric value of Mi,j
ir
ir
ir
which Mk,j
= Mi,j
= Mjir for all groups k 6= i = 1, 2, · · · , Ng . Then, Mi,j
becomes:
1

Mjir

(Ng − 1)(pd θj ) 1−α σ(1 − ρgj )Lj
=
(Ng )2

(A.20)

Inserting equation A.20 in equations A.13 and A.18, we obtain the following expression for the optimal revenue of group i:
1

πi (Mjr )

Np
X
(pd θj ) 1−α σ(1 − ρgj )Lj
=
[
− Mjr ]
2
Ng
j=1

(A.21)

Finally, from equation A.21 we can obtain the optimal value for Mjr . Deriving this
expression with respect to Mjr , we get:

Mjr =

q
1
(pd θj ) 1−α σLj φj Mjg
φj Ng

−

Mjg
φj

(A.22)

I can use equation A.22 to obtain the following expression for Mjir in terms of Mjg :

Mjir

(Ng − 1)(pd θj )
=
(Ng )2

1
1−α

σLj

(Ng − 1)
−
Ng

s

1

(pd θj ) 1−α σLj Mjg
φj

(A.23)
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Digression
If the most worrisome consequence in the war against drugs is violence generated by
the government’s and drug producers’ drug military expenditure, the model presented
in section A.3.1 provides one insightful result. If we had perfect information about
military expenditures made by all parties on municipality j to produce or avoid the
production of narcotics and the violence rate in the same municipality associated to
the drug war, we could split municipality j’s violence rate in the following way:

vj = β1 Mjg + β2 Mjr + β3 Mjir + rest

(A.24)

where β1 Mjg represents the violence rate explained by the government’s drug enforcement military expenditure. β2 Mjr represents the violence rate explained by drug
dealers’ anti-enforcement military expenditure. β1 Mjg + β2 Mjr is what we called the
first-order effect of enforcement in the introduction. Finally, β3 Mjir represents the
violence rate due to the drug dealers’ war when they fight over the control of the
territory to produce drugs. This is the second–order effect of enforcement.
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Figure A.23: Map of Colombia: Administrative Division
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(a) Rural Property Size Average

(b) 2005 GDP by Departamento

Figure A.24: Rationale behind using the distance variables
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(a) Logarithm of Homicide Rate

(b) Logarithm of Displacement Rate

(c) Index of Cocaine Eradication

(d) Anti-Eradication Index
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Figure A.25: Endogenous Variables VS Eradication and Anti-Eradication Indices
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(a) Logarithm of Homicide Rate
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(b) Logarithm of Displacement Rate

(c) Dealers War Index
(d) Altitude

Figure A.26: Endogenous Variables VS Dealers War Index and Altitude
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(b) Instrumentalized IAE

(c) Instrumentalized IDW

Figure A.27: Instrumentalized Drug War Indices
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2.83

1.71

0

1.94

3.27

4.11

7.20

0.37

0

1

mean

std

min

prctile. 25%

prctile 50%

prctile 75%

max

Moran Coef.

p-value

loghrate

IˆAE
IˆDW

altitude
IˆE

logpop

dcapitals

dbogota

IDW

IAE

IE

logdrate

loghrate

Variables

1

0.33

0

0.55

11.36

6.63

5.30

3.32

0

2.74

4.68

logdrate

1

0.37

0.24

0

0.43

1

0.81

0.069

0.019

0

0.16

0.069

IE

0

0.73

1

0.98

0.96

0.89

0

0.06

0.94

dbogota

1

0.38

0.67

0.40

0.23

1

-0.05

-0.03

-0.10

-0.12

0.11

1

0.85

-0.05

-0.002

-0.10

-0.07

0.15

0

0.87

1

0.96

0.94

0.86

0

0.11

0.89

dcapitals

Correlation Coefficients

0

0.43

1

0.71

0.074

0.01

0

0.15

0.072

IDW

Table A.2: Summary Statistics

1

0.30

0.23

0.23

0

0.20

1

1

0.083

0

0

0.27

0.09

IAE

1

0.15

0.07

0.19

0.31

0.19

0.22

0.33

0

0.33

15.81

10.15

9.48

8.88

4.81

1.10

9.56

logpop

1

-0.18

0.24

0.31

-0.21

-0.08

-0.19

-0.39

-0.07

0

0.82

3300

1850

1103.5

180

2

917.37

1142.03

altitude

0.085

1

1

0.125

-0.14

-0.672

-0.64

-0.035

-0.05

-0.066

0.06

0.11

1

0.1

0.66

0.33

0.14

0.26

0.66

IˆAE

0.198

0.01

-0.004

0.017

0.597

0.222

0.851

0.375

0.2033

0.92

0.23

0.153

0.11

0.02

0.17

0.20

IˆE

1

-0.059

0.068

-0.191

0.09

0.411

-0.02

0.061

-0.07

0.08

0.041

-0.04

1

0.78

0.66

0.56

0.21

0.16

0.66

IˆDW
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1
2

loghrate
RISARALDA
VALLE

DEL

CAUCA
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logdrate

IE

IAE
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IDW

altitude

CAQUETA

GUAVIARE

ARAUCA

GUAVIARE

BOYACÁ

GUAVIARE

PUTUMAYO

PUTUMAYO

CAQUETA

NARIÑO

3

ARAUCA

ARAUCA

CAQUETA

CAQUETA

ARAUCA

C/MARCA*

4

CAQUETA

PUTUMAYO

ARAUCA

CAUCA

PUTUMAYO

CALDAS

5

CALDAS

META

VICHADA

META

META

QUINDÍO

6

GUAVIARE

CESAR

META

GUAVIARE

VAUPES

RISARALDA

7

QUINDÍO

CHOCÓ

NARIÑO

RISARALDA

VICHADA

CAUCA

BOLIVAR

SANTANDER

8

NORTE

META

BOLIVAR

HUILA

MAGDALENA

CASANARE

ANTIOQUIA

ANTIOQUIA

LA GUAJIRA BOLIVAR

PUTUMAYO

CASANARE

AMAZONAS

13

TOLIMA

SUCRE

CHOCÓ

ANTIOQUIA

14

CESAR

CAUCA

CESAR

LA GUAJIRA AMAZONAS

15

LA GUAJIRA HUILA

9
10
11
12

16

NORTE

DE

SANTANDER
17
18
19
20
21

CAUCA

CAUCA

DE

VICHADA
NORTE

DE

SANTANDER

SANTANDER

NORTE

DE

SANTANDER
ANTIOQUIA

CASANARE

NORTE

DE

SANTANDER

NORTE

HUILA

CAUCA

NARIÑO

ANTIOQUIA

VALLE

DEL

CAUCA

ANTIOQUIA

SANTANDER
VALLE

GUAINA

HUILA

NARIÑO

TOLIMA
PUTUMAYO

LA GUAJIRA TOLIMA

CHOCÓ

CORDOBA

CESAR

LA GUAJIRA META

CALDAS

QUINDÍO

CESAR

CAQUETA

CALDAS

CORDOBA

CESAR

VALLE

DEL

CASANARE

CORDOBA

C/MARCA*

RISARALDA

SANTANDER CHOCÓ

CORDOBA

CALDAS

CASANARE

SUCRE

CALDAS

TOLIMA

VAUPES

SANTANDER VAUPES

SUCRE

DEL

CAUCA

DEL

CAUCA

NARIÑO

VALLE

DE

CAUCA

VALLE

DEL

CAUCA

GUAVIARE
ARAUCA

22

ATLÁNTICO NARIÑO

MAGDALENA MAGDALENA CASANARE

23

SANTANDER TOLIMA

GUAINÍA

BOLIVAR

MAGDALENA AMAZONAS

24

MAGDALENA QUINDÍO

RISARALDA

VICHADA

HUILA

25

VICHADA

C/MARCA*

BOYACÁ

ATLÁNTICO TOLIMA

VICHADA

26

BOLIVAR

GUAINÍA

HUILA

C/MARCA*

MAGDALENA

27

CHOCÓ

ATLÁNTICO VAUPES

28

SAN ANDRÉS AMAZONAS

29

BOYACÁ

30

AMAZONAS

31
32

RISARALDA

CHOCÓ

LA GUAJIRA

SANTANDER SUCRE

GUAINÍA

GUAINÍA

C/MARCA*

SUCRE

SANTANDER QUINDÍO

BOYACÁ

QUINDÍO

CORDOBA

BOYACÁ

SUCRE

CORDOBA

BOYACÁ

BOLIVAR

VAUPES

VAUPES

ATLÁNTICO AMAZONAS

GUAINÍA

SAN ANDRÉS SAN ANDRÉS SAN ANDRÉS ATLÁNTICO SAN ANDRÉS

C/MARCA*

SAN ANDRÉS ATLÁNTICO

* CUNDINAMARCA

Table A.3: Ranking of Departamentos by Variable

Fixed Effects

SDM FE

Dependent Variable: loghrate
SDM FE
Time Effects

SDM FE
Fixed and Time Effects

1.14***

-21182.04
652.42***

0.34

0.34

-23870.63

3482.58***

3345.32***

193.37***

56.11***

N.A.

70.27***

286.00***

186.31***

Corrected R2

Log L

LM Spatial Lag

LM Spatial Error

Rob. LM Spatial Lag

Rob. LM Spatial Error

Wald Spatial Lag

LR Spatial Lag

Wald Spatial Error

LR Spatial Error
4.96***

F Effects

0.34

1.27***

0.95*** 1.37*** 2.32***

0.38*** 0.62*** 1.00***

0.91***

0.04

182.98***

184.59***

59.88***

59.86***

51.42***

179.66***

2968.76***

3096.99***

-23828.04

0.34

0.34

1.94

13464

0.46***

0.62***

0.34***

1.25***

0.44

1.71***

0.62***

-0.003

0.61**

0.38*** 0.68*** 1.05***

1.28***

Table A.4: Regressions without Controlling for Endogeneity

*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** Statistically significant at 5%; * Statistically significant at 10%

57.67***

Haussman Test

118.69***

108.09***

83.05***

75.79***

39.03***

101.58***

589.87***

0.50

0.54

1.46

13464

0.26***

0.90***

R2

0.77**

1.94

0.14

σ2

0.63***

0.35***

0.90***

13464

0.62***

IDW

-0.06

0.41*** 0.93*** 1.33***

1.20***

0.49***

0.35***

ρW y

1.20***

IAE

Obs.

-0.98***

IE

5.28***

71.62***

123.05***

112.83***

81.64***

75.50***

73.02***

132.19***

265.66***

324.83***

-20983.06

0.51

0.55

1.44

13464

0.19***

0.98***

0.31***

1.05***
0.21*

0.53***

1.03*** 1.74*** 2.77***

0.32***

1.09*** 1.38*** 2.47***

Estimates Direct Indirect Total Estimates Direct Indirect Total Estimates Direct Indirect Total Estimates Direct Indirect Total

No Fixed or Time Effects

Intercept

Variables

SDM FE
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SDM F E
Fixed Effects

SDM FE
Time Effects

SDM FE
Fixed and Time Effects

9054.52***

661.69***

Rob. LM Spatial Lag

Rob. LM Spatial Error 201.87***

0.49**

0.76***

0.98*** 4.86*** 5.84***

0.27***

0.55*** 2.30*** 2.84***

0.07

238.63***

202.27***

21.71***

21.21***

133.99***

632.91***

7451.19***

7950.10***

-27905.98

0.55

0.55

3.41

13464

0.62***

2.28***

0.24***

1.38***

0.32

1.72***

2.57*** 4.48*** 7.05***

0.34*** 1.50*** 1.84***

1.41***

Table A.5: Regressions without Controlling for Endogeneity

*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** Statistically significant at 5%; * Statistically significant at 10%

8.68***

F Effects

161.51***

149.28***

85.51***

79.19***

5145.10***

0.72

0.75

2.09

13464

0.55***

0.68***

40.74***

2.60*** 4.93*** 7.53***

Haussman Test

186.31***

9514.34***

LM Spatial Lag

LM Spatial Error

LR Spatial Error

-28019.55

Log L

206.71***

0.54

Corrected R2

Wald Spatial Error

0.55

R2

20.70***

67.18***

3.42

σ2

LR Spatial Lag

408.77***

13464

Obs.

N.A.

5486.69***

0.66***

Wald Spatial Lag

-23906.12

2.27***

0.23***

0.40***

ρW y

2.23***

IDW

0.78

0.30*** 1.30*** 1.60***

0.21***

IAE

1.45***

0.40*

1.40***

IE

9.63***

44.18***

74.49***

68.88***

47.93***

43.86***

47.92***

122.05***

1456.17***

1530.30***

-23326.37

0.73

0.76

2.00

13464

0.37

0.54***

0.30***

0.32**

0.66**

1.02***

0.64*** 2.06*** 2.69***

0.33*** 0.78*** 1.12***

0.35**

Estimates Direct Indirect Total Estimates Direct Indirect Total Estimates Direct Indirect Total Estimates Direct Indirect Total

No Fixed or Time Effects

Dependent Variable: logdrate

Intercept

Variables

SDM FE
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Direct

Indirect

Total
-1.50***

Estimates

-34131.02
1671.90***

153.32***
54.59***

0.21

0.21

-32767.22

2916.38***

2909.45***

8.31***

1.34

34.50***

87.04***

89.88***

R2

Corrected R2

Log L

LM Spatial Lag

LM Spatial Error

Rob. LM Spatial Lag

Rob. LM Spatial Error

LR Spatial Lag

Wald Spatial Error

LR Spatial Error

-39652.23
625.79***

362.15***
625.67***

-0.001***

-0.001***

0.67***

13464

13.32

0.50

0.50

-37207.15

8019.02***

7799.96***

275.98***

56.92***

184.64***

336.03***

344.02***

Alt

Obs.

σ2

R2

Corrected R2

Log L

LM Spatial Lag

LM Spatial Error

Rob. LM Spatial Lag

Rob. LM Spatial Error

LR Spatial Lag

Wald Spatial Error

LR Spatial Error

-0.002***

0.0002

874.97***

863.29***

595.99***

391.96***

0.22

0.22

20.69

13464

0.36***

0.0001

0.04

0.48***

Direct

0.20*

-3.21***

Total

0.11***

0.02**

0.29***

Estimates

0.11***

0.02**

Direct

-0.27***

-0.01

Indirect

-0.16***

0.01*

Total

Table A.6: Regressions Controlling for Endogeneity: first-step regressions

937.19***

978.73***

896.74***

104.47***

70.59***

336.71***

302.83***

-7137.44

0.11

0.11

0.17

13464

0.23***

-0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.000004 -0.0000006 -0.000051*** -0.00006***

0.16

-3.69***

Indirect

No Fixed or Time Effects

SDM

Dependent Variable: massacres

Appendix

*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** Statistically significant at 5%; * Statistically significant at 10%

-0.001***

0.03

ρW y

-0.50***

-2.54***

0.66***

-0.55***

-2.48***

0.05

-0.06

0.08

Estimates

0.10

Total

govconthat

Indirect

Irreconthat

Direct

No Fixed or Time Effects
2.55***

Estimates

No Fixed or Time Effects

7.39***
-3.69***

SDM

3.71**

Total
-0.0002***

Dependent Variable: mines

-0.23

Intercept

0.00003
11.48***

SDM

-7.39***

-4.09**

Indirect

Dependent Variable: logcrops

91.65***

88.80***

95.08***

1730.14***

0.13

0.13

9.01

13464

7.21

0.43***

-7.64***

σ2

-1.77*

-4.69***

13464

-0.65

3.25*

0.53***

-1.11

3.48

ρW y

-1.03

dcapitals

-0.23

Obs.

-0.50

Variables

Direct

-0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.00042*** -0.00041***

0.70***

Estimates

No Fixed or Time Effects

SDM

No Fixed or Time Effects

SDM

dbogota

Alt

Intercept

Variables

Dependent Variable: irrecont

Dependent Variable: govcont
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-21322.64
729.49***
2786.14***
65.89***

1.96

0.33

0.33

-23930.63

3096.11***

2757.92***

339.15***

0.96

N.A.

109.54***

188.37***

199.97***

R2

Corrected R2

Log L

LM Spatial Lag

LM Spatial Error

Rob. LM Spatial Lag

Rob. LM Spatial Error

Wald Spatial Lag

LR Spatial Lag

Wald Spatial Error

LR Spatial Error
4.80***

F Effects

0.74

0.53**

0.35***
3.63**

0.07

0.40**
4.37***

0.60

0.75***

SDM FE
Time Effects

0.06

223.97***

223.22***

114.75***

115.31***

0.11

353.25***

698.66***

2699.83***

-23871.02

0.33

0.33

1.95

13464

0.46***

0.40*

0.17

0.94***
0.50**

0.11

1.71***

1.79***

2.29***

-1.19*** -1.08***

0.99 *** 0.73***

Total

SDM FE

5.09***

91.96***

81.98***

74.71***

72.51***

66.17***

16.00***

35.54***

2346.68***

404.46***

-21142.68

0.50

0.54

1.47

13464

0.23***

0.58

0.46**

0.47***
0.70

0.45*

3.31**

-0.30

4.00***

0.14

0.51*** 1.32*** 1.84***

Estimates Direct Indirect Total

Fixed and Time Effects

Table A.7: Regressions Controlling for Endogeneity: second-step regressions

*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** Statistically significant at 5%; * Statistically significant at 10%

102.75***

Haussman Test

74.53***

69.88***

75.02***

69.62***

35.06***

0.49

0.53

1.49

13464

0.29***

0.61

σ2

2.38***

0.51**

0.34***

13464

1.84***

SDM FE
Fixed Effects
Estimates Direct Indirect Total Estimates Direct Indirect

0.48***

0.53**

0.43**

-1.15*** -1.04***

1.36***

Total

ρW y

0.11

0.94*** 0.42***

0.17

0.92***

-1.03***

Estimates Direct Indirect

No Fixed or Time Effects

Dependent Variable: loghrate

Obs.

ˆ
IAE
ˆ
IDW

Intercept
Iˆ
E

Variables

SDM FE
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SDM FE
Fixed Effects

SDM FE
Time Effects

SDM FE
Fixed and Time Effects

-23938.97
5240.21***

0.66***

13464

3.47

0.54

0.54

-28111.11

9361.42***

8459.49***

934.70***

32.76***

N.A.

78.91***

338.01***

328.95***

Obs.

σ2

R2

Corrected R2

Log L

LM Spatial Lag

LM Spatial Error

Rob. LM Spatial Lag

Rob. LM Spatial Error

Wald Spatial Lag

LR Spatial Lag

Wald Spatial Error

LR Spatial Error
8.91***

F Effects

0.19

0.09
-5.03*

-4.84

3.02*** 3.10***

0.33*** 2.04*** 2.38***

0.08

373.81***

263.37***

87.81***

85.05***

5.99**

951.81***

6733.06***

7678.88***

-27970.03

0.54

0.54

3.45

13464

0.61***

0.87***

0.04

1.73***
1.20***

0.10
4.98

6.17***

0.89*** 0.98***

1.97*** 3.70*** 5.67***

0.15

9.75***

69.72***

19.26***

18.31***

19.18***

18.05**

59.29***

141.05***

1416.11***

1497.87***

-23386.91

0.73

0.76

2.01

13464

0.38***

0.87

-0.36

Table A.8: Regressions Controlling for Endogeneity: second-step regressions

*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** Statistically significant at 5%; * Statistically significant at 10%

119.38***

Haussman Test

103.13***

69.94***

59.71***

46.82***

17.81***

231.58***

5026.45***

0.72

0.74

2.09

13464

0.56***

0.46

-0.09

0.21**

ρW y

1.10*** 1.22***

1.15*** 1.10*** 1.22***

0.12

1.96*** 3.85*** 5.82***

0.83***

0.04

1.70***

-7.65***

0.79

-0.33

0.18*
-0.63

0.58

0.16

0.25

0.81*** 0.99***

Estimates Direct Indirect Total Estimates Direct Indirect Total Estimates Direct Indirect Total Estimates Direct Indirect Total

No Fixed or Time Effects

Dependent Variable: logdrate

ˆ
IAE
ˆ
IDW

Intercept
Iˆ
E

Variables

SDM FE
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Drogas en Colombia. Libro Blanco de Drogas, Universidad de los Andes.

REFERENCES

166

Merlo, A. (2003). Income Distribution, Police Expenditures, and Crime: A Political
Economy Perspective. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2-3):450–
458.
Mirron, J. A. (2001). Violence, Guns and Drugs: A Cross-Country Analysis. Journal
of Law and Economics, 44(S2):615–633.
Musto, D. F. (1991). Opium, Cocaine, and Marijuana in American History. Scientific
American, pages 40–47.
Pelletiere, D. and Reinart, K. A. (2002). The Political Economy of Used Automobile
Protection in Latin America. The World Economy, 25(7):1019–1037.
Polinsky, A. M. and Shavell, S. (1979). The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines. The American Economic Review, 69(5):880–891.
Polinsky, A. M. and Shavell, S. (1984). The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment.
Journal of Public Economics, 24:89–100.
Polinsky, M. and Shavell, S. (1991). A Note On Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies
Among Individuals. American Economic Review, 81(3):618–621.
Polinsky, M. and Shavell, S. (2007). Handbook of Law and Economics, volume 1-2.
Elsevier.
Porter, R. H. and Sattler, P. (1999). Patterns of Trade in the Market for Used
Durables: Theory and Evidence. NBER Working Papers 7149.
Pyle, D. (1983). The Economics of Crime and Law Enforcement. MacMillan.
Rattner, A. and Portnov, B. (2007). Distance Decay Function in Criminal Behavior:
A Case of Israel. Annals of Regional Science, 41:673688.
Restrepo, J. A. and Aguirre, K. (2007). Homicidios y Muertes Violentas: Un Análisis
Comparativo de las Fuentes en Colombia. Forensis, Datos Para la Vida, pages 323–
332.
Ritter, A. and Chalmers, J. (2011). The Relationship Between Economic Conditions
and Substance Use and Harm. Drug Alcohol Review, 30(1):1–3.
Shavell, S. (1987a). A Model of Optimal Incapacitation. American Economic Review,
77(2):107–110.
Shavell, S. (1987b). The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent.
American Economic Review, 77(4):584–592.
Shavell, S. (2004). Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law. Harvard University
Press.
Skaperdas, S. (1996). Contest Success Functions. Economic Theory, 7(2):283–290.

REFERENCES

167

Stokey, N. and Lucas, R. (1989). Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics. Harvard
University Press.
Sutton, M., Hodgkinson, S., and Levi, M. (2008). Handling Stolen Goods: Findings
from the 2003 Offending Crime and Justice Survey.
Swan, P. (1970). Durability of Consumer Goods. American Economic Review,
60:884894.
Thoumi, F. E. (2002). Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom
to Social Crisis. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
582:102–116.
UNITED NATIONS (2012). International Statistics on Crime and Justice. Available
at http://www.heuni.fi/Oikeapalsta/Search/$1266333832841$.
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (2012a). Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilı́citos-Colombia. Available at http://www.unodc.
org/colombia/es/simci/simci.html.
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (2012b). Worldwide
Drug Use Data Bases Collected by UN. Available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/data-and-analysis/statistics/drug-use.html.
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (2013). UNODC and Illicit
Crop Monitoring. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop-monitoring/index.html.
Vice-Presidencia de Colombia (2012). Word Drug Reports. Available at http://www.
derechoshumanos.gov.co/Observatorio/Paginas/NotaMetodologica.aspx.
Wilde, L. (1992). Criminal Choice, Nonmonetary Sanctions and Marginal Deterrence: A Normative Analysis. International Review of Law and Economics,
12(3):333–344.

